Showing posts with label FIDEL CASTRO. Show all posts
Showing posts with label FIDEL CASTRO. Show all posts

Wednesday, July 8, 2020

RSN: FOCUS: The Corporate Media Convinced Millions That Bernie Was "Unelectable"




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FOCUS: The Corporate Media Convinced Millions That Bernie Was "Unelectable"
Bernie Sanders, left, and Joe Biden chat before a Democratic presidential debate in Charleston, S.C. (photo: AP)
Branko Marcetic, Jacobin
Marcetic writes: "There is overwhelming evidence a surge of mostly older, Trump-fearing voters decided the Democratic primary - and that Bernie Sanders failed to counter an establishment messaging campaign that Trump would beat him in a general election." VVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVVV


hy did Joe Biden win the Democratic primary and Bernie Sanders lose it?
Everyone has a theory: Sanders went too far left, or too far woke; he couldn’t expand his base, particularly into the black electorate; his surprise 2016 showing mostly owed to anti-Clintonism, and his insurgent campaign turned off loyal Democrats; meanwhile, Biden was an electoral powerhouse able to excite voters with his “moderate” agenda and historic ties to the party.
Accepting all this has meant crashing headlong into a series of inconvenient facts. Sanders’s leftward stances on issues like immigration supposedly lost him rural counties, but he had the best standing with rural voters, out of all Democrats. He supposedly alienated rank-and-file Democrats with his rhetoric, yet held sky-high favorability ratings among them throughout 2020. He failed to expand his base, but won nearly every demographic in Nevada, even moderates and conservatives, and led nationally among black voters on the eve of South Carolina.
Then there’s the downright inexplicable. How did Sanders lose when surveys and exit poll after poll showed the public, and especially Democrats, overwhelmingly supported his policies, even in states he lost badly? How was he so decisively beaten despite being the first in either party to ever win the popular vote in the opening three contests, given that every Democrat since 1976 who’s won the first two alone has clinched the nomination? And when no nominee since 1972 has placed below second in either, how did Biden pull off a historic rout after coming a lowly fourth and fifth? More strangely, how did he do it when he neither visited nor even had a campaign operation in many of the states he ended up winning?
Answering these questions means understanding the topsy-turvy world of the 2020 election, the continuing power of legacy media, and how primary elections can swing wildly based on delicate shifts in perception.
All About Trump
The 2020 primary was all about Donald Trump. From the contest’s beginning to its end, anywhere between 55–65 percent of Democratic voters prioritized picking a nominee who could beat Trump over one they agreed with on the issues, unsurprising for an incumbent election. This was favorable turf for Biden, who made defeating the president the crux of his campaign, to the extent that he once told audiences the first thing he’d do as president was “make sure that we defeat Donald Trump.”
Just as consistently, voters saw Biden as the candidate by far most likely to win against Trump. For the seven months to January 2020, he hovered around 40 percent on that question in a Washington Post–ABC News poll, while Sanders trailed a distant second in the teens.
“If there would be a horse leading right now for me, it would probably be Biden, because all the polls indicate he would beat Trump handily,” one fifty-seven-year-old voter told the New York Times.
“Basically whoever can beat Donald Trump, but I think Biden has the best chance,” another older voter said when asked who she was backing, pointing to head-to-head polling.
As Patrick Murray, the director of Monmouth University Polling Institute told the paper, voters in Iowa felt “they have to vote for Joe Biden as the centrist candidate, to keep somebody from the left who they feel is unelectable from getting the nomination.”
Besides a corporate and political establishment united against him, Sanders had to overcome something else: decades’ worth of conventional wisdom, internalized by mostly older Democratic voters, that only unexciting centrists can win elections, and running leftward is electoral suicide.
This sentiment wasn’t just in Iowa. On the eve of the New Hampshire primary, mostly older voters in the state’s rural parts told VTDigger the same message: they preferred Sanders, but were going to vote for Pete Buttigieg because his more centrist politics would appeal to non-Democrats.
“It’s more important to get Donald Trump out. Period,” one retired pilot told the paper, having decided against voting for Sanders after watching Trump survive impeachment. “It’s more important than my personal politics.”
In Pennsylvania, one 2016 Sanders voter now focused on beating Trump fretted that “the S-word” would sink him in rural Pennsylvania. Interviewing thirty suburban voters, the Philadelphia Inquirer found a “consistent dividing line”: those most concerned with winning went for Biden, while those who prioritized a particular issue went for Sanders. In the wealthy Virginia suburb of Ashburn, one progressive health and wellness consultant reported her mostly Republican clientele “hate Trump, but they won’t vote for Sanders,” leading her to go for Biden. “Whoever can beat Trump is what I care about,” she explained.
The corporate media, particularly cable news, was pivotal to this. As I found when I studied two months’ worth of MSNBC’s Democratic primary coverage in 2019, these themes were relentlessly advanced by the network: beating Trump was all that mattered, Biden was the safest bet to do so, and running Sanders — when the network deigned to mention him at all — would be a risk. This was on top of the way cable news, chasing ratings, had whipped up fear of Trump among its viewers, prompting a spike in anxiety among news consumers that psychologists began noting.
These narratives were reinforced by the invasion of liberal news sources by the tiny, unrepresentative group of “Never Trump” Republicans, who incessantly warned Sanders was an electoral liability. (“A sociopath will beat a socialist, I think, seven days a week and twice on Sunday,” said the man who brought us Sarah Palin). “I thought Never Trump Republicans wouldn’t vote for Sanders,” one older voter, a former professor, told the Times in March, switching to Biden despite her support for Sanders’s ideas.
The Three Days That Decided the Race
All of this had an impact. Unlike Republicans, Democratic voters have a high degree of trust in legacy media, CNN especially, and get much of their news from television — particularly so for voters over fifty. This is, incidentally, the same demographic that most consumes cable news, votes in disproportionately high numbers in primary elections, and increased its share of the vote in this year’s primaries.
Sanders’s greatest obstacle was arguably convincing this cohort of voters to abandon their long-held skepticism about the Left in electoral politics, and to defy the relentless media messaging that reinforced it. And for a brief moment, he did. After winning the vote in Iowa and New Hampshire, and after Biden failed to crack third in either, perceptions of Biden’s electability collapsed, and for the first time in the race, Sanders led the field in both electability and voting intention.
But rather than momentum, these developments prompted a barrage of attacks and apocalyptic warnings from Democratic officials and pundits about Sanders’s threat to Democrats’ chances in November. A group of party centrists spent millions blanketing South Carolina with ads making these charges. Party leaders and rival candidates openly vowed to deprive him of the nomination if he won the most votes.
When Sanders defended Fidel Castro’s literacy program on 60 Minutes it was seized upon by anti-Sanders officials in Florida for a round of withering attacks and warnings of how they would play in the state. A statistical analysis by In These Times found CNN covered Sanders three times as negatively after his blowout Nevada win as they did Biden after his romp through South Carolina, assailing Sanders’s electability above all.
Many factors led to Biden’s triumph in the Palmetto State, from its conservatism and Biden’s close association with the nation’s first black president to, most importantly, Rep. Jim Clyburn’s endorsement that Sanders, crucially, never tried to head off. But it’s difficult to argue this media narrative didn’t play a role in the old, white tidal wave that swept Biden to victory.
Data show that while the nonwhite vote in South Carolina rose 10 percent since 2016, the white vote spiked by 19 percent. And while the number of voters aged eighteen to forty-four rose by 42,028, turnout among those forty-five and older skyrocketed by nearly three times that (123,130), with most of the gains concentrated among those sixty-five and over. As he would in every state that followed, Biden dominated among this group, and among voters who prioritized beating Trump.
Biden’s electability and support rebounded overnight, buoyed by more than $100 million in free media, much of it positive. As In These Times found, while post-Nevada negative coverage of Sanders fearmongered about the senator’s electability, what negative coverage there was of Biden focused mostly on the challenges he faced to win the nomination, and was even encouraging (“Vice President Biden has to get a little more inspirational”). While CNN never interviewed Sanders after Nevada, instead inviting Biden on to ask him if his chief rival would be a “McGovern-like mistake for this party,” it did interview the former vice president after he dominated in South Carolina. The network didn’t give Sanders the same courtesy it had given Biden to comment on his rival’s win.
What happened next is well known: with no path forward in the more diverse states ahead, and at the urging of former president Barack Obama, Biden’s fellow centrists stepped down and endorsed him, adding to his momentum; Sanders neither sought nor received the same assist from his only ally, Elizabeth Warren, who vowed to win the nomination by overturning the judgment of the primary voters.
Not-So Super Tuesday
The race essentially ended on Super Tuesday. Biden swept to victory in various conservative Southern states on the back of older anti-Trump voters, many of whom settled on Biden at the last minute. Virginia, competitive on the eve of South Carolina, saw a record turnout that suddenly swung behind Biden, with two-thirds concerned about nominating someone “too liberal,” and some explicitly saying they were out to block Sanders.
“The idea of risking the nomination to somebody like Bernie Sanders, the concern would be that he wouldn’t have the broad appeal to defeat Donald Trump,” one voter said.
“[Trump] has been the single biggest driver to the Democratic Party of Virginia,” former governor and lobbyist Terry McAuliffe told the Times. “There are a lot of like-minded Republicans who said, ‘I can’t vote for Trump but you got to give me somebody who we can vote for.’ Biden was always at the top of that list.”
Meanwhile, in states that Sanders should’ve won, Warren’s presence took a further toll. Sanders’s losing margins in Maine, Massachusetts, and Texas (1, 7, and 4 points, respectively) were dwarfed by Warren’s totals (16, 21, and 11 percent). In delegate-rich California, in which Sanders had heavily invested but won by only 7 points, she received 13 percent. We can only speculate how exactly these numbers would have shifted had Warren followed Buttigieg and Klobuchar’s lead. But it’s clear it would have made a difference.
On the eve of South Carolina, a slim plurality (21 percent) of Buttigieg voters had Sanders as their second choice, with Biden and Warren splitting 19 percent. Yet when the dust had settled a few days later, it was clear Buttigieg’s largely older, white voter base had shifted mostly to Biden in the wake of the South Bend mayor dropping out and endorsing the former vice president. At that same point, a whopping 40 percent of Warren voters had picked Sanders as their second choice, with Biden and Buttigieg splitting a mere 16 percent. How might a Buttigieg-style exit from the race have not just arrested Biden’s sense of momentum, but impacted these numbers?
These kinds of decisions had vast reverberations in a race where many voters weren’t sure what to do until the moment they got in the voting booth. Late deciders, a significant fraction of Super Tuesday’s voters and more likely to be looking for a candidate to beat Trump, swung overwhelmingly for Biden. In Minnesota, Maine, and Massachusetts, all states in which Biden was given little chance to win on the eve of voting, 55, 47, and 51 percent of voters made up their minds in the last few days, lifting him to victory.
The Super Tuesday result, made worse by the slow count of California’s votes, fatally dented Sanders’s perceived electability among the key older demographic, and did the opposite for Biden. Such voters had allowed themselves to be persuaded by the septuagenarian socialist after his first three primary wins; Biden’s victories in South Carolina and Super Tuesday gave them permission to go back to where they had always been most comfortable. In every state thereafter, Biden held a near-monopoly on voters over fifty, mirrored by Sanders’s domination of those below that age threshold. But 2020 wasn’t the year of youth turnout surge.
The irony was, the fears driving many older liberals from Sanders were never well-founded. He annihilated his rivals in donor numbers from Obama-to-Trump counties, had historic electoral strength in such areas, and had the largest lead among independents in head-to-head polling with Trump among all his rivals. This trend continued in the primary. As the Wall Street Journal later noted, “where voters are older, moderate or closely aligned with the Democratic Party, rather than independents, Mr. Sanders doesn’t win”; but in states with “either unusually large shares of self-described ‘very liberal’ voters, or unusually large numbers of independents participating,” he did.
According to exit polls, Sanders won independents in eighteen of twenty-three contests between February 3 and March 17, including in twelve of the seventeen states he lost to Biden. By contrast, Biden won Democrats in seventeen of those contests. Even in California and Colorado, both open primaries (where one didn’t need to be a Democrat to vote) that he convincingly lost, his losing margins against Sanders among Democrat voters were slim: 33–30 and 25–23, respectively. Democratic voters tried to imagine what people who weren’t like them wanted; unwittingly, they actually did the opposite, mostly voting in line with how other Democrats voted, and rejecting the leaning of a majority of independent voters.
One could point to any number of the campaign’s strategic errors to explain its defeat, including a failure to aggressively prosecute Biden’s record. One could also point to the unquantifiable impact of voter suppression, regularly cited to cast doubt on Republican victories, but shrugged off by the media when it disadvantaged Sanders.
Perhaps the overarching mistake, though, was declining to adjust to the political climate of the Democratic Party in 2020, where cautious, fearful, and mostly older Democratic voters concerned primarily with simply beating Trump needed assurance that someone with Sanders’s politics was “electable.” Ironically, Sanders may have benefitted from flipping the conventional advice, and running a more centrist campaign for the primary to assuage these voters’ concerns, before moving left in the general, when they had nowhere else to go.
Instead, Sanders ran the same issue-focused campaign he had run in 2016. Absent the historic youth voter surge he promised, always a questionable prospect, and with the campaign declining to expand to a national level its innovative organizing approach aimed at turning out nonvoters in the early states, running this strategy could work as long as the field remained divided. Once the establishment got its act together, Biden, the sole corporate Democrat with any significant nonwhite support, ended up the only warm body who could serve as the vessel for panicked stop-Sanders Democrats, and voters were driven to him by a unified front of messaging from the media and party establishment.
Biden ran a poor, often nonexistent campaign, and was on the wrong side of the issues from most of his party’s rank and file. And yet in many ways, he and the establishment that dragged him over the finish line more accurately took the pulse of the Democratic voting public in 2020, capitalizing on a political climate they helped create. Sanders ran a campaign to win the presidency; but Biden and the establishment that willed him to victory ran one for the Democratic nomination.











Tuesday, February 25, 2020

The Secret History of How Cuba Helped End Apartheid in South Africa




The Secret History of How Cuba Helped End Apartheid in South Africa










As the world focuses on Tuesday’s historic handshake between President Obama and Cuban President Raúl Castro, we look back at the pivotal role Cuba played in ending apartheid and why Castro was one of only five world leaders invited to speak at Nelson Mandela’s memorial. In the words of Mandela, the Cubans 'destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor … [and] inspired the fighting masses of South Africa.' Historian Piero Gleijeses argues that it was Cuba’s victory in Angola in 1988 that forced Pretoria to set Namibia free and helped break the back of apartheid South Africa. We speak to Gleijeses about his new book, “Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991,” and play archival footage of Mandela meeting Fidel Castro in Cuba.

Transcript
This is a rush transcript. Copy may not be in its final form.

NERMEEN SHAIKH: We turn now to the historic moment Tuesday when President Barack Obama shook hands with Cuban President Raúl Castro as both men participated in the memorial service for anti-apartheid leader Nelson Mandela in South Africa. The White House said the handshake was unscripted. It marked the first time a U.S. president has shaken hands with a Cuban leader since 2000. In Washington, Republicans expressed outrage over the exchange. During a hearing in the House, Republican Representative Ileana Ros-Lehtinen of Florida sparred with Secretary of State John Kerry, who said it did not represent any change in U.S. policy toward Cuba.
REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN: Mr. Secretary, sometimes a handshake is just a handshake. But when the leader of the free world shakes the bloody hand of a ruthless dictator like Raúl Castro, it becomes a propaganda coup for the tyrant. Raúl Castro uses that hand to sign the orders to repress and jail democracy advocates. In fact, right now, as we speak, Cuban opposition leaders are being detained, and they’re being beaten while trying to commemorate today, which is International Human Rights Day. They will feel disheartened when they see these photos. Could you please tell the Cuban people living under that repressive regime that a handshake nonwithstanding, the U.S. policy toward the cruel and sadistic Cuban dictatorship has not weakened? Thank you.
SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY: Ladies and gentlemen, today is about honoring Nelson Mandela. And the president is at an international funeral with leaders from all over the world. He didn’t choose who’s there. They’re there to honor Mandela. And we appreciate that people from all over the world and from all different beliefs and walks of life who appreciated Nelson Mandela and/or were friends of his came to honor him. And I think, as the president said—I urge you to go read his speech, or if you didn’t see it or haven’t read it, because the president said in his speech today honoring Nelson Mandela, he said, “We urge leaders to honor Mandela’s struggle for freedom by upholding the basic human rights of their people”—
REP. ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN: And would you say Raúl Castro is upholding their basic human rights?
SECRETARY OF STATE JOHN KERRY: No, absolutely not.
AMY GOODMAN: The uproar over President Obama’s handshake with President Raúl Castro has drawn attention to the close relationship between the South African anti-apartheid movement and Cuba. In 1991, Nelson Mandela visited Cuba with then-President Fidel Castro. This is a clip when they first met.
NELSON MANDELA: Before we say anything, you must tell me when you are coming to South Africa. You see—no, just a moment, just a moment, just a moment.
PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO: [translated] The sooner the better.
NELSON MANDELA: And we have had a visit from a wide variety of people. And our friend, Cuba, which had helped us in training our people, gave us resources to keep current with our struggle, trained our people as doctors, and SWAPO, you have not come to our country. When are you coming?
PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO: [translated] I haven’t visited my South African homeland yet. I want it, I love it as a homeland. I love it as a homeland as I love you and the South African people.
AMY GOODMAN: Well, for more on Cuba’s key role in the struggle to end apartheid in South Africa, we’re joined now in Washington, D.C., by Piero Gleijeses, professor of American foreign policy at the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. He uses archival sources from the United States, South Africa and Cuba to provide an unprecedented look at the history in his latest book, Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991_. You can read the book’s prologue pretoria on our website at democracynow.org.
Professor Gleijeses, welcome to Democracy Now! Talk about this key relationship, why Cuba was so seminal to the anti-apartheid movement.
PIERO GLEIJESES: Cuba is the only country in the world that sent its soldiers to confront the army of apartheid and defeated the army of apartheid, the South African army, twice—in 1975, 1976, and in 1988. And in Havana, when he visited Havana in July 1991—I won’t to be able to repeat exactly the words of Nelson Mandela, but Nelson Mandela said, “The Cuban victory,” referring to the Cuban victory over the South Africans in Angola in 1988, “destroyed the myth of the invincibility of the white oppressor and inspired the fighting masses of South Africa. Cuito Cuanavale,” which is a victory of the Cubans in Angola, “is the turning point in the liberation of our continent and of my people from the scourge of apartheid.” So, in—
AMY GOODMAN: For a country that knows very little, Professor Gleijeses, about the Cuban experience, its military intervention in Angola, can you step back for a moment and explain what President Castro—what Fidel Castro and these Cuban soldiers did?
PIERO GLEIJESES: Sure. In 1975, you have the decolonization of Angola, Portuguese colony slated to become independent on November 11, 1975. There is a civil war between three movements: one supported by the Cubans, the Cubans that supported over the years in its struggle against the Portuguese; the other two supported by South Africa and the United States. And the movement supported by the Cubans, the MPLA, which is in power in Angola today, having won free election, was on the verge of winning the civil war. And it was on the verge of winning the civil war—a paraphrase from what the CIA station chief in Angola at the time told me—because it was the most committed movement with the best leaders, the best program. And in order to prevent their victory, the victory of the MPLA, in October 1975, urged by Washington, South Africa invaded. And the South African troops advanced on Luanda, and they would have taken Luanda and crushed the MPLA if Fidel Castro had not decided to intervene. And between November 1975 and April 1976, 3,6000 Cuban soldiers poured into Angola and pushed the South Africans back into Namibia, which South Africa ruled at the time.
And this had an immense psychological impact—talking of South Africa—in South Africa, both among whites and among blacks. And the major black South African newspaper, The World, wrote in an editorial in February 1976, at a moment in which the South African troops were still in Angola, but the Cubans were pushing them back—they had evacuated central Angola. They were in southern Angola. The writing was on the wall. And this newspaper, The World, wrote, “Black Africa is riding the crest of a wave generated by the Cuban victory in Angola. Black Africa is tasting the heady wine of the possibility of achieving total liberation.” And Mandela wrote that he was in jail in 1975 when he learned about the arrival of the Cuban troops in Angola, and it was the first time then a country had come from another continent not to take something away, but to help Africans to achieve their freedom.
This was the first real contribution of Cuba to the liberation of South Africa. It was the first time in living memory that the White Giants, the army of apartheid, had been forced to retreat. And they had retreated because of a non-white army. And in a situation of internal colonialism, this is extremely important. And after that, the Cubans remained in Angola to protect Angola from the South African army. Even the CIA acknowledged that the Cubans were the guarantee for the independence of Angola. And in Angola, they trained the ANC, the African National Congress, of Mandela. And very close relations developed between the two. I don’t know if you want me to go on and talk about the next moment, or you want to interrupt me with some questions.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Yes, Professor Piero Gleijeses, if you could speak specifically about the role of Che Guevara in Africa?
PIERO GLEIJESES: Yeah, Che Guevara had nothing to do with South Africa. The role—
NERMEEN SHAIKH: In Africa, though, in the Congo and Angola.
PIERO GLEIJESES: Yes, I understand. The role of Che Guevara in 1964, 1965—in late 1964, Che Guevara was sent by Fidel Castro as Fidel Castro’s top representative to Sub-Saharan Africa—it was the first visit by a top Cuban leader to Sub-Saharan Africa—because the Cubans believed that there was a revolutionary situation in central Africa, and they wanted to help. And Che Guevara established relations with a number of revolutionary movements. One of them, the MPLA, the Movement for the Liberation of Angola, that was based in Congo-Brazzaville. And in 1965, the first Cubans fought in Angolan territory together with the MPLA. But the major role played by Che Guevara is that he led a group of Cubans into Congo, the former Belgian Congo, where there was a revolt by the followers of the late Lumumba against the central government enforced by the United States. And the United States had created an army of white mercenaries, the White Giants, mainly South African and Rhodesians and then Europeans, to crush this revolt. And the Cubans went at the request of the rebels, at the request of the government of Egypt, Algeria and Tanzania to help the rebels.
AMY GOODMAN: Uh—
PIERO GLEIJESES: And—yes?
AMY GOODMAN: Professor, I wanted to go back to Angola—
PIERO GLEIJESES: Yes.
AMY GOODMAN: —and this time bring in former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This is Kissinger explaining why the U.S. was concerned about the Cuban troops that Fidel Castro had sent to fight in Angola. After Kissinger, you’ll hear Fidel Castro himself.
SECRETARY OF STATE HENRY KISSINGER: We thought, with respect to Angola, that if the Soviet Union could intervene at such distances, from areas that were far from the traditional Russian security concerns, and when Cuban forces could be introduced into distant trouble spots, and if the West could not find a counter to that, that then the whole international system could be destabilized.
PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO: [translated] It was a question of globalizing our struggle vis-à-vis the globalized pressures and harassment of the U.S. In this respect, it did not coincide with the Soviet viewpoint. We acted, but without their cooperation. Quite the opposite.
AMY GOODMAN: That was President Fidel Castro and, before that, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger from the film CIA & Angolan Revolution. Professor Gleijeses?
PIERO GLEIJESES: OK, two points. One, Kissinger didn’t mention that the Cubans intervened in response to the South African invasion and that the United States had connived with the South Africans and urged the South Africans to invade. So here, there is a rather important issue of chronology.
The second point is that in the last volume of his memoirs, Kissinger, who in general is a very arrogant person, acknowledges that he made a mistake. And the mistake he made was in saying that the Cubans had intervened as proxies of the Soviet Union. And he writes in his memoirs that actually it had been a Cuban decision and that the Cubans had intervened and confronted the Soviets with a fait accompli. And then he asks a question in his memoirs: Why did Castro take this decision? And Kissinger’s answer is that Fidel Castro was probably—I’m quoting—”was probably the most genuine revolutionary leader then in power.” So, there are two Kissingers, if you want, and there is the Kissinger of his memoirs, where he says a few things that actually are true.
AMY GOODMAN: Piero Gleijeses, what do you make of the furor right now? You just heard Congressmember Lehtinen from Florida attacking John Kerry, you know, the significance of the handshake between President Obama and President Raúl Castro right there at the Soweto stadium at the memorial service for Nelson Mandela.
PIERO GLEIJESES: I think it’s pathetic and reflects the ethics of the United States and the policy of the United States. Obama, President Obama, was received with applause in South Africa when he spoke, etc., because he is the first black president of the United States. But the role of the United States as a country, as a government, past governments, in the struggle for liberation of South Africa is a shameful role. In general, we were on the side of the apartheid government. And the role of Cuba is a splendid role in favor of the liberation. This handshake—going beyond this particular issue, the handshake was long overdue. The embargo is absurd, is immoral. And we have here a president who bowed to the king of South Africa—of Saudi Arabia, I’m sorry, which certainly is no democracy. I mean, even Obama should know it. So it’s an absurd situation. The problem with Obama is that his speeches are good, his gestures are good, but there is no follow-up. So, unfortunately, it is just a gesture, a long-overdue gesture that does not change a shameful U.S. policy.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: Professor Piero Gleijeses, before we conclude, let’s turn to Fidel Castro speaking in South Africa on his visit in 1998.
PRESIDENT FIDEL CASTRO: [translated] Let South Africa be a model of a more just and more humane future. If you can do it, we will all be able to do it.
NERMEEN SHAIKH: That was Fidel Castro speaking in 1998 in South Africa, with former president, who just passed away, Nelson Mandela applauding him. Piero Gleijeses, we just have a minute. Could you talk about what most surprised you in your research in the Cuban archives about this history?
PIERO GLEIJESES: Well, there are a lot of things. One is the independence of Cuban policy vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. There are clashes between Fidel Castro and Gorbachev. There are clashes between the leaders of the Cuban military mission in Angola and the Soviet leaders, which I quote actually in my book and which make really fascinating reading. This is one thing.
But another thing that impressed me very much is the respect with which the Cubans treated the Angolan government. This is very important, because the Angolan government really depended on Cuba for its survival, the presence of the Cuban troops as a shield against South African invasion, which was a constant threat, and the very large and generous technical assistance that Cuba was providing to Angola. And the tendency would be to treat a government that’s so dependent with some kind of superiority. And this is something I’ve never found in international relations, this kind of respect with which Cuba treated what, by all objective counts, should have been a client government. And it’s particularly striking for someone who studies the United States and lives in the United States, because seriously the United States government does not treat government that depends on Washington with much respect.
AMY GOODMAN: Piero Gleijeses, thank you so much for being with us.
PIERO GLEIJESES: My pleasure.
AMY GOODMAN: Professor of American foreign policy at SAIS, the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University. We will post the prologue of your book on our website. The book is just out; it’s called Visions of Freedom: Havana, Washington, Pretoria, and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976-1991, just published by University of North Carolina Press. Go to democracynow.org to read that prologue. When we come back, we’ll talk about Russia and gay and lesbian policy. Stay with us.

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