he deadly coronavirus pandemic laid bare many inequalities in American society — and perhaps no inequality more devastating than disparities in healthcare. As workers had their hours slashed and millions were laid off entirely, we saw that the chasm between who has health coverage and who doesn’t remains one of the most harmful in America today.
It’s clear and urgent that our recovery from the pandemic must include healthcare reform. Namely: expanding Medicare, one of our country’s most foundational and popular federal programs. We can do so by dropping the eligibility age, lowering the cost of prescription drugs, and ensuring the program finally covers hearing, vision, and dental benefits.
New polling from Data for Progress and Social Security Works proves just how popular these proposals are. A June survey of 1,175 likely voters shows a full 83 percent of voters support expanding Medicare to cover hearing, vision, and dental care, including 86 percent of those over the age of 45. That popularity crosses party lines: 89 percent of Democrats, 82 of Independents, and 76 percent of Republicans are in favor.
The holes in Medicare coverage are harming seniors as we speak. Researchers at Johns Hopkins University found that mild hearing loss doubled dementia risk. Poor oral health and untreated gum disease also leads to increased serious risk of heart attacks, strokes, rheumatoid arthritis, and worsened diabetes. And aging takes a toll on vision, leading to injury, cognitive impairment, and depression.
In the richest country in the world, the outrageous reality is that 75 percent of senior citizens who suffer from hearing loss do not have a hearing aid because of the prohibitive cost. Sixty-five percent of senior citizens have no dental insurance and no idea how they will be able to afford to go to a dentist.
During the pandemic, more than 10 percent of people 65 and older lost their jobs. That’s about 1.1 million seniors. While nearly all workers 65 and older were Medicare beneficiaries, almost half had insurance coverage from their employer to cover medical expenses. Hearing, vision, and dental care could be pushed even further out of reach without that back-up coverage.
The numbers are even more devastating when we look at those below the current Medicare eligibility age. Nearly 6 million workers 55 years old and older lost their jobs in the spring of 2020 — 15% of total employment for this group — and we remain over 2 million jobs away from their employment levels before the pandemic hit. The U.S. Census Bureau found that for the first time in nearly 50 years, jobseekers (55 and older) are facing higher rates of unemployment and staying unemployed longer than those a few years younger. The decline in employment for Black, Hispanic, and Asian older workers was more than twice that of white older workers. And with older workers less likely to be able to telework coming into the pandemic, it stands to reason that Americans 55+ might have also left the workforce out of fear for their own safety. Research shows that this may be “particularly true for older workers of color who have been hit harder from both the health and economic aspects of the pandemic.”
The COVID-19 pandemic is just the latest argument for why Medicare expansion must also include lowering the eligibility age. And the public is with us here too. As Data For Progress and Social Security Works’ new research shows, 60 percent of likely voters — including 72 percent of Democrats and a majority of Republicans — favor lowering the eligibility age to 60. And the momentum is in our favor inside the halls of Congress too: more than 70 percent of Democrats in the House— including moderates, progressives, and those in some of the most vulnerable districts across the country — and many of our Senate colleagues are urging President Biden to include these critical proposals in his American Families Plan.
We also have an answer for the question that always arises around popular and necessary policies: how are we going to pay for it? The answer: by taking on the greed of the pharmaceutical industry and demanding that it stops ripping off taxpayers by charging us the highest prices in the world for lifesaving prescription drugs. It is a travesty that in the United States, one vial of insulin has gone from costing $21 in 1999 to $332 in 2019, reflecting a price increase of more than 1,000 percent.
By setting drug prices at the median price of other major countries like Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, and France, the Congressional Budget Office estimates we’ll save taxpayers at least $500 billion over a 10-year period. Additional cost-saving measures can raise the total saved to at least $650 billion. With those savings, we can finally make drug prices affordable for all Americans, guarantee Americans over 60 the security of having Medicare, and expand the benefits that Medicare provides to include dental, vision, and hearing for the first time.
We cannot come out of this national public health crisis only to retain the status quo — one that leaves at least 87 million uninsured or underinsured. We must do what is both popular and right, and expand Medicare.
Why have you chosen to be and stay here with Reader Supported News? It means something to you, no? This organization is underfunded … Because 1% of the subscribers can’t bring themselves to respond to the fundraising appeals!? That’s crazy.
Will Joe Manchin’s search for common ground wreck the Democrats’ agenda?
n a frosty night in February, Joe Manchin III, the senior senator from West Virginia, invited a few colleagues over for dinner aboard the houseboat he docks on the Potomac. In the past, opponents have sought to highlight the vessel for political effect; a 2018 advertisement by the National Republican Senatorial Committee called it a “$700,000 D.C. luxury yacht.” (In response, Manchin’s office reported that he bought it, used, for two hundred and twenty thousand dollars.) The boat—which he named Almost Heaven, after John Denver’s description of West Virginia in “Take Me Home, Country Roads”—resembles a small ferry; it is sixty-five feet long and boxy, with tinted windows. It serves as a residence on the nights he is in Washington, but also as a political prop. For voters who dislike the government, it allows Manchin, a seventy-three-year-old Democrat in his third term, to say that he could weigh anchor and escape anytime; for friends in politics, it provides an offshore venue for the kind of casual evening that Manchin considers vital to politics.
On this occasion, Manchin and his wife, Gayle, were joined by Senators Jon Tester, Democrat of Montana, and Susan Collins, Republican of Maine—who, along with Manchin, occupy a small island of centrists in a fiercely divided Congress. Collins told me recently, “It’s increasingly a lonely place to be.” Hours earlier, in the impeachment trial of former President Donald Trump, for inciting the insurrection at the Capitol on January 6th, Collins had been one of seven Republicans who joined Democrats in pronouncing him guilty. But the final tally was 57-43, ten votes short of conviction. To those who had hoped that the defiling of the Capitol and the assault on police would at last break Trump’s grip on his party, the result was dismal.
On board, Manchin’s guests ate Gayle’s spaghetti and meatballs, while he fixed the drinks. After a few hours, Tester started making his way home to his apartment across town, but as he went down the gangplank he found that it had become coated with ice. “My feet go to the ceiling,” he recalled recently. Manchin reached out to grab him, at which point he also fell. Both men started sliding. Tester’s foot hit the water. “I was looking for anything to grab,” he said. “I finally got a piece of metal and stopped. Joe did, too.” Tester was bleeding from his left hand; he asked Manchin if he was all right. “He says, ‘I think I broke my thumb.’ ” (Doctors put Manchin in a brace, but he took it off after a few weeks.)
In another year, the prospect of losing two Democratic senators overboard in an ice storm might be greeted with a certain wry resignation among Washington’s political class. This year, it inspires panic, at least among Democrats: in a 50-50 Senate, the Party’s agenda is only one vote—or one heartbeat—from oblivion. Manchin, in particular, holds extraordinary power. As perhaps the Senate’s most conservative Democrat, he often breaks from the Party, which gives him a de-facto veto over a large swath of the Administration’s agenda. In the first months of Joe Biden’s Presidency, Manchin tanked the nomination of Neera Tanden as budget director (he disapproved of her tweets), opposed raising the corporate tax rate to twenty-eight per cent (he preferred twenty-five per cent), and single-handedly narrowed unemployment benefits in a Covid-relief bill. Over and over, Manchin said that he was driven by a fundamental faith in bipartisanship, a belief that Democrats could and must find Republican support for their legislation—a posture so at odds with the present hostilities in Washington that it evoked a man hoisting his glass for a toast while his guests lunged at one another with steak knives.
Manchin’s sudden clout, after an unremarkable decade in national politics, has made him the subject of almost ludicrous attention. He is stalked by the political press, his comments are parsed for subtle variations, and he is courted by powerful figures on both the right and the left. On another recent evening aboard the boat, he was dining with Ron Klain, the White House chief of staff, when President Biden called. “He says, ‘When are you inviting me out there?’ ” Manchin told me. “I said, ‘We’re figuring out how to get you in by water. They’ll never know you came.’ ”
Biden and his advisers were engaged in a transparent campaign to win Manchin’s support. The last time Democrats held the White House, he was not much of a priority; President Barack Obama called him three times in eight years. In Biden’s first few months, he talked or met with Manchin at least half a dozen times. Biden took to calling him Jo-Jo, Manchin said, adding, “I don’t know where he came up with that.” But he appreciated that the President was not pressuring him much to adhere to the party line: “He’ll say, ‘Listen, I’ll never ask you to vote against your conviction.’ I said, ‘I know that, and I appreciate it.’ He just said, ‘If you can help me, help me,’ and I said, ‘I’ll help you where I can,’ and I said, ‘When I can’t . . . ’ ” Manchin changed tack. “I’m begging him, ‘We’ve got to start doing some things bipartisan.’ ”
Biden and Manchin have obvious points in common—two white, Catholic Joes, in their seventies, both former football players who take pride in their working-class roots, long after becoming wealthy. More deeply, each has less regard for ideology than for the hands-on horse-trading of Congress. In Biden’s 2017 book, “Promise Me, Dad,” he wrote, “At bottom, politics depends on trust, and unless you can establish a personal relationship, it’s awfully hard to build trust.” Manchin, too, is a heavy schmoozer, even by the standards of his profession. Hoppy Kercheval, the host of an influential political radio show in West Virginia, told me, “I’ve talked to him a thousand times, and there have been times where I think, I’ve got to get off the phone. He’s wearing me out.” Manchin has distributed his personal cell-phone number so widely that his staff has pleaded with him to get a new one. (He refuses.)
To many on the left, Manchin is an impediment to history, spouting bromides about patience and tradition at a moment when partisan attempts to curtail access to voting could undermine the legitimacy of free elections. (In May, a column in Esquire was headlined “In the Fight to Save Democracy, Joe Manchin Is Neville Chamberlain.”) Adam Jentleson, a progressive political strategist and a former Senate staffer, told me, “It’s like there’s a brain rot that senators get that comes from too many Sunday shows, too many conversations with comfortable people who think they’re living in a ‘West Wing’ episode.” He continued, “Manchin cutting a deal with Susan Collins is not going to bring people together. The end result will actually be that we pass much weaker solutions than we could if he was more realistic about the world he lived in.” In June, Manchin rendered the most controversial decision of his career: he vowed to oppose the Democrats’ signature election-reform bill, the For the People Act, because it lacked Republican support, and he refused to modify the filibuster rule, the sixty-vote threshold that would prevent his party from passing it alone. The Reverend Dr. William Barber II, the civil-rights activist and co-chair of the Poor People’s Campaign, immediately announced plans for a Moral March on Manchin in Charleston, the state capitol, and tweeted that Manchin’s position was “wrong, constitutionally inconsistent, historically inaccurate, morally indefensible, economically insane, and politically unacceptable.”
Manchin’s feud with progressive Democrats centers on a basic difference in their assessment of the Republican Party. To many of his colleagues, the G.O.P. has become an overt enemy of democracy, by perpetuating Trump’s lies about his loss in 2020 and rewriting state laws in ways that could allow them to overturn future elections. Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell has stated plainly, “One hundred percent of our focus is on stopping this new administration,” an echo of his comment, in 2010, that “the single most important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term President.” McConnell, in that view, will never coƶperate, because doing so could allow Democrats to win the next elections by claiming policy achievements and a breakthrough in partisan gridlock. Harry Reid, a senator from Nevada for three decades and the Democratic Senate Majority Leader from 2007 to 2015, told me that Manchin underestimates the change in D.C. culture. “We’ve never had it like this before,” he said. “When Lyndon Johnson was Majority Leader for six years, he overcame two filibusters. In my first six years as Leader, I had to face and overcome more than a hundred filibusters. I think that you cannot expect the Senate to be a place where it’s kind of ‘Kumbaya,’ where you hold hands and sing.”
But, when Manchin looks at today’s Republican Party, he sees, almost literally, his neighbors and friends. Since 2000, the congressional delegation of West Virginia has gone from all Democrats to all Republicans—except for him. The state has voted for a Republican in each of the past six Presidential elections, and in 2014 the state legislature flipped to Republican control for the first time since 1931. On January 6th, when word circulated on the Senate floor that Trump supporters had stormed the Capitol, Manchin did not initially assume the worst. “I’ve always been for a good protest,” he recalled. “My instinct was, Let them in! They’re raising all kinds of hell and hollering. Let them in! Let’s talk!” Soon, he glimpsed the horror of it—“Never in my wildest dreams did I imagine our form of government being attacked,” he said—and, during the impeachment trial, he voted to convict. But Manchin never broke faith with the Republican Party, and he was determined to work with it again.
If politics is the art of the possible, Manchin’s likes and dislikes may determine what is possible for the Democrats—on police reform, gun safety, expansions of labor and L.G.B.T.Q. rights, and legalization of millions of undocumented immigrants—in the two crucial years before the midterm elections, when they risk losing control of Congress. Whether or not his peers like it, his unease with some key elements of the progressive agenda reflects the views of millions of Americans, not only people like him—what we might call Tommy Bahama Democrats, the prosperous boomers who look askance at Trump-supporting friends but have no plans to stop inviting them for dinner—but also rural voters who feel estranged from the Democratic Party. Manchin’s power is forcing Democrats to expand their focus on systemic inequities to encompass places like West Virginia, where substandard schools, high poverty, and distrust of government helped fuel radical conservatism. In that sense, Manchin’s innate conservatism also sets boundaries around the Party’s instincts, forestalling transformative changes that could drive away moderate voters in 2022 and 2024.
In the awkward marriage between Manchin and the Democratic Party, neither side hides its ambivalence. In April, on “The Daily Show,” Trevor Noah likened Manchin to “that annoying kid on your block who had a pool. Yeah, he hogged all the noodles and wouldn’t let anyone use the diving board, but without him there’s no pool party.” The relationship rests on a basic fact of political arithmetic: in a state that Biden lost by thirty-nine points, Manchin has won six straight elections. As much as progressives condemn his resistance, he is all that stands between them and a Republican Senate majority. On June 1st, even as Manchin was digging in against many of his party’s priorities, Richard Durbin, of Illinois, the second-ranked Democrat in the Senate, told a reporter, “I say a prayer every morning and evening for Joe Manchin.”
As a Democrat often surrounded by conservatives, Manchin leans hard on the stagecraft of patriotism. When I stopped by his office on Capitol Hill not long ago, he was flanked by desktop statues of eagles in flight, accompanied by two brass lamps adorned with more eagles. While we talked, he illustrated a point by producing a tiny copy of the Constitution from the breast pocket of his suit coat.
Up close, Manchin could be mistaken for a high-priced football coach. He is six feet three, with an aquiline nose, a silver pompadour, and a meaty handshake. Before entering government full time, he worked mostly as a salesman—furniture and carpets, then coal—and you can feel it in his enthusiasm for retail politics. Kercheval, the radio host, told me, “He is very good in crowds. He’s very good one-on-one. It’s Clintonesque. When he’s talking to you, you feel like you’re the only one in the world. And I think, frankly, a lot of it is sincere. When he is talking to some little old lady somewhere, I think he is genuinely interested in what her problems are.” Manchin attributes his social appetite to growing up in a big Italian Appalachian family. “If I didn’t hug and kiss you, I’d get slapped,” he told me. “I didn’t give a shit who you were, I didn’t care what color you were, I’m going to hug and kiss you first, and then find out if we’re related.” Even when Manchin disagrees with people, they generally find him personable. Cecil Roberts, the head of the United Mine Workers of America, told me, “He can give you bad news, and, for a few minutes, you think he gave you good news.”
During his early years in Washington, his fellow-Democrats marvelled at his ability to win in a conservative state. “I thought, I have to see this miracle,” Barbara Boxer, who represented California in the Senate from 1993 to 2017, told me. “It takes a very special personality to overcome the innate negativity toward the other party.” She went on, “Having said all that, he wanted to get on my committee, and I stopped it cold. He was coming there to help coal country, and I was there to help get pollution and carbon out of the air.” Manchin didn’t let the slight affect their relationship, she said: “You would think we would have been at fisticuffs because of that, but he never had a bad word to say.”
The more divided Congress has become, the more Manchin has professed his faith in the power of collegiality. Reviving a long-forgotten Senate tradition, he has vowed never to campaign against an incumbent senator of either party, no matter how much they differ personally or ideologically. He and McConnell have feuded for years, but when McConnell faced a strong Democratic opponent in Amy McGrath, last year, Manchin declined to help her campaign.
In his votes and his comments, Manchin avoids the appearance of being in the full embrace of either party. In late January, hounded by reporters for a clearer signal of whether he would agree to push through a stimulus plan without Republicans, he said, repeatedly, “We’re going to make Joe Biden successful.” He eventually agreed to advance that bill with no Republicans, but in the following months he repeatedly questioned parts of Biden’s agenda. “If he senses that the Democrats are all doing one thing, and the Republicans are going to be aligned on the other side, he doesn’t want to seem like an easy sell,” Brian Fallon, a former aide to Chuck Schumer and Hillary Clinton, told me. Torpedoing Tanden’s nomination, in March, was a natural Manchin move: independent enough to earn approving coverage in conservative media, but not so grave that it would cause a rupture with Democratic leaders.
His constant triangulation makes him mercurial. “What he stands up and says from one caucus lunch to the next doesn’t match up,” a Democratic strategist said, “and he’s not the type of guy that’s going to go home and read a fifty-page briefing book.” In March, Manchin raised the prospect of making the filibuster “a little bit more painful,” by reviving the requirement for the marathon speeches known as the talking filibuster. Progressives rejoiced, but soon he expressed reservations about the idea. “If you have a talking filibuster, basically, you can just wait that one out,” he told me. “It doesn’t really achieve anything.”
In his office, I told him that much of Washington was asking a version of the same question: What does Joe Manchin really want? He flashed an irritated smile. “Can you believe that? It’s like I came here to hold people hostage,” he said. He repeated the question back to me. “What does Joe Manchin want? Son of a bitch—they think that they can spend a billion dollars or a hundred million dollars and that’ll take care of making it right?” He went on, “They want me to change. To agree. I say, No, I’m not going to change.”
Manchin often speaks of remaining true to the terrain that produced him—the town of Farmington, West Virginia (population: 325). “You are who you are because of where you’re raised and how you’re raised and who raised you,” he told me. “Farmington is why I haven’t changed.”
In 1978, the political scientist Richard Fenno, of the University of Rochester, published a landmark study titled “Home Style,” based on observations of eighteen members of the House as they returned to their districts. The book investigated a contradiction that came to be known as Fenno’s paradox: Americans often hate Congress but keep reĆ«lecting their local Congress members. The explanation, he concluded, was that successful politicians develop a “home style”—a set of behaviors that allow them to code-switch, accruing power in Washington while retaining trust back home. These days, Democrats in red states face extra pressure to attend to their home style. Tester, of Montana, told me, “Instead of going home every month, you go home every week. People want to see you. They want to make sure you haven’t ‘gone D.C.’ ”
A certain prickly independence runs deep in West Virginia. Long before it was a state, the mountains of northwestern Virginia attracted small farmers who resented the power and pride of plantation owners in the east. The two sides of the state clashed over taxes, slavery, and respect. In an open letter written in 1861, after Virginia voted to secede, politicians in the western counties questioned why they should put up with the “haughty arrogance and wicked machinations of would-be Eastern Despots.” They broke away from the Confederacy, joining the Union as a state in 1863, and later adopted the motto “Montani semper liberi”—mountaineers are always free.
Joe Manchin’s grandfather was born Giuseppe Mancini, in the southern-Italian region of Calabria. In 1904, when he was three years old, his family immigrated to Farmington, a hill town that straddles the narrow waters of Buffalo Creek, a couple of hours’ drive from Charleston. He started working with his father in a coal mine at eleven, and later opened the Manchin Grocery Store, while serving, at various points, as fire chief, constable, justice of the peace, and mayor. He and his wife, Kathleen—the matriarch known as Mama Kay—raised five kids and kept everyone close to home. By the time Joe III was growing up, the Manchins had risen in the small-town hierarchy. His father expanded the family business from groceries into furniture and carpets, and turned their home from a two-bedroom apartment above a garage into a six-bedroom house. Marion County, where they lived, was small, dependent on coal, and ninety-five per cent white.
Manchin first encountered politics beyond Farmington through the flamboyant figure he called Uncle Jimmy. A. James Manchin, as constituents knew him, spent half a century in state government, honing a knack for generating attention. He once arranged for a chorus of twelve trumpeters to dignify the opening of a sewage-treatment plant. (Years later, Jimmy said, “There’s still a lot of people in this state that think of A. James Manchin every time they flush their commodes.”) After he became secretary of state, in 1977, he endeared himself to constituents by defending West Virginia against hillbilly stereotypes portrayed on “The Love Boat,” and he handed out hundreds of thousands of honorary certificates and trinkets with the state seal on them. When critics complained that he used his office for self-promotion, he said, “Sure, I’m a showboat, a ham. Well, I’m in government!” Later, serving as West Virginia’s treasurer, he narrowly avoided a career-ending disgrace: in 1987, the state lost nearly three hundred million dollars on Wall Street investments. He was impeached, but he resigned before he could be pushed out; after he spent a decade away from politics, his home county elected him to the state legislature. On his desk in Washington, Joe Manchin keeps a photo of Uncle Jimmy beside his keyboard.
Jimmy exposed his nephew to another influence: during the Democratic primary of 1960, John F. Kennedy, running against Hubert Humphrey, spent weeks crisscrossing West Virginia, in the hope of demonstrating that a Catholic candidate could win in a predominantly Protestant state. His campaign recruited Uncle Jimmy to stump for Kennedy and introduce him at rallies. Joe, who was twelve, met Bobby and Teddy Kennedy in his parents’ kitchen, over a dinner of spaghetti. His father drove Jack Kennedy around in the family’s convertible. Manchin took note of the Kennedys’ powers of image management. “They knew how to come across as real people,” he said. “Hubert was probably more of a real person and had more of a real life than any of them. It didn’t come across as well.”
In 1965, Manchin went to West Virginia University, as a quarterback on a football scholarship. In his freshman year, he met Gayle Conelly; they married in 1967, while still in school, and later had three children, Heather, Joseph, and Brooke. The following year, the Manchins’ life in Farmington changed abruptly: a fire destroyed the family store and killed a salesclerk and three customers, including a child. Manchin left school for most of a year to help rebuild. Nine days after the fire, a series of explosions ripped through a nearby coal mine, killing seventy-eight men, including his mother’s younger brother. The mines withered, and so did the town. Manchin’s sister Paula Llaneza, who still lives in Farmington, told me, “We started losing people. No one came back.”
In 1982, while selling carpets in the family business, Manchin was elected to the state legislature and started moving up as a conservative Democrat. He became a national officer of the American Legislative Exchange Council, a conservative policy group that drafted model bills for state lawmakers. He opposed abortion, appealed to all “able-bodied” recipients of welfare to find work, and, according to theWall Street Journal, voted to reduce awards in the workers’-compensation system. In 1996, he ran in the primary for the gubernatorial race. The coal-miners’ union distributed T-shirts with his name crossed out. Cecil Roberts, the head of the union, told me, “It wasn’t that he didn’t care about unions. It was just that he was more of a pro-business Democrat in those days. He says that we cost him the election, which is probably true.” After he lost the primary, to a progressive rival named Charlotte Pritt, Manchin did not throw his support behind the Party’s new candidate; on the contrary, he sent letters to influential Democrats accusing her of ignoring the concerns of more conservative members of the Party. She lost the race.
If Manchin wanted to win, it seemed, he would need to expand his base of support beyond the business community. Out of government, he had become a successful coal broker, running a firm called Enersystems. (In his most recent Senate disclosures, he and Gayle reported a net worth of between four million and thirteen million dollars.) In 2001, he became the secretary of state, and, alongside his alliance with businesses, he courted organized labor, declaring that he could find common ground between them. When he ran for governor again, in 2004, he was endorsed by the miners’ union, the A.F.L.-C.I.O., and the West Virginia Education Association. Manchin won. Roberts believed that he had learned a lesson. “He included labor in everything that he did,” he said.
As Republicans gained influence in West Virginia, Manchin leaned ever harder on his self-narrative as a unifier. After he was elected governor, a local paper reported that one of his favorite movies was “Dave,” a Washington fairy tale in which an ordinary guy is thrust into the Presidency and ends up healing a divided nation. But, twenty-five years after he turned his back on the 1996 Democratic nominee, some in his party still consider the move a defining reflection of his priorities. Walt Auvil, a member of the West Virginia Democrats’ executive committee, who has tussled with Manchin over the years, said, “The state Democrats never recovered. The state was heading in a Republican direction anyway, but Joe rode that train very eagerly. He didn’t have a principle that says, This is bad, so I should act accordingly.”
In the view of Stephen Smith, a co-founder of WV Can’t Wait, a grassroots progressive group, Manchin represents the “wealthy good-old-boys’ club,” a generation of Democrats and Republicans who thrived as the economy and the social fabric frayed. “He’s been the most powerful lawmaker in West Virginia for twenty years,” Smith said. “And his game is to do what all establishment politicians do—namely, what’s best for him.”
Farmington, today, is less than half the size it was when Manchin was growing up. The family store, like most of the shops downtown, has been gone for years, but its big, bright sign, advertising Papa Joe’s Famous Meats, still hangs on a brick wall beside an empty lot. It’s a nod to local history, in a state that puts a high premium on nostalgia. Robert Rupp, a political-science professor at West Virginia Wesleyan College, told me, “We’ve lived in our house for thirty-one years, but it used to belong to a Mrs. Taylor. And when I die they’re going to say, ‘Robert Rupp lived in Mrs. Taylor’s house.’ ”
People in West Virginia have reason to savor the past. It’s the only state that has fewer people than it had seventy years ago. In April, the Census Bureau reported that West Virginia’s population had dropped another three per cent in the past decade, extending a decline that began in the nineteen-fifties. The loss of population means a loss of federal funding and political power. In 1950, West Virginia had six seats in the U.S. House of Representatives; next year, it will be down to two. The gaps in local infrastructure are profound. Jamie Greene, a teacher at North Marion High School, told me that the pandemic had exposed the scale of residents’ needs. “I had kids who took an A.P. exam last spring in a McDonald’s parking lot, because that was the closest place for them to connect to the Internet,” she said. “They took the test in their car, with their mom sitting next to them. We’ve been talking about extending broadband Internet in West Virginia for years, and it hasn’t happened.”
Auvil, the member of the Democratic executive committee, told me, “We’re fiftieth in the country in percentage of college graduates. We’re one of the oldest states in the country, and we’re the whitest state in the country. I’ve lived here my whole life, and I love the state. I love the people here. My family lives here. But those demographic facts are huge problems.”
At its best, the local sense of history reminds people of their interdependence. Stephanie Cummons, a thirty-eight-year-old mother of two, who lives down the block from where Manchin grew up, writes a column about her town for the Times West Virginian, a nearby paper. “We’ve been hit with a lot of tragedy—mine collapses and explosions and floods and different things,” she told me. “But we always take care of our own. And that’s something that you’re taught when you’re a child here. Whoever’s house you were in at suppertime, that’s where you ate.” People had their disagreements, of course, but they had to figure them out eventually—because, she said, “that other person is going to be in the pew beside you in church on Sunday.”
In the most recent election, more than two-thirds of the voters in Manchin’s home town went for Trump, but, unlike in much of the country, people in a tiny town don’t have the luxury of avoiding one another. “I’m a Democrat married to a Republican,” Cummons said, and laughed. “This was not disclosed to me at the point of our engagement—there was just blind love—but we don’t discuss politics. That is not wise for our marriage.”
Others in Farmington are more outspoken about their politics. In a blue farmhouse at the edge of town, Steven Torman, a former truck driver who identified himself as being of Cherokee descent, recently augmented the American flag on his porch with three Confederate flags, hung so that they face the road. “It’s my history,” Torman said. “I’m a free American, and I’m getting tired of being pushed around by the government.” When I asked him about Manchin, he said, “You’re going to find that most of the people in Farmington, and that includes the coal miners, don’t believe in Joe Manchin no more. He goes with the side that he thinks is winning.” I talked to Torman for a while, and he shared his thoughts on Trump (“Still my President”), Covid (“man-made”), and the vaccine (“They’re not chipping me”). Finally, I asked what he wanted to see Washington achieve for people in Farmington. He thought for a long moment, and said, “Bring back our school system, our education. Bring it back into what it used to be. Bring prayer back in the schools. Salute our flag.”
When Manchin says Farmington is the reason that he hasn’t changed, he’s offering a selective reading of his own terrain. If Washington were abiding by the inclusive logic of Stephanie Cummons, his vision of collaboration would make sense. But, with few exceptions, the Republicans he faces in Congress are more nearly aligned with Steven Torman. Auvil told me, “Joe loves that image of bipartisanship, but the question is, bipartisanship to what end? We had bipartisanship that got us into an Iraq war that cost us two trillion dollars and thousands of American lives and hundreds of thousands of Iraqi lives.” He added, “If you’re dealing with a party committed to a lie as its core tenet, why do you have to be bipartisan with that?”
In June, 2010, Robert C. Byrd, of West Virginia, the longest-serving senator in U.S. history, died in office. Manchin, who had easily won reĆ«lection for governor, entered the race to succeed him. Republicans coveted that seat in Congress, but Manchin had a strategy. He played up his roots as a coal-country centrist and deployed a publicity stunt that would have impressed his uncle Jimmy. In an advertisement that became famous, he took on climate-change legislation that Obama had endorsed. “I sued E.P.A., and I’ll take dead aim at the cap-and-trade bill, because it’s bad for West Virginia,” he said, as he pointed a hunting rifle at a copy of the bill and fired. That fall, he won with fifty-three per cent of the vote.
In the Senate, Manchin made a point of cultivating allies from both parties, arranging private meetings with every senator he could. In 2013, after twenty children and six educators were massacred in Newtown, Connecticut, he and Pat Toomey, Republican of Pennsylvania, introduced legislation to strengthen background checks on gun sales. The initiative failed, but Manchin showed an acute understanding of his constituents: West Virginians were fierce supporters of the Second Amendment, yet polls showed that they would not object to stricter background checks.
As Manchin sought common ground, the relationship between the parties was collapsing. The Obama Administration had negotiated with Republicans for months, seeking support for health-care reform. (Paul Krugman, the Times columnist, called the effort a “quest for bipartisanship gone stark raving mad.”) In the end, the bill received only one Republican vote, and many Democrats concluded that the talks had been a mistake. As if to prove the point, Senator Mike Enzi, one of the Republican negotiators, boasted to a home crowd in Wyoming that, were it not for the protracted talks, “you would already have national health care.”
By 2013, Senate Republicans were attempting to filibuster a broad range of Obama’s actions, including his nominations for Defense Secretary and for the U.S. Court of Appeals. Reid, the Senate Democratic leader, invoked the so-called “nuclear option”: he lowered the threshold of votes for Presidential nominees (except those to the Supreme Court) from sixty votes to fifty-one. Manchin was one of three Democrats who voted against it. “I said, ‘Harry, you’re going to rue the day you do this,’ ” Manchin told me. The Democrats’ problem, he suggested, was that they’d lost touch with Republican leaders. “I said, ‘When’s the last time you had a cup of coffee? When’s the last time you had dinner? Do you know how many children or grandchildren So-and-So has?’ ”
Reid told me recently that he has no memory of such an exchange, but he did remember trying to get McConnell to eat with him. “The other Republican leaders I’ve dealt with—all of them—were happy to sit down and talk about things over lunch or in the office, but McConnell didn’t want to do that,” Reid said. (A McConnell spokesman denied this.) Reid stands by his decision to scale back the filibuster. Not doing so, he said, risked “Obama’s Presidency being an asterisk.”
As the 2016 election approached, Manchin endorsed Hillary Clinton, but, after Trump dominated the state, Manchin tacked toward him. During the transition, he was considered for Secretary of Energy, and he visited Trump Tower. “I’ve had more personal time with Trump in two months than I had with Obama in eight years,” he said at the time. The Cabinet post went to Rick Perry, but Manchin stayed close to Trump; his Senate Web page boasted that he “voted with the Trump Administration 74% of the time,” and noted, “No Senator (Democrat or Republican) has split with their party more often.”
On the most important votes, Manchin remained largely faithful to Democrats; in 2017, he voted against Trump’s tax cuts and against efforts to repeal Obamacare. When possible, it seemed, he found ways to generate stagecraft that would satisfy both sides: though he voted for many of Trump’s nominees, he never cast a deciding vote. Most notably, he broke with his party to back Brett Kavanaugh, for the Supreme Court. But he did so only after Collins, the Republican, had insured that Kavanaugh had enough votes to be confirmed. Manchin’s behavior irked progressives, but they had little leverage over him. In 2017, under pressure from both Democrats and Republicans to take a side, he responded with irritation. “I don’t give a shit, you understand?” he told the Charleston Gazette-Mail. “Don’t care if I get elected, don’t care if I get defeated, how about that? If they think because I’m up for election, that I can be wrangled into voting for shit that I don’t like and can’t explain, they’re all crazy.” Every politician likes to dismiss critics, but Manchin had real reasons not to care what his peers said about him: he was seventy years old and prosperous, and he’d already held every job he was likely to get.
In his race the following year, Manchin won by just three percentage points. It was his smallest margin of victory in decades, and yet, given the Republicans’ ascendancy in West Virginia, it was a remarkable testament to his reputation. Rupp, the political scientist, said, “The most important saying in West Virginia politics is that everything in this state is political except politics, which is personal. This is why Joe does so well, because he has checked every box.”
Manchin’s box-checking has raised his profile and attracted money. In 2017, he and Collins were named honorary co-chairs of the business-friendly centrist group No Labels. In his election the next year, longtime Republican donors to groups associated with No Labels—including the hedge-fund manager Louis Bacon and the Chicago Bulls’ owner, Jerry Reinsdorf—gave to a pro-Manchin super PAC called Duty & Country. While he was co-chair of No Labels, liberals criticized the group for spending almost twice as much to reĆ«lect Republicans as it did for Democrats, and for considering a plan to attack the House Democratic leader, Nancy Pelosi.
For all of Manchin’s reverence for bipartisanship, the concept has a mixed record. Though John Adams famously dreaded a “division of the republic into two great parties,” some of history’s most significant breakthroughs occurred despite widespread disagreement. In 1870, when Congress passed the Fifteenth Amendment, which extended the electoral franchise to African-American men, not a single Democrat voted for it. C. Vann Woodward, in his 1955 book, “The Strange Career of Jim Crow,” described the way that hymns to comity and healing accompanied the injustices created in the post-Reconstruction South: “Just as the Negro gained his emancipation and new rights through a falling out between white men, he now stood to lose his rights through the reconciliation of white men.”
When Manchin talks about his faith in compromise, he doesn’t mention electoral pressures; he presents it as a shibboleth of rural life. “The less you have, the more you need that human interaction,” he told me. He often cites the legacy of his predecessor, Robert Byrd, who rose from an impoverished childhood in the coalfields to become the unofficial historian of the Senate and the keeper of its traditions. But Byrd never regarded the filibuster as inviolable. He engineered a series of revisions to Senate institutions; in 1974, he led the creation of a fast-track “budget reconciliation” process, which was not subject to the filibuster. In 1979, while arguing for further revision, he said, “Certain rules that were necessary in the 19th century and in the early decades of this century must be changed to reflect changed circumstances.” Byrd was a canny legislator who brought home billions of dollars’ worth of highways, dams, and other improvements to what he called “one of the rock bottomest of states.”
Ira Shapiro, a Senate staffer from 1975 to 1987, and a former counsel to Byrd, told me, “The nightmare scenario for Byrd was the paralyzed Senate. He valued bipartisanship, he valued extended debate, but when that was not possible he reacted to it, and I don’t believe Byrd would have stood by and watched McConnell destroy the Senate.” Shapiro continued, “If you’ve got somebody whose simple goal is to make the President a failure, which is exactly what McConnell’s goal is, then you have to recalculate.”
After all the campaigning and the posturing, the houseboat dinners and the flattery, the first real test of dealmaking in the Biden era arrived on March 4th, when the Senate began its final debate on the President’s $1.9-trillion plan for Covid relief. Republicans had already vowed to oppose it, so Democrats would have to pass it through reconciliation—though not before Ron Johnson, a Wisconsin Republican, made a show of resistance by forcing Senate clerks to read the entire six-hundred-and-twenty-eight-page bill aloud. It took ten hours and forty-four minutes.
Then Manchin stunned his colleagues by returning the proceedings to a standstill; among various demands, he insisted on restricting the length and the scope of unemployment benefits. Democrats had planned to give a tax break on up to ten thousand two hundred dollars of unemployment payments; Manchin would not allow the break to go to households that had earned more than a hundred and fifty thousand dollars. Hours ticked by, as Chuck Schumer, the Majority Leader, and Ron Klain, the White House chief of staff, took turns lobbying Manchin, to no avail. In the end, it took a direct call from Biden to break the impasse. Manchin got his changes and signed off on the bill.
The final result, considerably more modest than the original plan, was nevertheless a landmark piece of legislation, which included a tax credit for Americans with children, constituting the largest antipoverty effort in a generation. Manchin told me that he agreed to give up the hunt for Republican votes because Biden appealed to him personally: “I said, ‘Sir, as your friend and my President, if you’re asking me to do it, I’ll do it, against my better judgment.’ ” But he had also left Biden with a warning: he was not going to pass other bills without Republicans. “I said, ‘I can’t continue. I don’t believe it’s good for our country.’ ”
The spectacle of a Democrat from one of America’s neediest states laboring to reduce federal assistance infuriated many of his colleagues. “I think the man is utterly full of shit and not even good at it,” a Democratic aide told me. “I’m not the only frustrated Democrat, but no one can piss off Manchin right now.” Manchin talked constantly about negotiating, but, when progressives offered concrete benefits that West Virginians clearly needed, he did not budge. “Manchin could say, ‘This is a hostage-taking: give me roads, bridges, broadband, and I will give you my vote.’ And we would do it!,” Faiz Shakir, a political adviser to Bernie Sanders, said. “We could make your legacy amazing. You could lower prescription-drug costs for West Virginians. You could expand health insurance. You could have ‘Joe Manchin highways’ all over the place, ‘Joe Manchin water facilities.’ Instead, he says, ‘No, let’s tweak on the margins, in ways that only some Republicans can support.’ ”
Manchin is convinced that some progressive objectives, such as a fifteen-dollar minimum wage, would harm West Virginia’s economy. “I can’t lose one job. I don’t have one to spare,” he told me. “I know where it’s going to hit the hardest: rural America.” He has proposed a compromise at eleven dollars an hour. “I looked at my Democrat friends and I said, ‘You’re going to let the perfect be the enemy of the good,’ ” he added. “When do you expect to get a hundred per cent of everything you want?”
Even as many Democrats complain about Manchin, they have been quietly composing a playbook for winning his coƶperation. “Whatever you want the ultimate resolution to be, you need to propose something that’s two or three ticks to the left of that, so that Manchin can look like he dragged you toward the middle,” the Democratic strategist said. But Sean McElwee, a progressive activist who heads the polling firm Data for Progress, advised a different approach: “If you’re talking about this stuff in the way that you would talk about it with your liberal friends, you’re almost certainly fucking up.” McElwee wanted Democrats to take a vocabulary lesson from Manchin: Don’t talk about infrastructure spending that will combat climate change; talk about jobs. “Too often, when we have something in mind like tax credits for electric vehicles, the batteries are not even American-made,” he said. Manchin has been wary of proposals to create a clean-energy standard. But, McElwee said, “I think he is gettable on a clean-energy standard if it can create jobs, because he understands that West Virginia needs a part of that.” In March, Biden nominated Gayle Manchin to be the federal co-chair of the Appalachian Regional Commission, a development agency launched by J.F.K. to address the poverty that he had observed during the 1960 campaign.
Some Democrats suspected that Manchin would agree to change the filibuster after he saw obvious cases of Republican obstruction. Reid predicted to me, “I think there’s going to come a time when Joe’s going to say, ‘I’ve given it all this time. I’ve tried to be bipartisan. We can’t take it anymore.’ ”
The pressure on Manchin was rising on the right, too. In March, as Congress moved toward showdowns over voting rights and infrastructure, the advocacy group Americans for Prosperity, which was founded by the Koch brothers, the conservative oil magnates, bought advertisements on West Virginia radio, urging Manchin to “reject a partisan agenda that will hold West Virginians back from reaching their full potential.” The group also created a Web site to generate public demands for Manchin to stop “harmful partisan policy.” A coalition of conservative groups bused activists in to Charleston to stage a rally at the capitol, calling on Manchin to protect the filibuster.
They got what they wanted. On June 6th, in an op-ed in the Charleston Gazette-Mail, Manchin wrote that he would not alter the filibuster or advance a voting-rights bill with no Republican support. “I believe that partisan voting legislation will destroy the already weakening binds of our democracy,” he wrote. The voting-rights bill, which Senate Democrats had declared their top priority, was effectively dead. Manchin was not the only Democrat with reservations about the bill—“I think he is one person who speaks for many,” McElwee said—but he was the most outspoken, and some members of his party no longer hid their contempt. Mondaire Jones, a progressive congressman from New York, tweeted, “Manchin’s op-ed might as well be titled, ‘Why I’ll vote to preserve Jim Crow.’ ”
Nobody who knows Manchin well was surprised by his decision. “I would bet a year of my salary that he would not agree to change the filibuster,” Jonathan Kott, a former senior adviser to Manchin, had told me. “He would quit the Senate before he does that.” There was little that Democrats could do to persuade him. They could threaten to take away his position as chairman of the Energy and Natural Resources Committee, but that would only improve his reputation with conservatives at home. Progressives could challenge him in a primary, but, if they lost the general election, they would likely end up with a Republican along the lines of the state’s junior senator, Shelley Moore Capito, who has voted to repeal the Affordable Care Act, defund Planned Parenthood, block the Covid-relief bill, and acquit Trump, twice. If Democrats want to feel less captive to Manchin, they need to figure out how to elect more Democrats in places like West Virginia.
One morning in May, I followed Manchin to an event in Fairmont, the seat of Marion County, near his home town. Before it started, he spoke to a group of reporters about the For the People Act, nimbly switching between the vocabularies of the right and the left. “I understand the states’ rights,” he said, and mentioned the Tenth Amendment—catnip for conservatives. “But, on the other hand, every election should be accessible.” Voter access—that would play well with Democrats. “We should know who you are.” Voter I.D.—back to the right again. “But now you’ve got some states going off the rails, trying to make it almost difficult, because they don’t like the outcome of the election”—once more to the left. (A few weeks later, Manchin circulated a memo to colleagues in Congress, suggesting that he’d support the bill if it included a similarly mixed set of provisions. If common ground does not exist in Washington, Manchin was going to try to will it into being.)
After finishing with the reporters, Manchin stepped to the front of an auditorium full of local officials, including leaders of small towns and cities nearby. He talked to them first about the thing they had come to hear—how they could tap into Covid-relief funds—and then about what was on his mind. “We have been radicalized,” he said. “I never had a cell phone growing up. I started so long ago, it was four-digit numbers.” That got a laugh. “I didn’t have a computer. I never had access to all this information around. I didn’t know how to process it. None of us did, in our age group. You know how we processed it? We went to our comfort zone. If you’re leaning a little bit left, if you’re a little bit more progressive or liberal, ‘I got to find somebody who’s talking to me.’ If you’re a little bit right and very conservative, ‘I got another network over here. I’ve got a cable news I can go to, and they’ll tell me exactly what makes me feel good.’ So we got ourselves in this situation.”
In Manchin’s laments about radical politics and the pace of change, one could hear the protests of a man standing athwart history, not quite yelling “Stop,” but certainly yelling “Whoa.” If Republicans regain the majority in 2022, his moment of prominence will be over as abruptly as it arrived. What he does until then will determine if the Democratic Party, to which he devoted his career, remembers him as a hero who advanced its goals or as the man who obstructed them. For all of Manchin’s hesitations, politics is changing fast, even in the terrain he calls home.
Not far from where Manchin spoke to the local grandees, I had coffee with Aryanna Islam, a senior at Manchin’s alma mater, West Virginia University, who had recently been elected president of the College Democrats of West Virginia. Islam grew up in Fairmont. She told me that her father, Pinto, had moved from Bangladesh in 1992, and found work at Cracker Barrel, where he fell in love with his boss, a white West Virginian named Kathy Long. “They had to date secretly until he quit,” Islam said. She grew up in the public schools in Marion County, which were overwhelmingly white. “I was the diversity,” she said. In 2008, when she was eight years old, she read a kids’ biography of Obama and learned about his biracial background. “I said, ‘Wait a minute—that’s me, too!’ That really affected me.” When she was seventeen, she got a job through Manchin’s office as a page in the U.S. Senate. Two years later, she returned to intern in his office, answering phones and jotting down constituents’ comments. “There were a lot of angry phone calls. You’ll have one that’s, like, ‘He’s working with A.O.C.!’ And the other is, like, ‘He’s not working with her enough.’ ” She credited Manchin with launching her into politics.
But, over time, she had grown uncomfortable with his conservatism. To earn extra money, she worked at K.F.C., for eight dollars and seventy-five cents an hour. “The typical trope is ‘Oh, there’s just teen-agers working there,’ ” she said. “But that’s just not true, and if they don’t have enough to live on they have to resort to welfare services, to put food on their table.” She did not understand Manchin’s arguments for limiting the minimum wage to eleven dollars an hour. “It’s not livable, even here in West Virginia,” she said. “National media would have you believe ‘Oh, we’re very conservative. We don’t want the government giving us stimulus checks.’ But people really, really appreciated that! Where I worked, people were, like, ‘I need this to pay rent, or get food for the week.’ ”
Islam ran for the state legislature last year, and lost, but she’ll run again. She’s twenty-one years old, and like most of her friends she sees herself as a thoroughgoing progressive. She said, “A lot of people around here see government as a force for bad, and I want to see that change. I think it’s important to bring a voice like mine, as someone who’s young, who’s a person of color here in West Virginia, especially. I’d bring a whole new perspective to things. I want to get that into our political system.”
Democrats in Washington tend to assume that places like West Virginia will never be pulled back from the grip of the conservative movement. But, in recent years, a liberal backlash to the political establishment has gained force there. In the 2016 Democratic primary, Bernie Sanders won all fifty-five counties in the state. This February, a poll commissioned by workers’ advocates found that sixty-three per cent of West Virginians support a fifteen-dollar minimum wage—a level comparable to the state’s support for Trump. Islam has heard enough about bipartisanship. “Senator Manchin is waiting for something that’s just never going to happen,” she said. “It’s just holding up action that can be taken. He’s worried about what Republicans in West Virginia will say about him, but they’re going to trash him no matter what. So he might as well get us something in the process. He has the power now.”
By a 5-to-4 vote, the court ruled that Congress does not have the power under the Constitution to establish statutory rights and the power to enforce those rights with private lawsuits.
At issue in the case was the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which regulates how consumer credit agencies report and disseminate personal information. Specifically, the case centered on the actions of TransUnion, one of the "big three" credit reporting companies in the nation. It compiles information on consumers and sells that information to businesses that want to ascertain creditworthiness. Beginning in 2002, TransUnion placed an alert on those individuals whose first and last names matched the names on the Treasury Department's list of terrorists, drug traffickers, or other serious criminals. The alert told businesses that bought the credit reports that the individuals were a "potential match" for those flagged on the Treasury Department list.
A class of 8,185 individuals with alerts on their credit files sued TransUnion for damages under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which established a right to bring such lawsuits. But on Friday, the Supreme Court said Congress exceeded its constitutional authority in allowing a broad category of individuals to sue for being labelled as possible terrorists and drug traffickers.
The court said that much of the alleged harm was "too speculative" and that only a fraction of the individuals whose names had been matched and flagged could sue--only those who could prove an actual, concrete injury. In this case, that amounted to only about one-fifth of the class that sued. The court threw out the claims of the rest of the class, those who claimed a risk of injury. The court said that Congress had no right to grant that group standing to sue.
Writing for five-justice majority, Justice Brett Kavanaugh compared inaccurate data that was internally maintained by the company but never shared with a third party to a defamatory letter that someone writes but never sends. "A letter that is not sent does not harm anyone, no matter how insulting the letter is. " Similarly here, he said, the 6,332 class members whose "match alert" information was not transmitted to third-party businesses ... suffered no harm."
Kavanaugh wrote for himself, and four of the court's other conservatives, including Chief Justice John Roberts, and Justices Samuel Alito, Neil Gorsuch, and Amy Coney Barrett.
In dissent was the court's most conservative justice, Clarence Thomas, and the court's three liberals. Thomas said that the court had rendered unto itself and itself alone the power to define which claims have merit.
"In the name of protecting the separation of powers, this court has relieved the legislature of its power to create and define rights," said Thomas.
The majority, he concluded, had posed and itself answered a single question: "Who could possibly think that a person is harmed when he requests and is sent an incomplete credit reports, or is sent a suspicious notice information him that he may be a designated drug trafficker or terrorist, or is not sent anything informing him how to remove this inaccurate red flag?" wrote Thomas. "The answer is, of course, legion: Congress, the President, the jury [that awarded $40 million in damages]" the lower courts, "and four members of this court."
In a separate dissent, Justice Elena Kagan, joined by Thomas and the other dissenters, accused the majority of "transform[ing]" the law of standing that governs who has the right to sue "from a doctrine of judicial modesty into a tool of judicial aggrandizement. The court holds for the first time that a specific class of plaintiffs whom Congress allowed to bring a lawsuit cannot do so," she said.
Kagan went on to mock the majority's "set of curious assumptions"--among them that "people who specifically request a copy of their credit report may not even open the envelope ... or that people who learn their credit files label them potential terrorists would not have tried to correct the error." Rather than accept "those suppositions," said Kagan, "I sign up with Justice Thomas that one "need only tap into common sense to know that receiving a letter identifying you as a potential drug trafficker or terrorist is harmful" and thus a basis for a lawsuit.
Lawyers on both sides of the case see Friday's decision as a big victory for the large corporations. Andrew Pincus who filed a brief in the case on behalf of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce, said the ruling imposes "significant limits" on consumer lawsuits by requiring proof of concrete injury for a suit to go forward.
Scott Nelson, who filed a brief on behalf of Public Citizen, said the decision "really limits Congress' ability to create rights and let people enforce those rights" because, as he put it, "The court will second guess the congressional judgment on when there is a real injury" that justifies a lawsuit.
A woman rallies for rent relief in Los Angeles on May 1. California has announced a plan to pay off unpaid rent for tenants who fell behind during the pandemic. (photo: David McNew/AFP/Getty Images)
The rent forgiveness program would pay landlords all of what they are owed while simultaneously giving tenants a clean slate
The state’s governor, Gavin Newsom, is negotiating with legislators and said the $5.2bn plan would pay landlords all of what they were owed while giving renters a clean slate.
If successful, the rent forgiveness plan would amount to an extraordinary form of aid in the largest state in the US, which has suffered from a major housing crisis and severe economic inequality since long before Covid-19.
An estimated 900,000 renters in California owe an average of $4,600 in back rent, according to a recent analysis. Without aggressive protections and relief, experts say the state would experience a tsunami of evictions and a dramatic worsening of its homelessness crisis. Even with restrictions on evictions in place since March 2020, vulnerable renters have continued to be pushed out of their homes while out of work and unable to pay the high costs of rent in the state.
Federal eviction protections are due to expire at the end of June, as are California’s regulations, which applied to more renters. Lawmakers, who are currently negotiating over the state’s roughly $260bn operating budget, are debating whether to extend the restrictions on evictions beyond June. The vast majority of people who have applied for relief have not yet received funds, according to state officials, which is why tenant groups are pushing for protections to remain in place.
“The expectation for people to be up and at ’em and ready to pay rent on 1 July is wholeheartedly unfair,” Kelli Lloyd, a 43-year-old single mother, told the Associated Press. She said she had not worked consistently since the pandemic began in March 2020.
Lloyd, a member of the advocacy group Alliance of Californians for Community Empowerment, is supposed to pay $1,924 a month for a two-bedroom, two-bathroom rent-controlled apartment in the Crenshaw district of south Los Angeles. But she said she was $30,000 behind after not working for most of the last year to care for her two children as daycare centers closed and schools halted in-person learning.
That debt will probably be covered by the government. But Lloyd said she had recently lost a job at a real estate brokerage and had yet to find another. She is worried she could be evicted if the protections expire.
“Simply because the state has opened back up doesn’t mean people have access to their jobs,” she said.
Meanwhile, in the wine country area of Sonoma county, Keith Becker, a property manager, told the AP that 14 tenants were more than $100,000 behind in rent payments. It had put financial pressure on the owners, who Becker said had “resigned themselves to it”. He argued that the eviction protections should end.
The $5.2bn fund to pay off people’s rent comes from multiple federal aid packages approved by Congress. Jason Elliott, a senior counselor to Newsom on housing and homelessness, said that figure appeared to be more than enough to cover all rent debts in the state.
But the state has been slow to distribute that money, and it is unlikely it can spend it all by 30 June. A report from the California department of housing and community development showed that of the $490m in requests for rental assistance through 31 May, just $32m had been paid. That did not include the 12 cities and 10 counties that run their own rental assistance programs.
“It’s challenging to set up a new, big program overnight,” said the assemblyman David Chiu, a Democrat from San Francisco and chair of the assembly housing and community development committee. “It has been challenging to educate millions of struggling tenants and landlords on what the law is.”
Some officials have also questioned whether the program in its current form will reach all of the renters in debt. One San Francisco county official said the amount of aid allotted for his region was not nearly enough to cover the debts claimed by tenants, and applications were continuing to pour in. And the LA Times reported that the current funding formula was projected to leave 43% of LA applicants with no financial assistance.
While employment among middle- and high-wage jobs has exceeded pre-pandemic levels, employment rates for Californians earning less than $27,000 a year are down more than 38% since January 2020, according to Opportunity Insights, an economic tracker based at Harvard University.
“The stock market may be fine, we may be technically reopened, but people in low-wage jobs, which are disproportionately people of color, are not back yet,” said Madeline Howard, senior attorney for the Western Center on Law and Poverty.
Some housing advocates are asking the state to keep the eviction ban in place until the unemployment rate among low-wage workers has dropped to pre-pandemic levels. The idea is similar to how state officials would impose restrictions on businesses in counties where Covid-19 infection rates were higher while those with lower infection rates could reopen more quickly.
Berry has demonstrated on the podium before, but her impromptu protest Saturday came only after what she called a “setup” by meet officials.
Berry said she had no expectation to protest after she finished third in the hammer throw — and in fact did not even think the national anthem would be played. The song is played only once a night at the trials, not during every medal ceremony as at the Olympics. Afterward, she said an official told her the anthem would be played before she took the podium and posed for pictures.
“I feel like it was setup,” Berry said with a burst of laughter. “I feel like they did that on purpose, and I was pissed, to be honest. I was thinking about what should I do. Eventually, I just stayed there and just swayed. I put my shirt over my head. It was real disrespectful. I know they did that on purpose, but it’ll be all right. I see what’s up.”
Berry has been a pivotal figure in the discussion over protest at Olympic and international events. At the 2019 Pan-American Games in Peru, Berryraised her fistwhile standing atop the podium. The U.S. Olympic and Paralympic Committee placed her on probation for one yearfor violating Rule 50, the International Olympic Committee regulation that prohibits political protest. Last summer, the USOPC publicly and privately apologized to Berry. This year,it changed its rulesto allow protest at domestic events.
Berry still wants to use her voice to advocate for Black communities she feels have been wronged by police brutality and systemic racism. But Saturday night, she had no intention of hearing, much less protesting, the anthem.
“It really wasn’t a message,” Berry said. “I didn’t want to be up there. I felt like it was a setup. I was hot. I was ready to get my pictures and get to some shade.”
When the anthem played, Berry swayed next to the podium, a bronze medal around her neck and a bouquet of flowers in her hands. Fellow Olympic qualifiers DeAnna Price and Brooke Andersen stood on the top two steps. Berry held up a black T-shirt that read “Activist Athlete.”
“It was funny because they said they were going to play it before we walked out,” Berry said. “It just happened they played it when we were out there. So, you know, it’s okay. I really don’t want to talk about the anthem because that’s not important. The anthem don’t speak for me. It never has.”
The national anthem started playing at 5:20 local time in Eugene, roughly the same time it has been played on other nights of the trials. A USA Track and Field official suggested the timing with Berry’s podium ceremony was coincidental.
Although Berry said she did not anticipate protesting Saturday, she remains committed to her using sport to advance her cause.
“It’s really important for me and my community just to be able to represent,” Berry said. “I think sports is a distraction. Sports is entertainment. But my purpose and my voice and mission is bigger than the sport. So me being able to represent my communities and my people and those who have died at the hands of police brutality, those who have died to this systemic racism, I feel like that’s the important part. That’s why I’m going. And that’s why I was here today.”
Berry will be on a larger stage at the Tokyo Olympics. This weekend, Olympics-focused website Inside the Games reported the IOC isconsideringallowing some forms of protest at certain times.
“I feel like that’s not enough,” Berry said. “It’s our sacrifice. It’s our podium. It’s our moment. So we should be able to protest whatever we want. It’s not for them to decide.”
Berry secured her second Olympic bid with a throw of 241 feet 2 inches. It has been a whirlwind five years for Berry, who said she lost sponsors after her 2019 protest and thought she may have to leave the sport before Color of Change, an advocacy group, backed her.
Berry has said she will not back down in Tokyo, regardless of the rules in place. She has not decided how she will demonstrate.
“When I get there,” Berry said, smiling, “I’ll figure out something to do.”
The emotional labor of creating a more accepting league should not fall to LGBTQ athletes.
his week, Carl Nassib, a defensive end for the Las Vegas Raiders, came out as gay on Instagram. He’s the first active player in the NFL to be out publicly — a major milestone for men’s sports. Nassib’s announcement was quickly supported by the NFL community and his team, making it seem like his roster spot will be safe for the upcoming season. In a masculine, cutthroat league where players can be released at a moment’s notice for any reason, broad acceptance of Nassib marks a shift.
Nassib is not the first high-profile football player to come out — that would be Wade Davis in 2012. However, Davis did not play in a regular season game, and he came out after retiring. On the eve of the 2014 NFL draft, another player, Michael Sam, came out. Sam was eventually drafted by the St. Louis Rams, but was cut by the team before the season began. After a short stint with the Montreal Alouettes in Canada, Sam retired.
While Sam has avoided the spotlight since retiring, Davis has become an activist and public speaker. In the aftermath of Nassib’s announcement, Davis spoke with Vox on what goes through an athlete’s mind when they play while closeted, and what steps he thinks both the NFL and society need to take to foster a culture of acceptance.
The following, in Wade Davis’s words, has been condensed and edited.
For me, playing sports while not disclosing my sexuality was a double-edged sword. In some ways, being gay offered me misguided motivation. Because I hadn’t wrestled with my own internalized homophobia, and I believed that I needed to prove something to heterosexual people, I felt I had to show that I was as good an athlete as the straight guys. It took me many years before realizing that I didn’t have to prove anything to anyone.
I wish I knew then what I know now: that not learning to love myself as gay was a much greater loss than the possibility of not playing football. And the journey back to myself was and is just as painful. What I am also learning is LGBTQ folks are not actually the ones that need to be accepted here. We have already done the really hard work of accepting ourselves.
Some of the work that is still left unchecked is in the language that we use. The language of “coming out” connotes this idea that we have something to hide and that we are monsters who exist in the closet. What’s true is that the world is acting monstrous toward us.
We invite people in, as writer and activist Darnell Moore taught us. We extend an invitation to heterosexual people to not be so fearful of who we are. I would say that the work is for heterosexual people to see our ownership of our sexuality as a model for what it means to accept a part of yourself that the world says is unacceptable.
Because when they learn how to accept more of themselves, it makes it harder to reject someone else. If this shift happens and heterosexual people start sharing their stories of self-acceptance, it could crack open a space where you see more athletes who identify as LGBTQ, specifically in male-identifying sport spaces, because we trust that heterosexual folks have done the work.
Another shift that has to happen in sports is that coaches, other players, and owners have to get much more eloquent, much more sophisticated, and much more competent in their understanding of the differences between things like sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity, so they become less fearful of the fact that we’re going to be much more present, and much, much more visible in sports.
The majority of the labor right now is being done by women and LGBTQ folks. The work of women in soccer and women in the WNBA — who have had more openly LGBTQ athletes and coaches, and who have pushed social justice conversations further — has really been a model for other athletes. Women in sports have historically focused on building the collective power of the marginalized to effect social change, risking their careers, while too many men have been focused on the accumulation of individual power to dominate and control and not take the same risk. These women athletes, especially women of color, have had the right focus, and gay male athletes need to align ourselves with them.
The impact of Michael Sam cannot be denied, either. People saw Michael Sam, the kiss of him and his partner during the NFL Draft, as a spectacle. But what’s true is that it’s folks like Michael Sam who have used spectacle as a way to make it much easier for people to do what Carl Nassib did. We need to recognize the revolutionary spirit and action of Michael Sam, and not think that Carl’s announcement was somewhat better or more eloquent.
Transgender folks and folks who are deemed much more effeminate in their presentation have also done a lot of the labor that allows folks like myself and Carl Nassib to have the courage to be more open about our sexuality. Most people don’t imagine gay men being able to play sports like football, baseball, basketball, hockey, and soccer. Nassib’s announcement is part of a continual fracturing of that age-old myth. For younger folks who have had greater proximity to folks who identify as LGBTQ, this is the way it should always have been, and they’re saying, what’s taken everyone else so long.
Because when the labor of education and acceptance shifts, we will reach a new inflection point. Then we won’t see Carl Nassib’s invitation — as opposed to his coming out — as separate from other social movements. Because if marginalized groups can start to see a connection, then we will be able to move forward into a much more unified, collective front.
For now, though, Carl Nassib is another model for LGBTQ folks who like or play sports, showing that sports is a space not only where we exist, but where we belong.
This image is from the more recent Letter To You album. (photo: Letter To You Album)
Lyrics Bruce Springsteen, Erie Canal. From the 2006 album The Seeger Sessions. Adapted from the 1905 original by Thomas S. Allen.
I've got a mule and her name is Sal Fifteen miles on the Erie Canal She's a good old worker and a good old pal Fifteen miles on the Erie Canal
We haul'd some barges in our day Filled with lumber, coal, and hay We know every inch of the way From Albany to Buffalo
Low bridge, everybody down Low bridge, yeah we're coming to a town And you'll always know your neighbor And you'll always know your pal If ya ever navigated on the Erie Canal
We'd better look around for a job, old gal Fifteen miles on the Erie Canal You can bet your life I'll never part with Sal Fifteen miles on the Erie Canal
Get up mule, here comes a lock We'll make Rome 'bout six o'clock One more trip and back we'll go Right back home to Buffalo
Low bridge, everybody down Low bridge, we're coming to a town You'll always know your neighbor And you'll always know your pal If ya ever navigated on the Erie Canal
Where would I be if I lost my pal Fifteen miles on the Erie Canal I'd like to see a mule good as my Sal Fifteen miles on the Erie Canal
A friend of mine once got her sore Now he's got a broken jaw 'Cause she let fly with an iron toe And kicked him back to Buffalo
Low bridge, everybody down Low bridge 'cause we're coming to a town You'll always know your neighbor And you'll always know your pal If ya ever navigated on the Erie Canal
Low bridge, everybody down Low bridge, we're coming to a town You'll always know your neighbor And you'll always know your pal If ya ever made a livin' on the Erie Canal
Low bridge, everybody down Low bridge, we're coming to a town You'll always know your neighbor And you'll always know your pal If ya ever navigated on the Erie Canal
Low bridge, everybody down Low bridge, we're coming to a town Hooo...
Demonstrators gathered this month in Minnesota for a traditional Indigenous water ceremony during a protest against the Line 3 project. (photo: Kerem Yucel/AFP/Getty Images)
The administration urged a court to throw out a challenge brought by tribal and environmental groups, backing a pipeline that would carry Canadian oil across Minnesota and Wisconsin.
The closely watched filing in federal court was the latest in a series of actions taken by the administration to back Trump-era approvals of oil and gas infrastructure, despite President Biden’s pledge to aggressively cut emissions from fossil fuels, a major driver of climate change. The pipeline, which is known as Line 3 and is being built by Canadian pipeline company Enbridge Energy, has been the focus of mass protests in recent weeks.
Mr. Biden could still decide to withdraw the federal permits that the pipeline depends upon for construction to proceed. But for now, the administration is defending a decision by the United States Army Corps of Engineers to issue those permits. That decision was made in the closing days of the Trump Administration.