Wednesday, March 11, 2020
CC News Letter 11 March - Love in the time of the Karuna virus
Dear Friend,
Yesterday, the Iranian health authorities announced that another 54 people had died from the coronavirus in the previous 24 hours. This, the highest toll in a single day since the start of the outbreak, brings the total number of deaths to nearly 300. Another 881 new cases have been confirmed, increasing the total infection count to 8,042. At least 23 Iranian legislators and some senior government officials have caught the disease and two have died. Officials announced at the weekend that the virus had spread to almost all Iran’s provinces, warned that the number of cases could rise to more than 450,000 and that many might die.
A lovely poem by Ra Sh "Love in the time of the Karuna virus". Don't miss it!
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US sanctions on Iran turn coronavirus into a catastrophe
by Jean Shaoul
Yesterday, the Iranian health authorities announced that another 54 people had died from the coronavirus in the previous 24 hours. This, the highest toll in a single day since the start of the outbreak, brings the total number of deaths to nearly 300. Another 881 new cases have been confirmed, increasing the total infection count to 8,042. At least 23 Iranian legislators and some senior government officials have caught the disease and two have died. Officials announced at the weekend that the virus had spread to almost all Iran’s provinces, warned that the number of cases could rise to more than 450,000
and that many might die.
Yesterday, the Iranian health authorities announced that another 54 people had died from the coronavirus in the previous 24 hours.
This, the highest toll in a single day since the start of the outbreak, brings the total number of deaths to nearly 300. Another 881 new cases have been confirmed, increasing the total infection count to 8,042.
At least 23 Iranian legislators and some senior government officials have caught the disease and two have died. Officials announced at the weekend that the virus had spread to almost all Iran’s provinces, warned that the number of cases could rise to more than 450,000 and that many might die.
Tehran at night (Photo: Babak Farrokh)
Iran is the third worst infected country after China and Italy, with the highest death rate per reported case, leading to a widespread belief that the Iranian authorities have been underreporting the extent of the spread of the virus. Opposition groups inside and outside Iran claim that the number of deaths is far higher, with infections numbering in the tens of thousands. Iraj Harirchi, Iran’s deputy health minister, who has contracted the virus, denied any effort to downplay its spread.
Iran has shut down school and universities, cancelled public gatherings, including Friday prayers, concerts and sports events, and suspended flights to Europe. Last week, the government announced the mobilization of 300,000-strong teams in health centres, schools and bases across the country belonging to the Basij, Iran’s paramilitary security agency. It also said that it is setting up of 26,000 health centres in Iran’s cities, towns and villages that would test suspected patients and monitor them in their homes for three days. If patients’ health did not improve within three days, they would be taken to a hospital or receive in-home care.
The judicial authorities have released 70,000 prisoners, those serving less than five years, in an effort to combat the virus.
Iran also announced that it has produced a vaccine that is awaiting permits from Iran’s Food and Drug Organization to enter the clinical phase, while the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) said it is working to develop its own coronavirus testing kits.
Iran is struggling to cope with the virus, which has become a threatening political issue. Citizens and experts have accused the government of concealing information and failing to take action as soon as the contagion became known. This includes the failure to quarantine the epicentre of the disease—the city of Qom, Iran’s seventh largest and one of the holiest cities for Shia Muslims, where the disease and two deaths were first reported on February 19.
Regime opponents claim that the government refused to draw attention to the spread of the virus that must have occurred much earlier than February 19 in order not to turn the virus and lack of healthcare facilities into election issues and jeopardise the turnout for the February 21 elections.
Since then, the virus has spread from Iran to other Middle East and Central Asian countries as well as Canada and New Zealand as people have returned from Qom and other Iranian cities. Should the virus spread to impoverished Syria, Iraq and Lebanon, the consequences could be catastrophic.
Nevertheless, few commentators outside Iran have seen fit to mention the devastating humanitarian consequences of US sanctions—designed to exert “maximum pressure” on Iran to effect regime change—on the country’s beleaguered healthcare system.
Successive US administrations have employed sanctions as a key foreign policy tool to inflict untold suffering on innocent people in various countries. The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) estimated that an additional half a million Iraqi children had died between 1991 and 1998 as a result of the sanctions against the government of Saddam Hussein.
Washington’s relentless campaign against Iran since the 1979 Revolution has taken a terrible toll. The 2012-2015 sanctions under the Obama administration led to Iran’s oil and gas exports falling from over $9 billion in 2012 to under $3 billion in 2016 when sanctions were briefly, if incompletely, lifted after the signing of the 2015 nuclear accord. This shattered the country’s economy and access to critical food, pharmaceutical and industrial supplies.
At that time, the difficulty in obtaining export licenses for medicine and medical equipment led to acute shortages of some drugs and medical facilities, huge price rises, with a massive impact on six million people suffering from diseases such as haemophilia, multiple sclerosis, thalassemia, epilepsy, and various immunological disorders, as well as transplant and kidney dialysis patients and those being treated for cancer.
The re-imposition of much broader sanctions after the US unilaterally withdrew from the 2015 accord in 2018, and the threat of secondary sanctions against those countries supplying Iran, resulted in a cut-off of vital medicines, with reports that 80 important drugs were no longer available under the Iranian state’s drug insurance scheme.
According to a report by Human Rights Watch (HRW), although humanitarian trade is exempt from US sanctions, “broad restrictions on financial transactions, coupled with aggressive rhetoric from US officials, have drastically constrained the ability of Iranian entities to finance humanitarian imports, including vital medicines and medical equipment.” The US subsequently placed Iran’s central bank, along with some 20 other institutions, on its list of Specially Designated Global Terrorists.
These restrictions, along with the fall of the Iranian currency, have severely limited the ability of Iranian companies and hospitals to purchase essential medicines and medical equipment. Although Iran produces 97 percent of its medicines, a third of these drugs are made with imported ingredients. Most of the drugs needed to treat rare and chronic diseases, including cancers, are part of the three percent of essential medicines that must be imported. According to a list published by the Young Journalist Club news agency last year, 79 medications were no longer covered in Iran, meaning patients must pay for them.
Medical costs are likely to rise further with inflation running at 40 percent last year, and oil revenues plunging. According to OPEC, by October 2019, Iran’s crude oil production had fallen to 2.1 million bpd. Bloomberg reported that only 260,000 bpd on average was being exported. According to the International Monetary Fund, Iran’s GDP shrank by about 4.8 percent in the 2018 and another 9.5 percent in 2019, while unemployment rose from 14.5 percent in 2018 to 16.8 percent in 2019.
In October 2018, the United Nations’ International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague unanimously struck down US sanctions against Iran. Iran had brought the case, arguing that the US was in breach of its 1955 Treaty of Amity with Iran. The ICJ ruled that Washington must let Iran use international financial payments systems to buy humanitarian supplies. It demanded that Washington not block trade in critical goods, making it clear that the US war drive against Iran—including the re-imposition of banking sanctions on Iran—violated international law.
The Trump administration responded by saying it would withdraw from the treaty and review all international agreements that could expose it to binding decisions by the ICJ.
On February 29, President Donald Trump offered aid to Iran to help it cope with the virus if the country asked for assistance. Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani rejected this, saying, “They’ve appeared with a mask of sympathy that ‘we also want to help the people of Iran’.” He added, “If you are really telling the truth, then lift sanctions from medicine.”
Foreign Ministry spokesperson Abbas Mousavi went further, saying that the US was using the coronavirus outbreak as part of its propaganda campaign against Iran. He told reporters, “Since the outbreak of the virus in Iran, we have been observing the US-led anti-Iranian propaganda campaign and know about the measures the Americans have taken to reduce Iranian nation’s morale.”
Originally published in WSWS.org
Love in the time of the Karuna virus
by Ra Sh
the symptoms of the Karuna vius were noticeable everywhere. people
were happy. unburdened by wars, the governments spent more on food
and culture. Happy couples roamed the streets in the cities and the villages
freely, no one bothered them. no one watched anyone kissing.anyone hugging.
Coronavirus Offerings and Job Losses: University Reliance on China Bites
by Dr Binoy Kampmark
It was predicted, warned against and is happening. Universities fattened by the Chinese student market are now in a state of financial shock, cutting losses, trimming courses and doing what over managed institutions do best: remove working productive staff while preserving the gouty managerial class. COVID-19 was but a catalyst for something that
was already deep seated, a doomsday scenario for universities with management structures keen to make a killing from one traditional source. There were other incentives to do so, of course: falling government investment in education, an increased interest in finding sources of private income.
Two Other Pandemics: The Lemming and Apathy Viruses
by Philip A Farruggio
Of course, the worst pandemic of the 21st century is out and about us. Italy is now in a ‘lockdown’ state and throughout most of the world people are in a panic mode. And why not? Viruses like this Corona Virus can kill. Yet, in the world of politics there have been, for a long time now, those two other ones: The Lemming Virus and the Apathy virus.
Of course, the worst pandemic of the 21st century is out and about us. Italy is now in a ‘lockdown’ state and throughout most of the world people are in a panic mode. And why not? Viruses like this Corona Virus can kill. Yet, in the world of politics there have been, for a long time now, those two other ones: The Lemming Virus and the Apathy virus. They only kill what is left of our Republican Democracy… which is not much at all! The Trump cabal has very shrewdly mislabeled what is actually the main force behind this hijacking of our democracy, the real Deep State. What Eisenhower referred to as the Military Industrial Complex is in actuality the genuinely crooked and evil Deep State. Thus, Trump’s lemmings keep harping on what in reality is the actual cause of their demise, the force not in opposition, but actually behind his actions. It is the old joke of what the masochist said to the sadist. The masochist said ‘ Hit me!’ …. and the sadist answered ‘ NO!’ . Ditto for the lemmings who run off the cliff of reason when the Democratic Party pied pipers lead them.
We have this Two Party Scam that has continually gotten more powerful since the end of WW2. We know how the right wing Republican Party behaved when FDR tried to save Capitalism for his class. He made many great reforms to the system, with Socialism as the torch bearer. Not complete Socialism, but enough common sense policies to help stop the massive bleeding of the masses. Yet, the greedy Republican Fat Cats wanted no part of any reforms to their plantation system. If you read the history of Marine General Smedley Butler, you will find out how those same right wing Neo Nazi American Fat Cats tried to institute an actual Amerikan Coup de tat. Butler ratted them out and it failed. Then FDR dies and his successor, good old ‘ Give em hell Harry ‘ Truman, drops the two immoral and unnecessary A Bombs to show our new enemy, the Soviets, that we had the bomb and could make more than just one. Truman, the Democrat, helped set up the CIA under his watch to do as many ‘ dirty tricks’ they could do against his new enemy, our former ally. The Soviets were the ones who lost almost 30 million of their people to stop the Nazi machine. ‘ Friends…lovers no more’ as the song went. Harry also made sure that the Taft- Hartley Act was used to stop the unions from doing what should be as American as apple pie: The labor strike. From that point on the scam was in full throttle. So much so that the Democrats showed no balls when one of their own, JFK, stood up to that Deep State, and it killed him. Then, again, when that same evil group had MLK and then RFK murdered, silence from the other half of this One Party/Two Party con job .
Now we come to the most heinous of the two viruses, the Apathy Virus. We have millions, perhaps over a hundred million of our citizens, who suffer from this ailment. You engage one of them in any sort of conversation about the situation facing us here in Amerika, and either they A) Don’t know shit or B) Don’t care to know. One surmises that the old adage ‘ Ignorance is bliss’ rings true for them. They may care about what gossip is going on where they live, or care about their kids’ soccer league. Perhaps they care about the prices going up at the supermarket, or their other bills, but NEVER about the cause of these problems. Some may get pissed about the price of their cable or phone bills, or how they are being squeezed by health care or dental care costs, or insurance costs… but never about the WHY! They just frown and pay the bills ( and some may not even be able to do that ) and never seem to say ‘ Hey, this sucks! We need some needed change here!’ No, like the serfs on a giant feudal manor, they just know their place in the BIG PICTURE and won’t upset the MAN. Here’s the kicker: When someone or maybe a group of someones comes along to organize their anger and frustration into a better solution…they turn away. As far as the lengths that this Apathy Virus can come to, this writer remembers, as if it was yesterday:
Everyone knows the Kitty Genovese story. On March 13, 1964, three dozen New Yorkers heard a 28-year-old woman, their neighbor, being raped and stabbed in the street below by a house burglar named Winston Moseley, and no one did anything. Some turned up the television so as not to hear her screams.
W.C Fields said it best folks: ” Never give a sucker an even break!”
Philip A Farruggio is a contributing editor for The Greanville Post. He is also frequently posted on Global Research, Nation of Change, World News Trust and Off Guardian sites. He is the son and grandson of Brooklyn NYC longshoremen and a graduate of Brooklyn College, class of 1974. Since the 2000 election debacle Philip has written over 300 columns on the Military Industrial Empire and other facets of life in an upside down America. He is also host of the ‘ It’s the Empire… Stupid ‘ radio show, co produced by Chuck Gregory. Philip can be reached at paf1222@bellsouth.net.
Golden Anniversaries for Flawed Treaties: The NPT turns Fifty
by Dr Binoy Kampmark
The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons has also been edging its way into prominence as a prizing rival, but the NPT retains a traditional mix, permitting the club to remain exclusive to the clubbable, and to discourage others from joining it. It’s central point – that states with nuclear weapons will pursue general and complete disarmament – remains the stuff of hope, the aspiration of doddering types indifferent to certain timelines and programs.
Kashmir: Trapped in a Blind Alley?
by Sukla Sen
A war between India and Pakistan, if degenerates into a nuclear one – quite a possibility, may, as a consequence, even wipe out human civilisation from the face of the globe.
That itself is reason enough to make exploration of “peace” for Kashmir a worthwhile venture, in fact, an urgent existential
imperative.
Kashmir: Trapped in a Blind Alley? in India — by Sukla Sen — March 11, 2020
[A Note from the Author:
The monograph appearing below was penned about six months back and has since been carried by a journal, New Approach, in its, just published, (undated) special issue: J&K: Faultlines and Way Ahead.
It is edited by SekharBasu Roy.
The other contributors, understandably including three from Pakistan and one of Syrian origin, are: Lt. Gen.(Rtd.) Sanjay Kulkarni; WajahatHabibullah; Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) Harkirat Singh; Ram Puniyani; SanjivKrishanSood, ADG (Rtd.) BSF; TajHaider; Anil Khamboj, IG (Rtd.) BSF; K. Srinivasan, IG (Rtd.) BSF/CRPF; A K Pasha; Air Marshal (Rtd.) SumitMukerji; DhananjayTripathi; Babar Ayaz; Dr.WaielAwwad; F S Aijazuddin.
The virtually unaltered text, as had been sent to the editor of the said journal, is provided here with the addition of a very brief Epilogue, on account of the time lapsed in between.]
Kashmir: Trapped in a Blind Alley?
SuklaSen
Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameenast,
Hameenast-o hameenast-o hameen ast.1 (If there is a paradise on earth,
It is this, it is this, it is this.)
Amir Khusro (1253 – 1325), a famous Sufi musician, poet and scholar from India.
This couplet serves as a popular epithet for Kashmir, for centuries.
Doodh mango ge to kheerdenge, Kashmir mango ge to chir denge!2
(If you ask for milk, will offer youpudding, ask for Kashmir and will just tear you apart!)
An oft-repeated RSS slogan, rather war cry, on Kashmir.
Intro
In South Asia, the two most powerful neighbours, armed with nuclear weapons along with all the three – land, air and subsea, launching platforms, are constantly bickering.
So much so that this region is considered one of the most threatening global nuclear flashpoints.3
One of the major, perhaps the most major, issues of dispute is Kashmir.4And a war between India and Pakistan, if degenerates into a nuclear one – quite a possibility5, may, as a consequence, even wipe out human civilisation from the face of the globe.6
That itself is reason enough to make exploration of “peace” for Kashmir a worthwhile venture, in fact, an urgent existential imperative.
In the following, an attempt has been made, taking off from a brief description of Kashmir’s geography/topography/demography, recount of its past and, then, more recent developments – of which the “dispute” is the centrepiece, in some greater details.
Before proceeding further, it is, however, necessary to clarify that “Kashmir”, as used by an Indian, may denote either of the two: (i) the Kashmir Valley and (ii) the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
In order to locate it appropriately, it has to be read in the specific given context.
Geography,Topographyand DemographyKashmir, a 222,236 sq km region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent, is surrounded by China in the northeast, the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south, by Pakistan in the west, and by Afghanistan in the northwest. The region has been dubbed “disputed territory” between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan. A border, called the Line of Control (agreed to in 1972) divides the two parts. The eastern area of Kashmir, comprising the northeastern part of the region (Aksai Chin) has been under the control of China since 1962. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and in the Pakistan-controlled parts.7
The Kashmir region is predominantly mountainous, with deep, narrow valleys and high, barren plateaus. The relatively low-lying Jammu and Punch (Poonch) plains in the southwest are separated by the thickly forested Himalayan foothills and the PirPanjal Range of the Lesser Himalayas from the larger, more fertile, and more heavily populated Vale of Kashmir to the north. The vale, situated at an elevation of about 5,300 feet (1,600 metres), constitutes the basin of the upper Jhelum River and contains the city of Srinagar. Jammu and the vale lie in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, while the Punch lowlands are largely in Azad Kashmir.8
A princely state during the British colonial period, Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) was created by the British in 1846 with a Hindu Maharaja, Gulab Singh, ruling over a Muslim majority population. It consisted of three religiously and linguistically diverse regions: the Kashmir Valley with a largely Muslim population; the Jammu region with a Hindu majority; and the population of the Ladakh region which was half Buddhist, half Muslim.9
Past History in BriefAccording to legend, an ascetic named Kashyapa reclaimed the land now comprising Kashmir from a vast lake. That land came to be known as Kashyapamar and, later, Kashmir. Buddhism was introduced by the Mauryan emperor Ashoka in the 3rd century BCE, and from the 9th to the 12th century CE the region appears to have achieved considerable prominence as a centre of Hindu culture. A succession of Hindu dynasties ruled Kashmir until 1346, when it came under Muslim rule. The Muslim period lasted nearly five centuries, ending when Kashmir was annexed to the Sikh kingdom of the Punjab in 1819 and then to the Dogra kingdom of Jammu in 1846.
Thus, the Kashmir region in its contemporary form dates from 1846, when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the First Sikh War, Raja Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu, was created maharaja (ruling prince) of an extensive but somewhat ill-defined Himalayan kingdom “to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi.” The creation of this princely state helped the British safeguard their northern flank in their advance to the Indus and beyond during the latter part of the 19th century. The state thus formed part of a complex political buffer zone interposed by the British between their Indian empire and the empires of Russia and China to the north. For Gulab Singh, confirmation of title to these mountain territories marked the culmination of almost a quarter century of campaigning and diplomatic negotiation among the petty hill kingdoms along the northern borderlands of the Sikh empire of the Punjab.10
The“Dispute”: The Larger Background
It is commonly perceived that the “dispute” arose (between Pakistan and India) on account of the subcontinent gaining independence – on August 14-15 1947, throwing off the shackles of British colonial rule as the successful culmination of the long drawn out epic freedom struggle, with the Indian National Congress in the lead, combined with the changed scenario emerging post WW II – both globally and within Britain itself. Or more specifically, the traumatic “Partition” of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan – meant to be an exclusive homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent as demanded by the Muslim League, which, by then, came to represent the voices of large sections of Muslims.11
But the roots of the “dispute” are, actually, older than that andhave, rather expectedly, features unique to Kashmir.
Kashmir, as per the oldest, and subsequent, available historical accounts, used to be ruled by succession of dynastic rulers, following some form of Hinduism12 – dominated by Brahmans.
Buddhism would appear on the scene during the reign of emperor Ashoka (304–232 BCE) and Kashmir became a part of the Maurya Empire. Buddhism, apparently, remained a major presence till early sixth century.13
Kashmir’s encounter with Islam, via invasions from the west, commenced in early eleventh century.14 The first Sultanate came into being with a Ladakhi Buddhist ascending the throne in 1320 and converting to Islam.15In the 14th century, Islam gradually became the dominant religion in Kashmir. With the fall of Kashmir, a premier center of Sanskrit literary creativity, Sanskrit literature there disappeared.Islamic preacher Sheikh NooruddinNoorani, who is traditionally revered by Hindus as Nund Rishi, combined elements of Kashmir Shaivism with Sufi mysticism in his discourses.16Direct Mughal rule, under emperor Akbar, came to be established in late sixteenth century.17After four centuries of rule by successive Muslim rulers, Kashmir fell to the conquering armies of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh of Punjab in the 1820s. The Sikh rule had a pronounced anti-Muslim edge.18(T)he Kashmir region in its contemporary form dates from 1846, when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the First Sikh War, Raja Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu [an erstwhile servitor of the Sikh empire], was [by the victorious British] created maharaja (ruling prince) [for a consideration of Rupees 7.5 million] of an extensive but somewhat ill-defined Himalayan kingdom “to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi.” The creation of this princely state helped the British safeguard their northern flank in their advance to the Indus and beyond during the latter part of the 19th century. The state thus formed part of a complex political buffer zone interposed by the British between their Indian empire and the empires of Russia and China to the north. For Gulab Singh, confirmation of title to these mountain territories marked the culmination of almost a quarter century of campaigning and diplomatic negotiation among the petty hill kingdoms along the northern borderlands of the Sikh empire of the Punjab.19The Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu (as it was then called) was constituted between 1820 and 1858 and was “somewhat artificial in composition and it did not develop a fully coherent identity, partly as a result of its disparate origins and partly as a result of the autocratic rule which it experienced on the fringes of Empire.” It combined disparate regions, religions, and ethnicities: to the east, Ladakh was ethnically and culturally Tibetan and its inhabitants practised Buddhism; to the south, Jammu had a mixed population of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; in the heavily populated central Kashmir valley, the population was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, however, there was also a small but influential Hindu minority, the Kashmiri brahmins or pandits; to the northeast, sparsely populated Baltistan had a population ethnically related to Ladakh, but which practised Shi’a Islam; to the north, also sparsely populated, Gilgit Agency, was an area of diverse, mostly Shi’a groups; and, to the west, Punch was Muslim, but of different ethnicity than the Kashmir valley.20
Apart from the patchwork nature of the state thus created, no less significant was the fact that the Dogra kings, aided by their Kashmiri Pandit (i.e. Brahman), and Punjabi, administrative stuff, were very harsh with the vast impoverished Muslim masses of the Valley – mostly peasantry, artisansand workers.21This would leave its marked imprint on the subsequent history of Kashmir.22
One noteworthy aspect of the Dogra rule over Kashmir is that as distinct from Mughals, Afghans and Sikhs, whose rules had preceded that of the Dogras, Kashmir was only peripheral to their empires, and, consequently, would rule the region through proxies while remaining primarily engaged with the concerns of their larger empires,for the Dogras, Kashmir itself was the empire – their primary concer.23
The Immediate BackdropWith dissentions and anger simmering against the repressive Dogra rule – subordinate to the British colonial rulers, there was a blanket ban on the publication of newspapers until 1932 and no overt political activities or organisations were permitted.24
Regardless, the gatheringresentments exploded in public, in July 1931, in the form of first massive protest against the Dogra regime by the Muslims of the Valley, backed by the ulama.25On June 21 (or 25?), in a public meeting, first of its kind, before the gathered Muslim protestors, one Abdul Qadeer Khan delivered a rousing speech and gave a call to arms.He would soon be arrested and put on trial.26
During one of the trial sessions, on July 13, thousands of protestors would gather and attack – presumably after some of them being arrested, the Central Jail, the trial venue. They would be fired upon.Some protestors got killed. Thereafter, violence broke out in the main city of Srinagar. Hindus would be attacked and some of their houses looted. Again the mob would be fired upon causing deaths. Perhaps a few (3?)Hindus also got killed in the violence directed against them. Total toll on the Muslim side was reportedly 22 (or 21?).
But, July 13, thereafter, came to be observed as the Martyrs’ Day (Youm-e-Shuhada-e-Kashmir) by Kashmiri Muslims.
Versions of the whole episode, however, widely vary, depending on the source.27At any rate, while July 13 1931 stands out as a watershed moment in the history of Kashmir “dispute”, it also, in a way, busts the myth of a harmonious past28 of Kashmiri people.
At the most obvious level, July 13 stands for the first burst of open rebellion against Kashmir’s Hindu Dogra ruler by its alienated Muslim subjects and its suppression by the armed might of the state.
At another, the Hindu subjects of Kashmir got identified with their co-religionist ruler, in the eyes of both the overwhelming majority Muslim and minority Hindu subjects.29
Thus while the Kashmiri Muslims, by and large, view July 13 1931 as the launching event of their (unfinished?) freedom struggle against the then oppressive Hindu Dogra rulers, the Hindus, or the Kashmiri Pandits, to be more specific, imagine it as the first occasion of large-scale atrocities by the (far more numerous) Muslims of the Valley directed against them.
That is pretty much significant in making sense ofthe subsequent developments.
At any rate, under the impact of July 31 and at the prodding of the British, Maharajah Hari Singh,the then ruler, would introduce limited democracy to the state, which would permit, for the first time, formation of political groups.30
Taking advantage of the relative political freedom thus gained and spurred by continuing political turbulence the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC), an open political organisation of the Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir state – the first of its kind,was brought into being in a convention held in Srinagar from 14 to 16 October, 1932.
Interestingly, a speaker at the flag hoisting ceremony observed: Today, the hoisting of the green flag with crescent [a very obvious and explicit symbol of Islam] opens a new chapter in the history of Kashmir. As such, it is the duty of the Kashmiris to see that it remains hoisted always. This flag of the conference is the harbinger of love, peace and brotherhood among all the communities living in the State and it is the guarantor of peace, progress and happiness for all subjects of the Maharaja.
That is clearly indicative of intertwining of two conflicting urges: (I) marching as the flag-bearer of Islam and (ii) to champion the cause of love, peace and brotherhood among all the communities living in the State[and, thereby, a composite Kashmiri nationhood].31The implications of this self-contradiction would unfold in the coming days.
In any case, (i)n a special session in June 1939 the Muslim Conference was converted into the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference to represent all Kashmiris regardless of religion. This move brought the National Conference closer to the Indian National Congress which also favored a secular and non-communal approach to politics. This move towards secularizing the movement was apparently reinforced by the advice of Dr SaifuddinKitchlew, an eminent member of the Kashmiri diaspora in the Punjab, to Sheikh Abdullah.14Despite the towering stature of Sheikh Abdullah, the National Conference would formally split in 1941 and the earlier buried AJKMC was revived on June 13 1941.32So, here, one would find a broadly three-way tensions/conflicts emerging among the subjects of the repressive Dogra rule with three major players making appearance on the stage: (i) Hindus, spearheaded by the small but influential Kashmiri Pandits of the Valley, (ii) Muslims standing for composite Kashmiri nationalism and (iii) Muslims for Islamic solidarity – a natural ally of the Muslim League.
Be that as it may, in 1944, the National Conference, the most influential popular political outfit, led by Sheikh Abdullah issued a manifesto,Naya Kashmir (A New Kashmir), notionally addressed, and also presented, to the Dogra ruler, charting out a new roadmap for Kashmir’s polity. It had two parts: political and economic. It envisaged a democratic polity for Kashmir with the Dogra ruler as the nominal head. It was radical and socialistic in terms of its contents. it was very pro-women, called for universal franchise, freedom of expression, freedom of press, land to the tiller, state ownership of the industry, ending agrarian debt, ability of women to work in all trades and professions.33In its annual session in 1945, it passed a resolution espousing Indian unity, Indian independence and self-determination for India’s cultural nationalities.34 This is all the more significant considering the fact that the All-India Muslim League, in 1940, in Lahore had adopted the “Pakistan resolution”35 calling for separate homeland(s) for Indian Muslims(without, however, specifying any particular name) and Mohammad Ali Jinnah had articulated and put forward his “two-nation theory”36, in justification of the demand.
Consequently, when Jinnah visited Kashmir during the summer of 1944, he, reportedly, indicated his support for the Muslim Conference, led by Muslim leaders from the districts of Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur who had supported the “Pakistan Resolution”, in preference over the National Conference.37In May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir– an echo of the Quit India call issued by the Indian National Congress, directed at the British colonial rulers earlier in 194238, agitation directed against the Dogra rule and got arrested, being booked on sedition charge. Jawaharlal Nehru tried to go to Srinagar, to defend Sheikh in the court, but would be arrested and sent back.39The“three-way tensions/conflicts”, that had been referred to above, kept sharpening.
More so, under the impact of the evolving political scenario in India under direct British rule, particularly since the conclusion of the WW II and the transfer of baton in Britain itself from the diehard Conservative Winston Churchill to the Labour leader Clement Attlee, in July 194540 – in keen anticipation of the impending transfer of power and cessation of the British rule over the subcontinent.
The “Dispute” ArisesOn February 20 1947, Attlee, the British Prime Minister, told the House of Commons that his government intended to hand India over to the Indians not later than June, 1948 and Lord Louis Mountbatten was named the new Viceroy to accomplish this task.41
Prior to that, the Muslim League leader Jinnah had called upon the Indian Muslims to observe August 16 1946 as the Direct Action Day in order to realise its demand for separate homeland for the Muslims. As a consequence, Calcutta, the capital of the Bengal province, with a Muslim League Chief Minister then, had witnessed the Great Calcutta Killings on that day. Violence would, in time, spread to various other corners of India.42Apparently, intimidated by the prospect of the bearing the responsibility for failing to contain spreading violence and bloodshed, the newly appointed Viceroy advanced the day of transfer of power to August 15 1947 and delayed the announcement of the award of Partition to two days later.43In the event, in the run-up to and, even more than that, aftermath of the Partition, the subcontinent would encounter perhaps the most horrific episode of violence during that century perpetrated, and suffered, by civilian populations – in this case, involving the followers of three major religions in the region: Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam.44The state of Jammu and Kashmir was also not unaffected.45What, however, is more germane, in the current context, that the Partition left open the issue of the princely states, under British paramountcy – numbering over 560, of which the J&K was one of the two largest. The rulers had, at least hypothetically, three options: either merge with the Dominion of India or of Pakistan or remain independent.46
That gave rise to the “dispute”, involving both India and Pakistan and also the J&K state – its ruler and the (medley47 of) subjects.
The initial dilly-dallying48 on the part of the then Dogra ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, the geographical location of the state – bordering both the newly emergent Dominions, and the fact of Muslim majority population – with its own internal divisions, lorded over by a Hindu ruler – all these factors went to complicate things and contributed to the making of the “dispute”.
The “Dispute” UnfoldsIt would be necessary to keep in mind that this point onward, “history” itself will be highly controversial. “Facts” would be hotly contested and divergent narratives would be dished out by the bitterly feuding parties.49
An objective and conscientious student would have to willy-nilly take one’s own pick by applying one’s best judgement and carefully scanning those narratives.
The main trouble erupted on October 22 1947, in the form of waves of armed Pukhtoon intruders coming from Pakistan. However, things had already turned unsettled at least in the Poonch area, in Jammu. There were, as per one reading, three significant developments:
The first was a pro-Pakistan, anti-Maharaja uprising by Muslim Poonchis in western Jammu that ‘liberated’ large parts of this area from the Maharaja’s control. The second was major inter-religious violence in the province that caused upheaval and death, including a possible massacre of Muslims. The third was the creation of the Provisional Azad (Free) Government in areas liberated or ‘freed’ by the Poonch uprising. This region soon popularly became known as ‘Azad Kashmir’. These three actions all occurred during the ten-week interregnum between the creation of India and Pakistan on 15 August 1947.50To be sure, there are conflicting versions.
What, however, is undeniable that things came to a boil on October 22.
Before proceeding further ahead, it would be in fitness of things to recall, in passing, that till the very eve of Independence the princely states of Hyderabad and Junagadh – both Hindu majority states with Muslim rulers, and Jammu & Kashmir – a Muslim majority state with a Hindu ruler, remained undecided on their options on joining either of the two Dominions or stay independent.51
Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir, on August 1947, would propose Standstill Agreements to both the Dominions. Pakistan would accept it on August 15; India would ask for further negotiations.52
On September 18 1947, in violation of the Standstill Agreement, Pakistan cut off supply of essential items to the state.53
On October 22, despite talks being in progress54 between the state and Pakistan – regardless of steady infiltrations from across the border, huge number of tribesmen, equipped with modern weapons, invadedMuzaffarabad from the side of Abbottabad.There were, reportedly, large-scale atrocities against the locals and a large number of Kashmiris including Muslim, Hindus and Sikhs were killed by, apparently Pakistan sponsored, tribal invaders.55
Instrument of Accession, Raging Battle, Military Stalemate and Eventual Ceasefire
On October 26, the exasperated ruler, MaharajaHari Singh, out of sheer desperation, finally decided to prostrate before the Dominion of India, confirming his readiness to surrender, albeit with important riders, only to make best of the miserable situation he was faced with.
He sent a letter recording his offer56 to accede to India accompanied with the Instrument of Accession57, which would duly be accepted by Lord Mountbatten as the Governor-General of the Indian Dominion, the next day – October 27. The same day, the first batch of the Indian armed forces, still under the overall command of British generals, as was very much the case with its Pakistani counterparts, landed in Srinagar, being airborne.58
As would be expected, this climaxed thecrucial and intense negotiations between the concerned parties, not excluding Sheikh Abdullah – freed from Maharaja’s jail, quite possibly facilitated by the prodding ofthe Indian National Congress leaders, Nehru, and Gandhi, in particular, only on September 2959, in the brief intervening period, in continuation with the chain of earlier rounds.
A very telling sign was a particular commitment by the Maharaja at the tail end of his “offer” letter:
I may also inform your Excellency’s Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Shaikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.
Now, the battle would rage on.
With the balance of forces significantly upended.60Notwithstanding the fact that Muslim-majority Gilgit would also, like its predecessor Poonch, stage a successful uprising against the Dogra rule, and, eventually, in favour of Pakistan “on or around 3 November 1947”61.
The harsh winter, accompanied with heavy snowfalls, won’t, however, be too late to make its entry on the scene. This worked much more to the disadvantage of the Indian forces, drawn from the plains, than the raiders – mountain tribes.62
Even then, a better trained and equipped army was able to push back the invading militias, reportedly indulging in severe large-scale atrocities against local civilians – not excluding Muslims63, to a significant extent. However, the raiders could hold on to the territories on the west and the north, with considerable local support.
Pakistan, in response, gradually started increasing the presence of its regular forces. In the spring of 1948 regular army battalions, later entire brigades and artillery regiments participated in operations. The battle intensified.64
Between May and December 1948, the Indian forces could, however, score some critical incremental gains.
There, however, arose, apparently, a situation of military stalemate on the ground.65
On top of that, both the feuding states were still Dominions,with their armed forces under the commands of British generals.66
In September 1948, India would initiate military operations to annex the princely state of Hyderabad.67
As regards the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India, prodded by its Governor-General – Lord Mountbatten, had lodged a complaint with the United Nations Security Council on January 1 1948, in response to which Pakistan would lodge a countercomplaint, on the following January 15th, bringing in also the issue of India’s annexation of Junagadh, overriding its ruler’s move to accede to Pakistan, by signing the Instrument of Accession.68Eventually, through the interventions of the UN Security Council, a cease fire became operative on January 1 1949.69
It would be useful to recall here that while India had based its case on its claimed legality, anchored in the “accession”, further buttressed by a pledge to honour popular choice – to be determined via a “plebiscite”; Pakistan challenged the authenticity of the “accession” and the ruler’s competence to do that, apart from highlighting the religious demography of the state in support of its claim over the territory.70
Kashmir: Divided into twoAt any rate, the erstwhilestate of Jammu and Kashmir now effectively split into two parts – along the Line of Control (LoC), regardless of the, hotly contested, “legal” positions
Pakistan got to retain a large chunk in the north – Northern Areas or Gilgit-Baltistan, and a rather thin slice in the west – Azad Kashmir.
In 1947, most of these areas had seen popular revolts against Maharaja Hari Singh and, eventually, in favour of Pakistan.
India got the rest.
In other words, Punjabi speaking areas of Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad, along with Gilgit andBaltistan came to be under control by Pakistan, while the most part of Jammu regionand Ladakh and the entire Kashmir Valley came to India.71
One of the major (assessed) reasons why the Indian forces could clear the Valley of the invading Pukhtoons is the cooperation by the locals under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah.72
While the developments, in this region, this point onwards would become a focus of international attention and a major, arguably the most major, source of violent – both low-level and highly intense, clashes between neighbouring India and Pakistan, the area under the control of Pakistan has, reportedly, no problem in terms of its relation with Pakistan, nor,for that matter, Jammu and Ladakh with India.
Undoubtedly, the Valley is the hotspot.
As a consequence, it is primarily this area which would be the focal point of the following discussions, in the process of exploring a resolution of the “problem” or “dispute”.
Since Accession (October 1947) till Rise of Insurgency (1989-90)The limited war, accession, capped by the UN mediated ceasefire, however, led to no “solution” of the “dispute”.
While, in the eyes of the UN, India and Pakistan were the two disputants, the peoples of Kashmir – subjected to divergent pulls were/are no less so.
It would, however, be in the fitness of things to briefly review the various critical UNSC resolutions, as regards the “dispute” and its “resolution”, in the given context.
On January 20 1948, Resolution 39 was passed establishing a three-member Commission to investigate the complaints by both the disputants. This had been preceded by the Resolution 38, passed on January 17. The Commission, as envisaged in Resolution 39, did not come into fruition until May 1948. Meanwhile, the Security Council continued its deliberations and the war too continued.
On April 21 1948, the (three-part) Resolution 47 was adopted. It laid down the ground rules for holding the “plebiscite”. Pakistan was asked to use its “best endeavours” to secure the withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, putting an end to the fighting in the state. India was asked to “progressively reduce” its forces to the minimum level required for keeping law and order and, subsequently, appoint a Plebiscite Administrator nominated by the United Nations, who would oversee a free and impartial plebiscite
The Resolution was recommendatory, not mandatory, in nature.73
While a ceasefire would come into force on January 1 1949, neither Pakistan nor India made any move towards fulfilling the laid down conditions for holding the “plebiscite” and it would never be held.
The UNSC, however, would continue to pass resolutions, with progressively decreasing frequency, the last one being: Resolution 307, adopted on December 21, 1971.74
The initial Indian pledge, to the UN, to hold a referendum was very much in tandem with the traditional position taken by the Indian National Congress, the ruling party, in respect of the future of the princely states in British India. Also its stand in alignment with its stand in case of Junagadh and Hyderabad.75 But, far more importantly – as would become evident with the passage of time, its confidence that with Sheikh Abdullah, the tallest political leader from the Valley, by its side – having been appointed the Head of the Emergency Administration on 30 October 1947 and also leading a volunteer force locally raised to fight the invaders and, then, on March 17 194876, the Prime Minister of the state under Indian control, it will not be difficult to have a favourable opinion.76
But, soon, the relations would start souring and, consequently, Sheikh would be dismissed from his office on August 8 1953and then thrown behind the bars suspecting his commitment to the “Accession”.78
As a result, would evaporate the confidence.
Thus, India would finally rescind from the pledge in 1954, on the ostensible ground of Pakistan joining a military alliance with the USA and, thereby, altering the basic parameters as had hitherto existed.79Conversely, Pakistan, which was rather unenthusiastic about the plebiscite, initially, started demanding it more and more loudly.80
The seeds of the growing tussle between India/Nehru and Nehru’s one-time close associate81 Sheikh Abdullah, who, virtually, was the very personification of the Valley, or at least Valley Muslims82, lay in their vastly different readings of the implications of Kashmir’s accession to India.83Though Sheikh played a pivotal role in the process of Kashmir’s accession to India – under extraordinary circumstances, it appears that for him it was the second best option – to be a part of “secular” India, enjoying a large degree of autonomy and with himself at the helm. The best, however, would have been an independent Kashmir (Valley)84, neutral between India and Pakistan – both, however, keenly desirous of annexing Kashmir, the, most likely, prime consideration being its assessed geo-political salience.
Indian leaders, including Nehru – hard-nosed politicians as they were, could very well sense that Sheikh’s ambitions were in flagrant conflict with their own design, even while acknowledging his very considerable political utility.
Sheikh, cognizant of his weakness vis-à-vis the Indian state, started flirting with foreign powers.
That turned out to be the proverbial last straw on the camel’s back.85Consequently, Sheikh was just not dethroned but also thrown behind the bars.
That, in process, seriously ruptured the bond between the Indian state and the people of the Valley.
The Indian state was, of course, only too aware of that.
The three major elements in the armoury of the Indian state to tackle the Kashmir issue, henceforth would be political manoeuvring, combined with the selective use of carrot and stick –more stick than carrot.
Before being dismissed, the National Conference government led by Sheikh, unencumbered by the Indian legal system, had implemented a fairly comprehensive, despite some significant conceptual and implementational glitches, land reforms – evidently, the first and, perhaps, the most radical in India.86
This will be further followed up in the late ‘70s, again under Sheikh.87
This was in alignment with the spirit of the 1944 manifesto, Naya Kashmir88 (New Kashmir) – its Article 26, in particular, adopted by the National Conference, under his leadership.
Sheikh, as the Prime Minister, was succeeded by BakshiGhulam Mohammad, another National Conference leader.
With Sheikh behind the bars, his followers, led by Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, would, in August 1955, found the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front or Plebiscite Front to act as the main opposition force, without eliciting much tangible success.89However, by the end of 1963, the pent up frustrations of the people burst out in the open over the theft of holy relic from the Hazratbal Shrine. The relic would soon be recovered.90But, under its impact, Sheikh would soon be released from jail.91
In 1975, at the end of a period stretching over twenty one odd years with many ups and downs, there would be an accord92 between the then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and Sheikh, in February 1975, paving the path for his assuming the office of Chief Minister, soon thereafter93.
The most salient point of the Accord was Sheikh giving up the demand for plebiscite.
Since January 64 till Sheikh taking up the reign again in February ’75, there were three Prime/Chief Ministers.
Sheikh, ‘Sher-e-Kashmir‘ (the ‘Lion of Kashmir’), would die in harness, on September 8 198294, re-inaugurating a phase of political uncertainties.
Along with Sheikh, the most robust ballast restraining the prospect of Kashmiri nationalism turning towards extremism also disappeared.
Amid political turbulence, in the ‘80s, extremism kept gathering momentum – the ongoing Jihad in neighbouring Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran also playing their roles.95
In February 1984, the execution of Kashmir Liberation Front militant Maqbool Bhat96 would spark off widespread public protests.97In July 1984, the dismissal of the popular Farooq Abdullah government by Governor Jagmohan, acting as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s hatchet man, through thoroughly questionable machinations, added further fat to the slow fire.98
The year 1987 would prove to be a major turning point.99
An alliance of Islamic parties, the Muslim United Front (MUF), was formed to contest the 1987 state elections and emerged as a major player, the first time in the state – post-Accession, for an Islamic political outfit.
However, when the poll results came out, they were victorious in only 4 of the contested 43 seats.
This was, as is widely acknowledged, the outcome of a massive rigging by the rulingNational Conference in alliance with the Congress.100.Rigging of polls was nothing new – it is commonly held that only ’77 and ’83 polls were not rigged.101
But the scale of rigging this time provided a strong tailwind to the sprouting militancy in the state.102
InsurgencyArrives
The new phase103 would, sort of,be inaugurated with the assassination, on November 4 1989, of Justice Neelkanth Ganjoo104, by the JKLF militants, who had delivered capital punishment to MaqboolBhat.It had been preceded by the murder of a BJP leader, TikkaLalTaploo, on September 14 1989.105
The first political assassination had taken place with a National Conference block president, Md. Yusuf Halwai, having been shot dead in Srinagar on August 21 1989.106
Its first eruptions had, however,started appearing in 1988107 itself.
In the second half of 1989 the alleged assassinations of the Indian spies and political collaborators by JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) was intensified. Over six months more than a hundred officials were killed to paralyse government’s administrative and intelligence apparatus. The daughter of then interior affairs minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was kidnapped in December and four terrorists had to be released for her release. This event led to mass celebrations all over the valley.108
This would soon be followed by exodus of panic-stricken Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley, mainly Srinagar.
Rather intriguingly, a very large number fled on a single night of January 19 1990, the very day the newly appointed Governor Jagmohan, for the second time,had taken over the reins of the state, with the Chief Minister resigning, in protest.109
The exodus, of course, would continue for a while, with the overwhelming bulk of the Panditsmigrating.110The estimates of how many, however, widely vary.
Of the approximately 300,000 to 600,000 Hindus living in the Kashmir Valley in 1990 only 2,000–3,000 remain there in 2016.111
The appointment of Jagmohan as the Governor, as a sort of a BJP nominee, with his earlier track record of dismissing Farooq Abdullah government at the behest of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, by the V P Singh government was bound to be disastrous112 and so it almost immediately turned out to be.
On January 21, a protest march, against atrocities by security forces on the previous day, was indiscriminately fired upon and 35, the highest till then, lives were reportedly extinguished.113Things kept happening, at a rather feverish pitch, and 1990 proved to be the major turning point since 1987.
1990 was also the first year when the when the head of the state failed to hoist the national flag on Republic Day. It was a period when the Indian state exposed not only its ugliest face but also its most helpless form.114What is worth noting here that a deliberate purely strong-arm policy just not only radically worsened the situation but also showed up the weakness of the Indian state.
Jagmohan would, eventually, be packed off115, following another round of atrocious mass killing by the security forces on May 21.116
But, the damage he could manage to inflict, during his rather short-lived tenure – just over four months, was simplyenormous.117
A Brief Recap
Between “Accession” of Kashmir to India on October 27 1947 and May 26 1990, the day Jagmohan demitted office, certain watershed events that took place need be specifically flagged here, before proceeding further.
First, Sheikh Abdullah’s appointment as the Head of the Emergency Administration on 30 October 1947, to be followed up with his assumption of the post of the Prime Minister of the state on March 17 1948. This had helped cement the emotional bond between the Valley and India.
This would suffer a serious jolt when Sheikh was unceremoniously dethroned and thrown behind the bars in early August 1953.
Things got partly repaired with his rehabilitation of sorts in 1975.
His death in 1982, while in office, is another momentous development.
The alleged large-scale rigging of the polls in 1987 triggered the rise of (budding) militancy, mainly led by the quasi-secular JKLF.
Under the impact of the rule of Jagmohan, during the first half of 1990, militancy assumed mass character, it also turned distinctly religious-sectarian and the atmosphere in the Valley became sharply communalised. Pakistan started shifting its support from the JKLF to pro-Pakistan Islamic militant groups.
Decades of Turbulence, Militancy and Repression: Till August 4 2019The insurgency that made its appearance in the Valley in 1989-90 is since continuing, albeit with periodic ups and downs, in tandem with largely raised level of state repression, again, with fluctuating intensities.
The allegations of human rights violations are too ubiquitous.
So are the charges of Pakistan’s active promotion of armed militancy and terrorism.
The militancy itself, apparently further fuelled by repression, is getting deeper and deeper into the zone of radicalised Islam, rather contemptuous of any notion of “liberal democracy”.
In between, 2008 saw the emergence of stone pelting on the streets as a back-up form of mass resistance – to be met with more than matching state brutalities.
The global community is generally rather disinterested except on the ground of a potentially apocalyptic possible nuclear war between the two perpetually feuding neighbours, who went overtly nuclear in May 1998 and are relentlessly engaged in enhancing respective nuclear arsenals and developing the triad of delivery platforms since then.
While this period saw a radically spiked level of brutal violence, including sexual118– by the state and, also, by the militants – composed of both locals and outsiders, a few events merit special mention.
* Closely following the Pandit exodus and brutalities let loose by the administration under Jagmohan, in February 1991, there was one alleged event of mass gang rape by the Indian armed forces in the twin villages of Kunan and Poshpora, in the Kupwara district.119
* Alleged Shopian rape and murder followed by mas unrest in May-June 2009.120
* Late 2010 saw triggering of prolonged unrest by an allegation of murder of three youths, via staged encounter, by the Indian Army.121
* On July 8 2016, a local militant, BurhanWani, in his very early twenties, was killed in an armed encounter with the Indian security forces. He was a commander of the theHizbulMujahideen and had gained considerable popularity among the local youth via social media. His death sparked off a new wave of militant recruitments.122
* The last in this series is the Pulwama suicide blast, on February 14 2019, carried out by a local youth in which at least forty CRPF jawans in transit got killed.123
Current Situation: Since August 5 2019
On August 5 and 6, just over last two days of the extended monsoon session of the Indian parliament, the incumbent regime brought about some seismic changes as regards the legal and constitutional status of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir via some highly questionable parliamentary jugglery.124
In sum, the Article 370 of the Constitution – the recognition of the terms of the Instrument of Accession between the state and India by the latter in its Constitution, was made null and void, without actually amending it.
The Article 35A, which debars “outsiders” from purchasing property in the state – a protective measure not unique to the J&K alone, was scrapped.
The state was bifurcated – to come into force on October 31st, between Jammu and Kashmir on the one hand and Ladakh on the other.125
The status of both the states stands degraded to that of Union Territories – something unprecedented since 1956.126
Before doing all these, a large number of additional troops were deployed, in an already highly militarised zone, on the streets; round the clock curfew declared, all over the state, all forms of communications – including telephones, internet etc. were cut off. Kashmir, in a way, was completely sealed off from the outside world.127
All known political leaders from the Valley have been put under arrest, including threeformer Chief Ministers. The total number of arrests, as per one report, is around 4,000128, with a few hundreds shifted out of the state129.
At the time of writing, with more than a month elapsed, things remain broadly the same130, understandably, giving rise to a humanitarian crisis.131Horror stories of custodial tortures have started leaking out.132The judicial system in Srinagar, reportedly, remains frozen, while the Supreme Court fails to take note.133
Bouts of extended lock-down accompanied with state repressions are nothing new to Kashmir, though the scale and intensity, this time, is unprecedented.134
Far more importantly, It appears to be part of a larger game plan, that was not there ever before.
An acknowledged “moderate” observer thus presciently noted:
In the context of the UAPA, NRC, communalisation, Ayodhya, it is one more node in a pattern hurtling the Indian state towards a denouement where all of us feel unsafe. Not just Kashmiris, not just minorities, but anyone standing up for constitutional liberty.135
In this context, it is not easy to refrain from drawing the readers’ attention to what this writer had concluded in an analysis of the outcome of the 2019 parliamentary poll in India:
Modi 2.0 very much presents us with the looming threat of the dismantling of the “India” – embodying the values of “democracy”, “pluralism” and “egalitarianism”, that had been wrought out in the crucible of the epic freedom struggle and, in the process, finally emerged on the 15th August 1947 – in pursuance of a project to supplant it with a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nation state) – by mobilising the Hindus of India as “Hindus”, drowning out all other identities linked to language, culture, gender, caste, class etc., constantly stoking hatred and violence against the constructed inimical “others”.136
To connect the dots, while the previous Indian regimes – the Congress-led ones, in particular, had made, rather liberal, use of state repressions, intent upon retaining Kashmir as a part of the Indian territory – for a number of reasons, the subject move by the incumbent regime is primarily geared towards a very different objective altogether – actualising its long cherished project of transforming India into a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nationstate).
Only if this is kept in mind, it would be possible to make sense of this momentous move cloaked in carefully planned deceptions and anchored in constitutional jugglery.
Engaged observers have quite emphatically underlined that a major outcome of this move is wiping out of that tribe of Kashmiri politicians – constantly shrinking, though, since the passing away of Sheikh Abdullah, who were seeking a “solution” of the Kashmir “problem” without asking for secession from India.
Given the salience of theissue, in determining the shape of things to come, it would quite be in the fitness of things to cite a few, verbatim:
I. By arresting mainstream leaders, activists, lumping them with separatists, and creating a binary in which “You are with us or against us”, the govt too has left virtually no political space for “collaborators”.137
II. For now, the middle ground in Kashmir stands obliterated.138
III. A recent tweet by a Kashmiri activist based in Europe, who is a harsh critic of Pakistan on J&K and intervenes in the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva to rebut any unfavourable report against India, sums up the situation. “Spoke to a friend in Srinagar after a two week hiatus and asked about the situation. His reply: There are only two Kashmiris left. One who feels betrayed &humiliated. The other, who tells the first one: ‘We told you so’. That was all we spoke. Both not knowing what else to say.”139
IV.By these sweeping arrests, the government has blurred the lines between separatists, terrorists, stone-pelters and mainstream leaders who’ve kept the tricolour flying.140V. “For the past 70 years, mainstream leaders have been holding the Indian flag high in the Valley, sometimes at the cost of the lives. See what they (the Centre) have done to the mainstream,” said a PDP leader.
“I fear there will be no mainstream in Kashmir now. The entire Valley is now on the other side of the divide,” he said.141
Three of the five quotes above are from pretty well-known and well-respected journalists.
This quashing of the “middle ground” is, however, no unintended side-effect of an overzealous act by a regime having full faith in its own capacity to extinguish all opposition – armed and unarmed, through use of raw coercion.
It is very much designed to be that way.
Jitendra Singh, the Minister of State for the Prime Minister’s Office, thereby, supposedly, privy to the government’s mind, and an MP from Jammu, to boot, in a recent freewheeling chat with the Indian Express has made it as much explicit as possible:
No, no. Actually I don’t see any future for them (i.e. young politicians, such as Sajad Lone, Omar Abdullah, ShahFaesal). They are also realising that their political innings has come to an end. It is only some section of the media that wants to see some future, so that the story can carry on. The story has ended.142
The same minister has rubbed this in further, again a month thereafter, by formally pronouncing that the arrested political leaders and activists, who, quite tellingly, include even BJP’s own allies and protégés143, are not going to be freed in any near future.144
This, apparent, deliberate self-infliction of a grievous wound would make sense only if one keeps in mind that for the current regime, Kashmir is just one of the more crucial pieces on the political chessboard, meant to be used, to checkmate “India”.
The regime cannot but be keenly aware of the fact that this approach of eliminating the “middle ground”, in all probability, would give a strong boost to armed militancy once attempts are made to restore, at least some degree of, “normalcy”.
The reason for which such a development would be considered welcome, and not dreaded – as would normally be expected, is that it– being held up as a mortal threat to mainland India, will help to communally polarise it and, thereby, smoothen the projected journey towards a “Hindu Rashtra”.
One can hardly dig out any other alternative plausible explanation.
Very much in tandem with this approach, the Union Home Minister has flatly refused to talk to any organised force in the Valley.145
Not to be outdone, the Defence Minister has registered refusal to talk to Pakistan either.146
The Home Minister, accordingly, met (apparently, in a choreographed move) a crowd of 22 village heads on September 3 in Delhi. As is expected, nothing of any consequence appears to have been discussed.147
The earlier regimes, including the NDA led by Vajpayee, had, in between waves of armed repressions also used to make periodic overtures towards peace – with Kashmiris and also Pakistan, in separate moves.
Thus we had Lahore (1999)148, Agra (2001)149 and Sharm El Sheikh (2009)150 between India and Pakistan.
With Kashmiris, the most significant official moves had been made in 2006 and then again in 2010.
All these, eventually, turned out to be stillborn though.151
But, this time round no such gesture appears to be in the offing.
A plausible explanation for that has already been offered above.
The Peace ProspectsIn a situation of violent conflict no durable peace can be conceived of without the consent of the vital stakeholders to a negotiated settlementof the dispute(s) causing the conflict, however difficult the process may appear to be.
That, by its very definition, would call for “negotiations” between the disputants – all by themselves or aided by some external mediator(s), to make even a beginning.
No magic formula, howsoever sensible or even attractive it may look, is not going to “work” unless it emerges out of engagements between all the stakeholders.152
As was attempted to map above, in the subject case, the (three) major feuding sides are (i) the Indian state – engaged in maintaining, and further tightening, of its ownership over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, under its control, and the Valley, in particular; (ii) the people of the Valley – many, or arguably most, of whom are asking for, somewhat nebulous, “Azadi”153, either within “India” – with much greater autonomy, or (mostly) from India –through merger with the neighbouring ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ or in the form of an independent state – staunchly Islamic or a more liberal version of it, and (iii) Pakistan, which considers annexation of the state under India as an “unfinished agenda of the Partition”154in the region towards that goal.
Right now, the incumbent Indian regime is frankly bent upon going just the opposite way.
The only other way of achieving “peace” is the scoring of decisive military victory by one of the feuding parties over its opponent(s).
As regards the possibility of a decisive military victory, the history of the struggle of the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel, armed with nuclear weapons, could be a good reference point.
On top of that, in the subject case, despite large asymmetry in terms of conventional weapons, India and Pakistan are both armed with nuclear weapons backed up by all the three delivery platforms155 (In case of Pakistan the third leg of the triadic platform is – nuclear-tipped missiles from submarine, at least, close to completion.)
And, given the domestic popular mood, no Pakistani regime can afford to let militancy in Kashmir be just crushed by the Indian state.
Hence, it, too, does not look very much likely, in any foreseeable future.
Talks had, however, been held between India and Pakistan – in not-too-distant past, albeit, without involving “Kashmir” as an autonomous entity, on three occasions. At least the first two took place, quite plausibly, because of American prodding.
There was no such apparent external trigger for the efforts at internal dialogues.
But then, these, in any case, looked far less promising.
Arguably, the Agra conclave had raised maximum hopes, though, at the end, it failed even to produce a pro forma joint statement.156
In any case, this time round, the Indian regime is in just no mood to engage any meaningful “talk”.
(In fact, given the current trend, once the current session (September 2019) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is over, the possibility of a large-scale military crackdown in the Valley cannot just be ruled out.)
Moreover, the US, which, in the past – most visibly in the case of Kargil War157, had played a vital role – even if, mostly, from behind the screen, under Donald Trump, has lost much of its diplomatic clout.
The repeated offers of Trump to mediate, in response to the urgings by Pakistan and even otherwise, have been summarily rejected by India.158
Pakistan, under the circumstances, is trying its utmost to get the world leaders involved by scaring them with the talks of a possible nuclear war.159As of now, it has failed to evoke the desired response.160
Things may start changing only in case of a significant shift in the global scenario.
The Road AheadRight now, there is a radical shift in the stance of the Indian regime, away from even any overture in favour of peace, against the backdrop of armed militancy, infused with extremist Islamism161, gaining more and more grounds at the costs of “moderates”, with Pakistan, which itself has a dismal record as regards human rights of various minorities162 and now headed by a Prime Minister – widely believed to be a nominee of its military establishment163, actively fanning the fire.
There is also a relative disinterest in “Kashmir”, on the global arena, partly caused by India’s enhanced economic and diplomatic clout, in the recent decades.
Even otherwise, in not-too-distant past, there was massive violation of human rights, in neighbouring puny Sri Lanka164. In more immediate present, Myanmar165 saw state directed genocide against one of its minority ethnic communities. In neither of the cases, the concerned regime faced any tangible consequence.
That, however, does, in no way, do away with the dire need of peace in Kashmir, more so, given its, all too obvious, nuclear dimensions.
Public opinion, in the region and globally, has got to be diligently mobilised, regardless of the roadblocks, in favour of initiating dialogues, to explore a “solution”, involving all the stakeholders, maybe with some credible mediator helping out in the process.
That appears tobe the only way out.
23 09 2019
Epilogue
Though the monograph had,finally, been wrapped up well after the momentous, or rather seismic, August 5, the reports from the ground zero were still fairly scant, given the extent and intensity of the lockdown imposed.
The lockdown, still in place, has, however,by now started gettingincrementally relaxed – though not unaccompanied by at least a few moves right in the opposite direction, in the wake of the much delayed (by more than five months) eventual response, from the Indian Supreme Court166, in particular: social media sites are, right now, at least notionally, accessible167; schools are reopened after seven months168.
Quite a few factfinding reports169, by various civil society groups, have, in the meanwhile, seen the light of the day – braving considerable hurdles. One is pretty recent170 – came out just the last week.
Here,however, no attempt would be made to provide any synopsis of these or any analytical account of the subsequent developments.
It will, nevertheless, only be in the fitness of things to explicitly acknowledge that despite huge – understandably quite unprecedented even by the Kashmir standard, military mobilisation by the Indian state, no major military operation – as distinct from rather customary coercive measures, has yet been launched against the local people in general.
Nor there has been a noticeable spurt in armed militancy or even an outbreak of intifada – in response to August 5 and its aftermath.
These two, noteworthy, developments are, apparently, somehow interlinked – with the international opinion building and diplomacy forming crucial elements of the overall backdrop, and deserve to be closely interrogated.
Notes and References:
The monograph appearing below was penned about six months back and has since been carried by a journal, New Approach, in its, just published, (undated) special issue: J&K: Faultlines and Way Ahead.
It is edited by SekharBasu Roy.
The other contributors, understandably including three from Pakistan and one of Syrian origin, are: Lt. Gen.(Rtd.) Sanjay Kulkarni; WajahatHabibullah; Maj. Gen. (Rtd.) Harkirat Singh; Ram Puniyani; SanjivKrishanSood, ADG (Rtd.) BSF; TajHaider; Anil Khamboj, IG (Rtd.) BSF; K. Srinivasan, IG (Rtd.) BSF/CRPF; A K Pasha; Air Marshal (Rtd.) SumitMukerji; DhananjayTripathi; Babar Ayaz; Dr.WaielAwwad; F S Aijazuddin.
The virtually unaltered text, as had been sent to the editor of the said journal, is provided here with the addition of a very brief Epilogue, on account of the time lapsed in between.]
Kashmir: Trapped in a Blind Alley?
SuklaSen
Agar firdaus bar roo-e zameenast,
Hameenast-o hameenast-o hameen ast.1 (If there is a paradise on earth,
It is this, it is this, it is this.)
Amir Khusro (1253 – 1325), a famous Sufi musician, poet and scholar from India.
This couplet serves as a popular epithet for Kashmir, for centuries.
Doodh mango ge to kheerdenge, Kashmir mango ge to chir denge!2
(If you ask for milk, will offer youpudding, ask for Kashmir and will just tear you apart!)
An oft-repeated RSS slogan, rather war cry, on Kashmir.
Intro
In South Asia, the two most powerful neighbours, armed with nuclear weapons along with all the three – land, air and subsea, launching platforms, are constantly bickering.
So much so that this region is considered one of the most threatening global nuclear flashpoints.3
One of the major, perhaps the most major, issues of dispute is Kashmir.4And a war between India and Pakistan, if degenerates into a nuclear one – quite a possibility5, may, as a consequence, even wipe out human civilisation from the face of the globe.6
That itself is reason enough to make exploration of “peace” for Kashmir a worthwhile venture, in fact, an urgent existential imperative.
In the following, an attempt has been made, taking off from a brief description of Kashmir’s geography/topography/demography, recount of its past and, then, more recent developments – of which the “dispute” is the centrepiece, in some greater details.
Before proceeding further, it is, however, necessary to clarify that “Kashmir”, as used by an Indian, may denote either of the two: (i) the Kashmir Valley and (ii) the state of Jammu and Kashmir.
In order to locate it appropriately, it has to be read in the specific given context.
Geography,Topographyand DemographyKashmir, a 222,236 sq km region in the northwestern Indian subcontinent, is surrounded by China in the northeast, the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Punjab in the south, by Pakistan in the west, and by Afghanistan in the northwest. The region has been dubbed “disputed territory” between India and Pakistan since the partition of India in 1947. The southern and southeastern parts of the region make up the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, while the northern and western parts are controlled by Pakistan. A border, called the Line of Control (agreed to in 1972) divides the two parts. The eastern area of Kashmir, comprising the northeastern part of the region (Aksai Chin) has been under the control of China since 1962. The predominant religion in the Jammu area is Hinduism in the east and Islam in the west. Islam is also the main religion in the Kashmir valley and in the Pakistan-controlled parts.7
The Kashmir region is predominantly mountainous, with deep, narrow valleys and high, barren plateaus. The relatively low-lying Jammu and Punch (Poonch) plains in the southwest are separated by the thickly forested Himalayan foothills and the PirPanjal Range of the Lesser Himalayas from the larger, more fertile, and more heavily populated Vale of Kashmir to the north. The vale, situated at an elevation of about 5,300 feet (1,600 metres), constitutes the basin of the upper Jhelum River and contains the city of Srinagar. Jammu and the vale lie in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir, while the Punch lowlands are largely in Azad Kashmir.8
A princely state during the British colonial period, Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) was created by the British in 1846 with a Hindu Maharaja, Gulab Singh, ruling over a Muslim majority population. It consisted of three religiously and linguistically diverse regions: the Kashmir Valley with a largely Muslim population; the Jammu region with a Hindu majority; and the population of the Ladakh region which was half Buddhist, half Muslim.9
Past History in BriefAccording to legend, an ascetic named Kashyapa reclaimed the land now comprising Kashmir from a vast lake. That land came to be known as Kashyapamar and, later, Kashmir. Buddhism was introduced by the Mauryan emperor Ashoka in the 3rd century BCE, and from the 9th to the 12th century CE the region appears to have achieved considerable prominence as a centre of Hindu culture. A succession of Hindu dynasties ruled Kashmir until 1346, when it came under Muslim rule. The Muslim period lasted nearly five centuries, ending when Kashmir was annexed to the Sikh kingdom of the Punjab in 1819 and then to the Dogra kingdom of Jammu in 1846.
Thus, the Kashmir region in its contemporary form dates from 1846, when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the First Sikh War, Raja Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu, was created maharaja (ruling prince) of an extensive but somewhat ill-defined Himalayan kingdom “to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi.” The creation of this princely state helped the British safeguard their northern flank in their advance to the Indus and beyond during the latter part of the 19th century. The state thus formed part of a complex political buffer zone interposed by the British between their Indian empire and the empires of Russia and China to the north. For Gulab Singh, confirmation of title to these mountain territories marked the culmination of almost a quarter century of campaigning and diplomatic negotiation among the petty hill kingdoms along the northern borderlands of the Sikh empire of the Punjab.10
The“Dispute”: The Larger Background
It is commonly perceived that the “dispute” arose (between Pakistan and India) on account of the subcontinent gaining independence – on August 14-15 1947, throwing off the shackles of British colonial rule as the successful culmination of the long drawn out epic freedom struggle, with the Indian National Congress in the lead, combined with the changed scenario emerging post WW II – both globally and within Britain itself. Or more specifically, the traumatic “Partition” of the subcontinent into India and Pakistan – meant to be an exclusive homeland for the Muslims of the subcontinent as demanded by the Muslim League, which, by then, came to represent the voices of large sections of Muslims.11
But the roots of the “dispute” are, actually, older than that andhave, rather expectedly, features unique to Kashmir.
Kashmir, as per the oldest, and subsequent, available historical accounts, used to be ruled by succession of dynastic rulers, following some form of Hinduism12 – dominated by Brahmans.
Buddhism would appear on the scene during the reign of emperor Ashoka (304–232 BCE) and Kashmir became a part of the Maurya Empire. Buddhism, apparently, remained a major presence till early sixth century.13
Kashmir’s encounter with Islam, via invasions from the west, commenced in early eleventh century.14 The first Sultanate came into being with a Ladakhi Buddhist ascending the throne in 1320 and converting to Islam.15In the 14th century, Islam gradually became the dominant religion in Kashmir. With the fall of Kashmir, a premier center of Sanskrit literary creativity, Sanskrit literature there disappeared.Islamic preacher Sheikh NooruddinNoorani, who is traditionally revered by Hindus as Nund Rishi, combined elements of Kashmir Shaivism with Sufi mysticism in his discourses.16Direct Mughal rule, under emperor Akbar, came to be established in late sixteenth century.17After four centuries of rule by successive Muslim rulers, Kashmir fell to the conquering armies of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh of Punjab in the 1820s. The Sikh rule had a pronounced anti-Muslim edge.18(T)he Kashmir region in its contemporary form dates from 1846, when, by the treaties of Lahore and Amritsar at the conclusion of the First Sikh War, Raja Gulab Singh, the Dogra ruler of Jammu [an erstwhile servitor of the Sikh empire], was [by the victorious British] created maharaja (ruling prince) [for a consideration of Rupees 7.5 million] of an extensive but somewhat ill-defined Himalayan kingdom “to the eastward of the River Indus and westward of the River Ravi.” The creation of this princely state helped the British safeguard their northern flank in their advance to the Indus and beyond during the latter part of the 19th century. The state thus formed part of a complex political buffer zone interposed by the British between their Indian empire and the empires of Russia and China to the north. For Gulab Singh, confirmation of title to these mountain territories marked the culmination of almost a quarter century of campaigning and diplomatic negotiation among the petty hill kingdoms along the northern borderlands of the Sikh empire of the Punjab.19The Princely State of Kashmir and Jammu (as it was then called) was constituted between 1820 and 1858 and was “somewhat artificial in composition and it did not develop a fully coherent identity, partly as a result of its disparate origins and partly as a result of the autocratic rule which it experienced on the fringes of Empire.” It combined disparate regions, religions, and ethnicities: to the east, Ladakh was ethnically and culturally Tibetan and its inhabitants practised Buddhism; to the south, Jammu had a mixed population of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs; in the heavily populated central Kashmir valley, the population was overwhelmingly Sunni Muslim, however, there was also a small but influential Hindu minority, the Kashmiri brahmins or pandits; to the northeast, sparsely populated Baltistan had a population ethnically related to Ladakh, but which practised Shi’a Islam; to the north, also sparsely populated, Gilgit Agency, was an area of diverse, mostly Shi’a groups; and, to the west, Punch was Muslim, but of different ethnicity than the Kashmir valley.20
Apart from the patchwork nature of the state thus created, no less significant was the fact that the Dogra kings, aided by their Kashmiri Pandit (i.e. Brahman), and Punjabi, administrative stuff, were very harsh with the vast impoverished Muslim masses of the Valley – mostly peasantry, artisansand workers.21This would leave its marked imprint on the subsequent history of Kashmir.22
One noteworthy aspect of the Dogra rule over Kashmir is that as distinct from Mughals, Afghans and Sikhs, whose rules had preceded that of the Dogras, Kashmir was only peripheral to their empires, and, consequently, would rule the region through proxies while remaining primarily engaged with the concerns of their larger empires,for the Dogras, Kashmir itself was the empire – their primary concer.23
The Immediate BackdropWith dissentions and anger simmering against the repressive Dogra rule – subordinate to the British colonial rulers, there was a blanket ban on the publication of newspapers until 1932 and no overt political activities or organisations were permitted.24
Regardless, the gatheringresentments exploded in public, in July 1931, in the form of first massive protest against the Dogra regime by the Muslims of the Valley, backed by the ulama.25On June 21 (or 25?), in a public meeting, first of its kind, before the gathered Muslim protestors, one Abdul Qadeer Khan delivered a rousing speech and gave a call to arms.He would soon be arrested and put on trial.26
During one of the trial sessions, on July 13, thousands of protestors would gather and attack – presumably after some of them being arrested, the Central Jail, the trial venue. They would be fired upon.Some protestors got killed. Thereafter, violence broke out in the main city of Srinagar. Hindus would be attacked and some of their houses looted. Again the mob would be fired upon causing deaths. Perhaps a few (3?)Hindus also got killed in the violence directed against them. Total toll on the Muslim side was reportedly 22 (or 21?).
But, July 13, thereafter, came to be observed as the Martyrs’ Day (Youm-e-Shuhada-e-Kashmir) by Kashmiri Muslims.
Versions of the whole episode, however, widely vary, depending on the source.27At any rate, while July 13 1931 stands out as a watershed moment in the history of Kashmir “dispute”, it also, in a way, busts the myth of a harmonious past28 of Kashmiri people.
At the most obvious level, July 13 stands for the first burst of open rebellion against Kashmir’s Hindu Dogra ruler by its alienated Muslim subjects and its suppression by the armed might of the state.
At another, the Hindu subjects of Kashmir got identified with their co-religionist ruler, in the eyes of both the overwhelming majority Muslim and minority Hindu subjects.29
Thus while the Kashmiri Muslims, by and large, view July 13 1931 as the launching event of their (unfinished?) freedom struggle against the then oppressive Hindu Dogra rulers, the Hindus, or the Kashmiri Pandits, to be more specific, imagine it as the first occasion of large-scale atrocities by the (far more numerous) Muslims of the Valley directed against them.
That is pretty much significant in making sense ofthe subsequent developments.
At any rate, under the impact of July 31 and at the prodding of the British, Maharajah Hari Singh,the then ruler, would introduce limited democracy to the state, which would permit, for the first time, formation of political groups.30
Taking advantage of the relative political freedom thus gained and spurred by continuing political turbulence the All Jammu and Kashmir Muslim Conference (AJKMC), an open political organisation of the Muslims of the Jammu and Kashmir state – the first of its kind,was brought into being in a convention held in Srinagar from 14 to 16 October, 1932.
Interestingly, a speaker at the flag hoisting ceremony observed: Today, the hoisting of the green flag with crescent [a very obvious and explicit symbol of Islam] opens a new chapter in the history of Kashmir. As such, it is the duty of the Kashmiris to see that it remains hoisted always. This flag of the conference is the harbinger of love, peace and brotherhood among all the communities living in the State and it is the guarantor of peace, progress and happiness for all subjects of the Maharaja.
That is clearly indicative of intertwining of two conflicting urges: (I) marching as the flag-bearer of Islam and (ii) to champion the cause of love, peace and brotherhood among all the communities living in the State[and, thereby, a composite Kashmiri nationhood].31The implications of this self-contradiction would unfold in the coming days.
In any case, (i)n a special session in June 1939 the Muslim Conference was converted into the All Jammu and Kashmir National Conference to represent all Kashmiris regardless of religion. This move brought the National Conference closer to the Indian National Congress which also favored a secular and non-communal approach to politics. This move towards secularizing the movement was apparently reinforced by the advice of Dr SaifuddinKitchlew, an eminent member of the Kashmiri diaspora in the Punjab, to Sheikh Abdullah.14Despite the towering stature of Sheikh Abdullah, the National Conference would formally split in 1941 and the earlier buried AJKMC was revived on June 13 1941.32So, here, one would find a broadly three-way tensions/conflicts emerging among the subjects of the repressive Dogra rule with three major players making appearance on the stage: (i) Hindus, spearheaded by the small but influential Kashmiri Pandits of the Valley, (ii) Muslims standing for composite Kashmiri nationalism and (iii) Muslims for Islamic solidarity – a natural ally of the Muslim League.
Be that as it may, in 1944, the National Conference, the most influential popular political outfit, led by Sheikh Abdullah issued a manifesto,Naya Kashmir (A New Kashmir), notionally addressed, and also presented, to the Dogra ruler, charting out a new roadmap for Kashmir’s polity. It had two parts: political and economic. It envisaged a democratic polity for Kashmir with the Dogra ruler as the nominal head. It was radical and socialistic in terms of its contents. it was very pro-women, called for universal franchise, freedom of expression, freedom of press, land to the tiller, state ownership of the industry, ending agrarian debt, ability of women to work in all trades and professions.33In its annual session in 1945, it passed a resolution espousing Indian unity, Indian independence and self-determination for India’s cultural nationalities.34 This is all the more significant considering the fact that the All-India Muslim League, in 1940, in Lahore had adopted the “Pakistan resolution”35 calling for separate homeland(s) for Indian Muslims(without, however, specifying any particular name) and Mohammad Ali Jinnah had articulated and put forward his “two-nation theory”36, in justification of the demand.
Consequently, when Jinnah visited Kashmir during the summer of 1944, he, reportedly, indicated his support for the Muslim Conference, led by Muslim leaders from the districts of Muzaffarabad, Poonch and Mirpur who had supported the “Pakistan Resolution”, in preference over the National Conference.37In May 1946, Sheikh Abdullah launched the Quit Kashmir– an echo of the Quit India call issued by the Indian National Congress, directed at the British colonial rulers earlier in 194238, agitation directed against the Dogra rule and got arrested, being booked on sedition charge. Jawaharlal Nehru tried to go to Srinagar, to defend Sheikh in the court, but would be arrested and sent back.39The“three-way tensions/conflicts”, that had been referred to above, kept sharpening.
More so, under the impact of the evolving political scenario in India under direct British rule, particularly since the conclusion of the WW II and the transfer of baton in Britain itself from the diehard Conservative Winston Churchill to the Labour leader Clement Attlee, in July 194540 – in keen anticipation of the impending transfer of power and cessation of the British rule over the subcontinent.
The “Dispute” ArisesOn February 20 1947, Attlee, the British Prime Minister, told the House of Commons that his government intended to hand India over to the Indians not later than June, 1948 and Lord Louis Mountbatten was named the new Viceroy to accomplish this task.41
Prior to that, the Muslim League leader Jinnah had called upon the Indian Muslims to observe August 16 1946 as the Direct Action Day in order to realise its demand for separate homeland for the Muslims. As a consequence, Calcutta, the capital of the Bengal province, with a Muslim League Chief Minister then, had witnessed the Great Calcutta Killings on that day. Violence would, in time, spread to various other corners of India.42Apparently, intimidated by the prospect of the bearing the responsibility for failing to contain spreading violence and bloodshed, the newly appointed Viceroy advanced the day of transfer of power to August 15 1947 and delayed the announcement of the award of Partition to two days later.43In the event, in the run-up to and, even more than that, aftermath of the Partition, the subcontinent would encounter perhaps the most horrific episode of violence during that century perpetrated, and suffered, by civilian populations – in this case, involving the followers of three major religions in the region: Hinduism, Sikhism and Islam.44The state of Jammu and Kashmir was also not unaffected.45What, however, is more germane, in the current context, that the Partition left open the issue of the princely states, under British paramountcy – numbering over 560, of which the J&K was one of the two largest. The rulers had, at least hypothetically, three options: either merge with the Dominion of India or of Pakistan or remain independent.46
That gave rise to the “dispute”, involving both India and Pakistan and also the J&K state – its ruler and the (medley47 of) subjects.
The initial dilly-dallying48 on the part of the then Dogra ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh, the geographical location of the state – bordering both the newly emergent Dominions, and the fact of Muslim majority population – with its own internal divisions, lorded over by a Hindu ruler – all these factors went to complicate things and contributed to the making of the “dispute”.
The “Dispute” UnfoldsIt would be necessary to keep in mind that this point onward, “history” itself will be highly controversial. “Facts” would be hotly contested and divergent narratives would be dished out by the bitterly feuding parties.49
An objective and conscientious student would have to willy-nilly take one’s own pick by applying one’s best judgement and carefully scanning those narratives.
The main trouble erupted on October 22 1947, in the form of waves of armed Pukhtoon intruders coming from Pakistan. However, things had already turned unsettled at least in the Poonch area, in Jammu. There were, as per one reading, three significant developments:
The first was a pro-Pakistan, anti-Maharaja uprising by Muslim Poonchis in western Jammu that ‘liberated’ large parts of this area from the Maharaja’s control. The second was major inter-religious violence in the province that caused upheaval and death, including a possible massacre of Muslims. The third was the creation of the Provisional Azad (Free) Government in areas liberated or ‘freed’ by the Poonch uprising. This region soon popularly became known as ‘Azad Kashmir’. These three actions all occurred during the ten-week interregnum between the creation of India and Pakistan on 15 August 1947.50To be sure, there are conflicting versions.
What, however, is undeniable that things came to a boil on October 22.
Before proceeding further ahead, it would be in fitness of things to recall, in passing, that till the very eve of Independence the princely states of Hyderabad and Junagadh – both Hindu majority states with Muslim rulers, and Jammu & Kashmir – a Muslim majority state with a Hindu ruler, remained undecided on their options on joining either of the two Dominions or stay independent.51
Maharaja Hari Singh, the ruler of Kashmir, on August 1947, would propose Standstill Agreements to both the Dominions. Pakistan would accept it on August 15; India would ask for further negotiations.52
On September 18 1947, in violation of the Standstill Agreement, Pakistan cut off supply of essential items to the state.53
On October 22, despite talks being in progress54 between the state and Pakistan – regardless of steady infiltrations from across the border, huge number of tribesmen, equipped with modern weapons, invadedMuzaffarabad from the side of Abbottabad.There were, reportedly, large-scale atrocities against the locals and a large number of Kashmiris including Muslim, Hindus and Sikhs were killed by, apparently Pakistan sponsored, tribal invaders.55
Instrument of Accession, Raging Battle, Military Stalemate and Eventual Ceasefire
On October 26, the exasperated ruler, MaharajaHari Singh, out of sheer desperation, finally decided to prostrate before the Dominion of India, confirming his readiness to surrender, albeit with important riders, only to make best of the miserable situation he was faced with.
He sent a letter recording his offer56 to accede to India accompanied with the Instrument of Accession57, which would duly be accepted by Lord Mountbatten as the Governor-General of the Indian Dominion, the next day – October 27. The same day, the first batch of the Indian armed forces, still under the overall command of British generals, as was very much the case with its Pakistani counterparts, landed in Srinagar, being airborne.58
As would be expected, this climaxed thecrucial and intense negotiations between the concerned parties, not excluding Sheikh Abdullah – freed from Maharaja’s jail, quite possibly facilitated by the prodding ofthe Indian National Congress leaders, Nehru, and Gandhi, in particular, only on September 2959, in the brief intervening period, in continuation with the chain of earlier rounds.
A very telling sign was a particular commitment by the Maharaja at the tail end of his “offer” letter:
I may also inform your Excellency’s Government that it is my intention at once to set up an interim Government and ask Shaikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with my Prime Minister.
Now, the battle would rage on.
With the balance of forces significantly upended.60Notwithstanding the fact that Muslim-majority Gilgit would also, like its predecessor Poonch, stage a successful uprising against the Dogra rule, and, eventually, in favour of Pakistan “on or around 3 November 1947”61.
The harsh winter, accompanied with heavy snowfalls, won’t, however, be too late to make its entry on the scene. This worked much more to the disadvantage of the Indian forces, drawn from the plains, than the raiders – mountain tribes.62
Even then, a better trained and equipped army was able to push back the invading militias, reportedly indulging in severe large-scale atrocities against local civilians – not excluding Muslims63, to a significant extent. However, the raiders could hold on to the territories on the west and the north, with considerable local support.
Pakistan, in response, gradually started increasing the presence of its regular forces. In the spring of 1948 regular army battalions, later entire brigades and artillery regiments participated in operations. The battle intensified.64
Between May and December 1948, the Indian forces could, however, score some critical incremental gains.
There, however, arose, apparently, a situation of military stalemate on the ground.65
On top of that, both the feuding states were still Dominions,with their armed forces under the commands of British generals.66
In September 1948, India would initiate military operations to annex the princely state of Hyderabad.67
As regards the state of Jammu and Kashmir, India, prodded by its Governor-General – Lord Mountbatten, had lodged a complaint with the United Nations Security Council on January 1 1948, in response to which Pakistan would lodge a countercomplaint, on the following January 15th, bringing in also the issue of India’s annexation of Junagadh, overriding its ruler’s move to accede to Pakistan, by signing the Instrument of Accession.68Eventually, through the interventions of the UN Security Council, a cease fire became operative on January 1 1949.69
It would be useful to recall here that while India had based its case on its claimed legality, anchored in the “accession”, further buttressed by a pledge to honour popular choice – to be determined via a “plebiscite”; Pakistan challenged the authenticity of the “accession” and the ruler’s competence to do that, apart from highlighting the religious demography of the state in support of its claim over the territory.70
Kashmir: Divided into twoAt any rate, the erstwhilestate of Jammu and Kashmir now effectively split into two parts – along the Line of Control (LoC), regardless of the, hotly contested, “legal” positions
Pakistan got to retain a large chunk in the north – Northern Areas or Gilgit-Baltistan, and a rather thin slice in the west – Azad Kashmir.
In 1947, most of these areas had seen popular revolts against Maharaja Hari Singh and, eventually, in favour of Pakistan.
India got the rest.
In other words, Punjabi speaking areas of Poonch, Mirpur, and Muzaffarabad, along with Gilgit andBaltistan came to be under control by Pakistan, while the most part of Jammu regionand Ladakh and the entire Kashmir Valley came to India.71
One of the major (assessed) reasons why the Indian forces could clear the Valley of the invading Pukhtoons is the cooperation by the locals under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah.72
While the developments, in this region, this point onwards would become a focus of international attention and a major, arguably the most major, source of violent – both low-level and highly intense, clashes between neighbouring India and Pakistan, the area under the control of Pakistan has, reportedly, no problem in terms of its relation with Pakistan, nor,for that matter, Jammu and Ladakh with India.
Undoubtedly, the Valley is the hotspot.
As a consequence, it is primarily this area which would be the focal point of the following discussions, in the process of exploring a resolution of the “problem” or “dispute”.
Since Accession (October 1947) till Rise of Insurgency (1989-90)The limited war, accession, capped by the UN mediated ceasefire, however, led to no “solution” of the “dispute”.
While, in the eyes of the UN, India and Pakistan were the two disputants, the peoples of Kashmir – subjected to divergent pulls were/are no less so.
It would, however, be in the fitness of things to briefly review the various critical UNSC resolutions, as regards the “dispute” and its “resolution”, in the given context.
On January 20 1948, Resolution 39 was passed establishing a three-member Commission to investigate the complaints by both the disputants. This had been preceded by the Resolution 38, passed on January 17. The Commission, as envisaged in Resolution 39, did not come into fruition until May 1948. Meanwhile, the Security Council continued its deliberations and the war too continued.
On April 21 1948, the (three-part) Resolution 47 was adopted. It laid down the ground rules for holding the “plebiscite”. Pakistan was asked to use its “best endeavours” to secure the withdrawal of all tribesmen and Pakistani nationals, putting an end to the fighting in the state. India was asked to “progressively reduce” its forces to the minimum level required for keeping law and order and, subsequently, appoint a Plebiscite Administrator nominated by the United Nations, who would oversee a free and impartial plebiscite
The Resolution was recommendatory, not mandatory, in nature.73
While a ceasefire would come into force on January 1 1949, neither Pakistan nor India made any move towards fulfilling the laid down conditions for holding the “plebiscite” and it would never be held.
The UNSC, however, would continue to pass resolutions, with progressively decreasing frequency, the last one being: Resolution 307, adopted on December 21, 1971.74
The initial Indian pledge, to the UN, to hold a referendum was very much in tandem with the traditional position taken by the Indian National Congress, the ruling party, in respect of the future of the princely states in British India. Also its stand in alignment with its stand in case of Junagadh and Hyderabad.75 But, far more importantly – as would become evident with the passage of time, its confidence that with Sheikh Abdullah, the tallest political leader from the Valley, by its side – having been appointed the Head of the Emergency Administration on 30 October 1947 and also leading a volunteer force locally raised to fight the invaders and, then, on March 17 194876, the Prime Minister of the state under Indian control, it will not be difficult to have a favourable opinion.76
But, soon, the relations would start souring and, consequently, Sheikh would be dismissed from his office on August 8 1953and then thrown behind the bars suspecting his commitment to the “Accession”.78
As a result, would evaporate the confidence.
Thus, India would finally rescind from the pledge in 1954, on the ostensible ground of Pakistan joining a military alliance with the USA and, thereby, altering the basic parameters as had hitherto existed.79Conversely, Pakistan, which was rather unenthusiastic about the plebiscite, initially, started demanding it more and more loudly.80
The seeds of the growing tussle between India/Nehru and Nehru’s one-time close associate81 Sheikh Abdullah, who, virtually, was the very personification of the Valley, or at least Valley Muslims82, lay in their vastly different readings of the implications of Kashmir’s accession to India.83Though Sheikh played a pivotal role in the process of Kashmir’s accession to India – under extraordinary circumstances, it appears that for him it was the second best option – to be a part of “secular” India, enjoying a large degree of autonomy and with himself at the helm. The best, however, would have been an independent Kashmir (Valley)84, neutral between India and Pakistan – both, however, keenly desirous of annexing Kashmir, the, most likely, prime consideration being its assessed geo-political salience.
Indian leaders, including Nehru – hard-nosed politicians as they were, could very well sense that Sheikh’s ambitions were in flagrant conflict with their own design, even while acknowledging his very considerable political utility.
Sheikh, cognizant of his weakness vis-à-vis the Indian state, started flirting with foreign powers.
That turned out to be the proverbial last straw on the camel’s back.85Consequently, Sheikh was just not dethroned but also thrown behind the bars.
That, in process, seriously ruptured the bond between the Indian state and the people of the Valley.
The Indian state was, of course, only too aware of that.
The three major elements in the armoury of the Indian state to tackle the Kashmir issue, henceforth would be political manoeuvring, combined with the selective use of carrot and stick –more stick than carrot.
Before being dismissed, the National Conference government led by Sheikh, unencumbered by the Indian legal system, had implemented a fairly comprehensive, despite some significant conceptual and implementational glitches, land reforms – evidently, the first and, perhaps, the most radical in India.86
This will be further followed up in the late ‘70s, again under Sheikh.87
This was in alignment with the spirit of the 1944 manifesto, Naya Kashmir88 (New Kashmir) – its Article 26, in particular, adopted by the National Conference, under his leadership.
Sheikh, as the Prime Minister, was succeeded by BakshiGhulam Mohammad, another National Conference leader.
With Sheikh behind the bars, his followers, led by Mirza Mohammad Afzal Beg, would, in August 1955, found the All Jammu and Kashmir Plebiscite Front or Plebiscite Front to act as the main opposition force, without eliciting much tangible success.89However, by the end of 1963, the pent up frustrations of the people burst out in the open over the theft of holy relic from the Hazratbal Shrine. The relic would soon be recovered.90But, under its impact, Sheikh would soon be released from jail.91
In 1975, at the end of a period stretching over twenty one odd years with many ups and downs, there would be an accord92 between the then Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, and Sheikh, in February 1975, paving the path for his assuming the office of Chief Minister, soon thereafter93.
The most salient point of the Accord was Sheikh giving up the demand for plebiscite.
Since January 64 till Sheikh taking up the reign again in February ’75, there were three Prime/Chief Ministers.
Sheikh, ‘Sher-e-Kashmir‘ (the ‘Lion of Kashmir’), would die in harness, on September 8 198294, re-inaugurating a phase of political uncertainties.
Along with Sheikh, the most robust ballast restraining the prospect of Kashmiri nationalism turning towards extremism also disappeared.
Amid political turbulence, in the ‘80s, extremism kept gathering momentum – the ongoing Jihad in neighbouring Afghanistan and the Islamic revolution in Iran also playing their roles.95
In February 1984, the execution of Kashmir Liberation Front militant Maqbool Bhat96 would spark off widespread public protests.97In July 1984, the dismissal of the popular Farooq Abdullah government by Governor Jagmohan, acting as Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s hatchet man, through thoroughly questionable machinations, added further fat to the slow fire.98
The year 1987 would prove to be a major turning point.99
An alliance of Islamic parties, the Muslim United Front (MUF), was formed to contest the 1987 state elections and emerged as a major player, the first time in the state – post-Accession, for an Islamic political outfit.
However, when the poll results came out, they were victorious in only 4 of the contested 43 seats.
This was, as is widely acknowledged, the outcome of a massive rigging by the rulingNational Conference in alliance with the Congress.100.Rigging of polls was nothing new – it is commonly held that only ’77 and ’83 polls were not rigged.101
But the scale of rigging this time provided a strong tailwind to the sprouting militancy in the state.102
InsurgencyArrives
The new phase103 would, sort of,be inaugurated with the assassination, on November 4 1989, of Justice Neelkanth Ganjoo104, by the JKLF militants, who had delivered capital punishment to MaqboolBhat.It had been preceded by the murder of a BJP leader, TikkaLalTaploo, on September 14 1989.105
The first political assassination had taken place with a National Conference block president, Md. Yusuf Halwai, having been shot dead in Srinagar on August 21 1989.106
Its first eruptions had, however,started appearing in 1988107 itself.
In the second half of 1989 the alleged assassinations of the Indian spies and political collaborators by JKLF (Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) was intensified. Over six months more than a hundred officials were killed to paralyse government’s administrative and intelligence apparatus. The daughter of then interior affairs minister, Mufti Mohammad Sayeed was kidnapped in December and four terrorists had to be released for her release. This event led to mass celebrations all over the valley.108
This would soon be followed by exodus of panic-stricken Kashmiri Pandits from the Valley, mainly Srinagar.
Rather intriguingly, a very large number fled on a single night of January 19 1990, the very day the newly appointed Governor Jagmohan, for the second time,had taken over the reins of the state, with the Chief Minister resigning, in protest.109
The exodus, of course, would continue for a while, with the overwhelming bulk of the Panditsmigrating.110The estimates of how many, however, widely vary.
Of the approximately 300,000 to 600,000 Hindus living in the Kashmir Valley in 1990 only 2,000–3,000 remain there in 2016.111
The appointment of Jagmohan as the Governor, as a sort of a BJP nominee, with his earlier track record of dismissing Farooq Abdullah government at the behest of the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, by the V P Singh government was bound to be disastrous112 and so it almost immediately turned out to be.
On January 21, a protest march, against atrocities by security forces on the previous day, was indiscriminately fired upon and 35, the highest till then, lives were reportedly extinguished.113Things kept happening, at a rather feverish pitch, and 1990 proved to be the major turning point since 1987.
1990 was also the first year when the when the head of the state failed to hoist the national flag on Republic Day. It was a period when the Indian state exposed not only its ugliest face but also its most helpless form.114What is worth noting here that a deliberate purely strong-arm policy just not only radically worsened the situation but also showed up the weakness of the Indian state.
Jagmohan would, eventually, be packed off115, following another round of atrocious mass killing by the security forces on May 21.116
But, the damage he could manage to inflict, during his rather short-lived tenure – just over four months, was simplyenormous.117
A Brief Recap
Between “Accession” of Kashmir to India on October 27 1947 and May 26 1990, the day Jagmohan demitted office, certain watershed events that took place need be specifically flagged here, before proceeding further.
First, Sheikh Abdullah’s appointment as the Head of the Emergency Administration on 30 October 1947, to be followed up with his assumption of the post of the Prime Minister of the state on March 17 1948. This had helped cement the emotional bond between the Valley and India.
This would suffer a serious jolt when Sheikh was unceremoniously dethroned and thrown behind the bars in early August 1953.
Things got partly repaired with his rehabilitation of sorts in 1975.
His death in 1982, while in office, is another momentous development.
The alleged large-scale rigging of the polls in 1987 triggered the rise of (budding) militancy, mainly led by the quasi-secular JKLF.
Under the impact of the rule of Jagmohan, during the first half of 1990, militancy assumed mass character, it also turned distinctly religious-sectarian and the atmosphere in the Valley became sharply communalised. Pakistan started shifting its support from the JKLF to pro-Pakistan Islamic militant groups.
Decades of Turbulence, Militancy and Repression: Till August 4 2019The insurgency that made its appearance in the Valley in 1989-90 is since continuing, albeit with periodic ups and downs, in tandem with largely raised level of state repression, again, with fluctuating intensities.
The allegations of human rights violations are too ubiquitous.
So are the charges of Pakistan’s active promotion of armed militancy and terrorism.
The militancy itself, apparently further fuelled by repression, is getting deeper and deeper into the zone of radicalised Islam, rather contemptuous of any notion of “liberal democracy”.
In between, 2008 saw the emergence of stone pelting on the streets as a back-up form of mass resistance – to be met with more than matching state brutalities.
The global community is generally rather disinterested except on the ground of a potentially apocalyptic possible nuclear war between the two perpetually feuding neighbours, who went overtly nuclear in May 1998 and are relentlessly engaged in enhancing respective nuclear arsenals and developing the triad of delivery platforms since then.
While this period saw a radically spiked level of brutal violence, including sexual118– by the state and, also, by the militants – composed of both locals and outsiders, a few events merit special mention.
* Closely following the Pandit exodus and brutalities let loose by the administration under Jagmohan, in February 1991, there was one alleged event of mass gang rape by the Indian armed forces in the twin villages of Kunan and Poshpora, in the Kupwara district.119
* Alleged Shopian rape and murder followed by mas unrest in May-June 2009.120
* Late 2010 saw triggering of prolonged unrest by an allegation of murder of three youths, via staged encounter, by the Indian Army.121
* On July 8 2016, a local militant, BurhanWani, in his very early twenties, was killed in an armed encounter with the Indian security forces. He was a commander of the theHizbulMujahideen and had gained considerable popularity among the local youth via social media. His death sparked off a new wave of militant recruitments.122
* The last in this series is the Pulwama suicide blast, on February 14 2019, carried out by a local youth in which at least forty CRPF jawans in transit got killed.123
Current Situation: Since August 5 2019
On August 5 and 6, just over last two days of the extended monsoon session of the Indian parliament, the incumbent regime brought about some seismic changes as regards the legal and constitutional status of the erstwhile state of Jammu and Kashmir via some highly questionable parliamentary jugglery.124
In sum, the Article 370 of the Constitution – the recognition of the terms of the Instrument of Accession between the state and India by the latter in its Constitution, was made null and void, without actually amending it.
The Article 35A, which debars “outsiders” from purchasing property in the state – a protective measure not unique to the J&K alone, was scrapped.
The state was bifurcated – to come into force on October 31st, between Jammu and Kashmir on the one hand and Ladakh on the other.125
The status of both the states stands degraded to that of Union Territories – something unprecedented since 1956.126
Before doing all these, a large number of additional troops were deployed, in an already highly militarised zone, on the streets; round the clock curfew declared, all over the state, all forms of communications – including telephones, internet etc. were cut off. Kashmir, in a way, was completely sealed off from the outside world.127
All known political leaders from the Valley have been put under arrest, including threeformer Chief Ministers. The total number of arrests, as per one report, is around 4,000128, with a few hundreds shifted out of the state129.
At the time of writing, with more than a month elapsed, things remain broadly the same130, understandably, giving rise to a humanitarian crisis.131Horror stories of custodial tortures have started leaking out.132The judicial system in Srinagar, reportedly, remains frozen, while the Supreme Court fails to take note.133
Bouts of extended lock-down accompanied with state repressions are nothing new to Kashmir, though the scale and intensity, this time, is unprecedented.134
Far more importantly, It appears to be part of a larger game plan, that was not there ever before.
An acknowledged “moderate” observer thus presciently noted:
In the context of the UAPA, NRC, communalisation, Ayodhya, it is one more node in a pattern hurtling the Indian state towards a denouement where all of us feel unsafe. Not just Kashmiris, not just minorities, but anyone standing up for constitutional liberty.135
In this context, it is not easy to refrain from drawing the readers’ attention to what this writer had concluded in an analysis of the outcome of the 2019 parliamentary poll in India:
Modi 2.0 very much presents us with the looming threat of the dismantling of the “India” – embodying the values of “democracy”, “pluralism” and “egalitarianism”, that had been wrought out in the crucible of the epic freedom struggle and, in the process, finally emerged on the 15th August 1947 – in pursuance of a project to supplant it with a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nation state) – by mobilising the Hindus of India as “Hindus”, drowning out all other identities linked to language, culture, gender, caste, class etc., constantly stoking hatred and violence against the constructed inimical “others”.136
To connect the dots, while the previous Indian regimes – the Congress-led ones, in particular, had made, rather liberal, use of state repressions, intent upon retaining Kashmir as a part of the Indian territory – for a number of reasons, the subject move by the incumbent regime is primarily geared towards a very different objective altogether – actualising its long cherished project of transforming India into a “Hindu Rashtra” (Hindu nationstate).
Only if this is kept in mind, it would be possible to make sense of this momentous move cloaked in carefully planned deceptions and anchored in constitutional jugglery.
Engaged observers have quite emphatically underlined that a major outcome of this move is wiping out of that tribe of Kashmiri politicians – constantly shrinking, though, since the passing away of Sheikh Abdullah, who were seeking a “solution” of the Kashmir “problem” without asking for secession from India.
Given the salience of theissue, in determining the shape of things to come, it would quite be in the fitness of things to cite a few, verbatim:
I. By arresting mainstream leaders, activists, lumping them with separatists, and creating a binary in which “You are with us or against us”, the govt too has left virtually no political space for “collaborators”.137
II. For now, the middle ground in Kashmir stands obliterated.138
III. A recent tweet by a Kashmiri activist based in Europe, who is a harsh critic of Pakistan on J&K and intervenes in the United Nations Human Rights Council in Geneva to rebut any unfavourable report against India, sums up the situation. “Spoke to a friend in Srinagar after a two week hiatus and asked about the situation. His reply: There are only two Kashmiris left. One who feels betrayed &humiliated. The other, who tells the first one: ‘We told you so’. That was all we spoke. Both not knowing what else to say.”139
IV.By these sweeping arrests, the government has blurred the lines between separatists, terrorists, stone-pelters and mainstream leaders who’ve kept the tricolour flying.140V. “For the past 70 years, mainstream leaders have been holding the Indian flag high in the Valley, sometimes at the cost of the lives. See what they (the Centre) have done to the mainstream,” said a PDP leader.
“I fear there will be no mainstream in Kashmir now. The entire Valley is now on the other side of the divide,” he said.141
Three of the five quotes above are from pretty well-known and well-respected journalists.
This quashing of the “middle ground” is, however, no unintended side-effect of an overzealous act by a regime having full faith in its own capacity to extinguish all opposition – armed and unarmed, through use of raw coercion.
It is very much designed to be that way.
Jitendra Singh, the Minister of State for the Prime Minister’s Office, thereby, supposedly, privy to the government’s mind, and an MP from Jammu, to boot, in a recent freewheeling chat with the Indian Express has made it as much explicit as possible:
No, no. Actually I don’t see any future for them (i.e. young politicians, such as Sajad Lone, Omar Abdullah, ShahFaesal). They are also realising that their political innings has come to an end. It is only some section of the media that wants to see some future, so that the story can carry on. The story has ended.142
The same minister has rubbed this in further, again a month thereafter, by formally pronouncing that the arrested political leaders and activists, who, quite tellingly, include even BJP’s own allies and protégés143, are not going to be freed in any near future.144
This, apparent, deliberate self-infliction of a grievous wound would make sense only if one keeps in mind that for the current regime, Kashmir is just one of the more crucial pieces on the political chessboard, meant to be used, to checkmate “India”.
The regime cannot but be keenly aware of the fact that this approach of eliminating the “middle ground”, in all probability, would give a strong boost to armed militancy once attempts are made to restore, at least some degree of, “normalcy”.
The reason for which such a development would be considered welcome, and not dreaded – as would normally be expected, is that it– being held up as a mortal threat to mainland India, will help to communally polarise it and, thereby, smoothen the projected journey towards a “Hindu Rashtra”.
One can hardly dig out any other alternative plausible explanation.
Very much in tandem with this approach, the Union Home Minister has flatly refused to talk to any organised force in the Valley.145
Not to be outdone, the Defence Minister has registered refusal to talk to Pakistan either.146
The Home Minister, accordingly, met (apparently, in a choreographed move) a crowd of 22 village heads on September 3 in Delhi. As is expected, nothing of any consequence appears to have been discussed.147
The earlier regimes, including the NDA led by Vajpayee, had, in between waves of armed repressions also used to make periodic overtures towards peace – with Kashmiris and also Pakistan, in separate moves.
Thus we had Lahore (1999)148, Agra (2001)149 and Sharm El Sheikh (2009)150 between India and Pakistan.
With Kashmiris, the most significant official moves had been made in 2006 and then again in 2010.
All these, eventually, turned out to be stillborn though.151
But, this time round no such gesture appears to be in the offing.
A plausible explanation for that has already been offered above.
The Peace ProspectsIn a situation of violent conflict no durable peace can be conceived of without the consent of the vital stakeholders to a negotiated settlementof the dispute(s) causing the conflict, however difficult the process may appear to be.
That, by its very definition, would call for “negotiations” between the disputants – all by themselves or aided by some external mediator(s), to make even a beginning.
No magic formula, howsoever sensible or even attractive it may look, is not going to “work” unless it emerges out of engagements between all the stakeholders.152
As was attempted to map above, in the subject case, the (three) major feuding sides are (i) the Indian state – engaged in maintaining, and further tightening, of its ownership over the state of Jammu and Kashmir, under its control, and the Valley, in particular; (ii) the people of the Valley – many, or arguably most, of whom are asking for, somewhat nebulous, “Azadi”153, either within “India” – with much greater autonomy, or (mostly) from India –through merger with the neighbouring ‘Islamic Republic of Pakistan’ or in the form of an independent state – staunchly Islamic or a more liberal version of it, and (iii) Pakistan, which considers annexation of the state under India as an “unfinished agenda of the Partition”154in the region towards that goal.
Right now, the incumbent Indian regime is frankly bent upon going just the opposite way.
The only other way of achieving “peace” is the scoring of decisive military victory by one of the feuding parties over its opponent(s).
As regards the possibility of a decisive military victory, the history of the struggle of the Palestinians vis-à-vis Israel, armed with nuclear weapons, could be a good reference point.
On top of that, in the subject case, despite large asymmetry in terms of conventional weapons, India and Pakistan are both armed with nuclear weapons backed up by all the three delivery platforms155 (In case of Pakistan the third leg of the triadic platform is – nuclear-tipped missiles from submarine, at least, close to completion.)
And, given the domestic popular mood, no Pakistani regime can afford to let militancy in Kashmir be just crushed by the Indian state.
Hence, it, too, does not look very much likely, in any foreseeable future.
Talks had, however, been held between India and Pakistan – in not-too-distant past, albeit, without involving “Kashmir” as an autonomous entity, on three occasions. At least the first two took place, quite plausibly, because of American prodding.
There was no such apparent external trigger for the efforts at internal dialogues.
But then, these, in any case, looked far less promising.
Arguably, the Agra conclave had raised maximum hopes, though, at the end, it failed even to produce a pro forma joint statement.156
In any case, this time round, the Indian regime is in just no mood to engage any meaningful “talk”.
(In fact, given the current trend, once the current session (September 2019) of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) is over, the possibility of a large-scale military crackdown in the Valley cannot just be ruled out.)
Moreover, the US, which, in the past – most visibly in the case of Kargil War157, had played a vital role – even if, mostly, from behind the screen, under Donald Trump, has lost much of its diplomatic clout.
The repeated offers of Trump to mediate, in response to the urgings by Pakistan and even otherwise, have been summarily rejected by India.158
Pakistan, under the circumstances, is trying its utmost to get the world leaders involved by scaring them with the talks of a possible nuclear war.159As of now, it has failed to evoke the desired response.160
Things may start changing only in case of a significant shift in the global scenario.
The Road AheadRight now, there is a radical shift in the stance of the Indian regime, away from even any overture in favour of peace, against the backdrop of armed militancy, infused with extremist Islamism161, gaining more and more grounds at the costs of “moderates”, with Pakistan, which itself has a dismal record as regards human rights of various minorities162 and now headed by a Prime Minister – widely believed to be a nominee of its military establishment163, actively fanning the fire.
There is also a relative disinterest in “Kashmir”, on the global arena, partly caused by India’s enhanced economic and diplomatic clout, in the recent decades.
Even otherwise, in not-too-distant past, there was massive violation of human rights, in neighbouring puny Sri Lanka164. In more immediate present, Myanmar165 saw state directed genocide against one of its minority ethnic communities. In neither of the cases, the concerned regime faced any tangible consequence.
That, however, does, in no way, do away with the dire need of peace in Kashmir, more so, given its, all too obvious, nuclear dimensions.
Public opinion, in the region and globally, has got to be diligently mobilised, regardless of the roadblocks, in favour of initiating dialogues, to explore a “solution”, involving all the stakeholders, maybe with some credible mediator helping out in the process.
That appears tobe the only way out.
23 09 2019
Epilogue
Though the monograph had,finally, been wrapped up well after the momentous, or rather seismic, August 5, the reports from the ground zero were still fairly scant, given the extent and intensity of the lockdown imposed.
The lockdown, still in place, has, however,by now started gettingincrementally relaxed – though not unaccompanied by at least a few moves right in the opposite direction, in the wake of the much delayed (by more than five months) eventual response, from the Indian Supreme Court166, in particular: social media sites are, right now, at least notionally, accessible167; schools are reopened after seven months168.
Quite a few factfinding reports169, by various civil society groups, have, in the meanwhile, seen the light of the day – braving considerable hurdles. One is pretty recent170 – came out just the last week.
Here,however, no attempt would be made to provide any synopsis of these or any analytical account of the subsequent developments.
It will, nevertheless, only be in the fitness of things to explicitly acknowledge that despite huge – understandably quite unprecedented even by the Kashmir standard, military mobilisation by the Indian state, no major military operation – as distinct from rather customary coercive measures, has yet been launched against the local people in general.
Nor there has been a noticeable spurt in armed militancy or even an outbreak of intifada – in response to August 5 and its aftermath.
These two, noteworthy, developments are, apparently, somehow interlinked – with the international opinion building and diplomacy forming crucial elements of the overall backdrop, and deserve to be closely interrogated.
Notes and References:
- : <https://allpoetry.com/Couplet-7>.
- RSS slogans like “Doodh mango ge to kheerdenge, Kashmir mango ge to chirdenge (If you ask for milk, we’ll give you kheer, but if you ask for Kashmir we shall kill you”).
(Ref.: ‘A prayer for peace’, dtd. May 19 2002, at <https://www.thehindu.com/thehindu/mag/2002/05/19/stories/2002051900090100.htm>.) - It has been suggested that the Indian sub-continent is the most dangerous place in the world to-day and Kashmir is a nuclear flash-point.
(Ref.: ‘Speech by ShriI K.R. Narayan, President of India, at the Banquet in Honour of Mr. William J. Clinton, President of The United States of Ameria, on March 21 2000 in New Delhi, at <http://www.krnarayanan.in/html/speeches/others/mar21000.htm>.)
Also ref.: ‘South Asia is a nuclear flashpoint, expert tells Euronews’, dtd. March 2 2019, at <https://www.euronews.com/2019/03/02/south-asia-is-a-nuclear-flashpoint-expert-tells-euronews> and 5:39 to 7:27 mins. at<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=RNUTQmSNfrE&feature=youtu.be>. [4] - Since 2016, Kashmir has been in an almost constant state of unrest, which while not caused by the Pakistanis – Indian ham-handedness and human rights abuses managed this all on their own – has been taken advantage of by them and their terrorist proxies. A settlement that all three parties—the Indians, Pakistanis, and, let’s not forget, the Kashmiris—will find acceptable is impossible to imagine.
(Ref.: Revisiting “The Most Dangerous Place in the World” by Roberto Rivera, dtd. March 1 2019, at <http://www.breakpoint.org/2019/03/revisiting-the-most-dangerous-place-in-the-world/>.) - : ‘Military failure could push Pakistan to initiate nuclear attack against India’, dtd. July 14 2018, at <https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/military-failure-could-push-pakistan-to-initiate-nuclear-attack-against-india/articleshow/54479254.cms?from=mdr>.
- ‘The Global Cost Of India-Pak Nuclear War’ by Abheet Singh Sethi, dtd. Sept. 29 2016, at <https://archive.indiaspend.com/cover-story/the-global-cost-of-india-pak-nuclear-war-27563> and ‘India-Pakistan nuclear war could end human civilisation: Even limited nuclear exchange would devastate food production around the world, according to International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War’, dtd. Dec. 10 2013, at <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/pakistan/10507342/India-Pakistan-nuclear-war-could-end-human-civilisation.html>.
- : ‘Understanding the Kashmir Conflict’ by Subhamoy Das, dtd. March 6 2017. at<https://www.learnreligions.com/history-of-the-kashmir-conflict-1770394>.
- : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
- : ‘The New Wave of Mobilisation in Kashmir: Religious or Political?’ by Simple Mohanty at <https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/full/10.1177/0049085717743838>.
- : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
- , e.g.: ‘A History of India’ by Hermann Kulke and DietmarRothermund, Third Edition, pp. 258 -293, at <http://111.68.99.107/libmax/Administrator/Library/DigitalResources/Digital/Books/A%20HISTORY%20OF%20INDIA.pdf>
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
Also: ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>. - : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rinchan>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- : ‘Kashmir’ at <https://www.britannica.com/place/Kashmir-region-Indian-subcontinent>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir>.
- :’Demystifying Kashmir’ by NavnitaChadhaBehera, The Brookings Institution, 2006, pp. 14-15, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Behara-%E2%80%93-Demystifying-Kashmir.pdf>.
Also <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_Kashmir> and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>. - He (my uncle) told me (a young Kashmiri Muslimvictim of alleged mass rape by Indian military) Kashmir’s story (of discrimination and “dispute”) not just starting from the Partition and the promises made by Pandit Nehru, but from the beginning of Dogra rule.
: ‘That Night in KunanPoshpora: Do you remember KunanPoshopora? You should’ at <https://antiserious.com/that-night-in-kunan-poshpora-33b48db9a94e>.
This implies that the narrative of oppression of Kashmiris by its erstwhile Dogra rulers is a part of popular memory, even now. - ‘The Economic Roots of the National. Awakening in Jammu and. Kashmir (1846-1947)’, by Ab Rashid Shiekh, chapter 5, at<https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/23085/10/15_chapter6.pdf>.
- Ibid.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
- ’13 July, 1931 : The Whole Truth …’, op cit.
- : ’13 July 1931: A Chapter of Kashmir’ at <https://kashmirlife.net/13-july-1931-a-chapter-of-kashmir-61908/>.
Also: ‘Kashmir Martyrs’ Day: Everything about Kashmir’s July 13 carnage’ at <https://www.freepressjournal.in/webspecial/kashmir-martyrs-day-everything-about-kashmirs-july-13-carnage> and ‘Martyrs’ Days: Memorializing 13 July 1931 in Kashmir: MriduRai’ at <https://kafila.online/2011/07/13/martyrs%E2%80%99-days-memorializing-13-july-1931-in-kashmir-mridu-rai/>. - Here is a significant comment on the narrative of “Kashmiriyat”:
The composite and accommodating culture of Kashmir, often known as kashmiriyat, pre-dates the Valley’s role as an outpost of a succession of alien empires. At its core has been a gentle, mystical and humanist form of Islam influenced by Sufism. The term describes a Kashmiri identity which embraced both the Valley’s Muslim majority and its highcaste[sic] Hindu minority, the pandits. The concept is often overstated, as if to evoke a political paradise before a biblical fall and the embroiling of the Valley in the rival nationalisms of India and Pakistan. The religious and class divisions between Kashmiri-speaking Hindus and Muslims were always clear-cut. The Kashmiri nationalist current that has proclaimed kashmiriyat as its standard has often turned to Islam rather than a more inclusive regionalism as its defining identity. And it seems the term kashmiriyat was never used before 1947—it was in part invented as a political rallying cry. Yet its strength has come from a perception that Kashmir has been inclusive in its culture, and that both the Muslim majority and the vastly smaller and more privileged Hindu minority contributed to the language and the culture, respected and honoured the other community’s religious festivals and practices, and so shared a Kashmiri identity which created a bond stronger than the differences of faith and belief.
(Ref.: ‘A Mission in Kashmir’ by Andrew Whitehead, Viking, 2007, Chapter 2, p. 14, at <https://www.andrewwhitehead.net/uploads/3/5/0/5/3505647/02_caught_in.pdf>.)
It may be noted that in today’s context, there appears to be a very large degree of congruence between the proponents of Kashmiriyat, presupposing a harmonious past, and those of Kashmir’s continuance within India, albeit with a large degree of autonomy; also to some extent with those demanding “independence” (or “Azadi”). But, presumably none with those asking for unconditional integration with either India or Pakistan. - : ‘Emergence and Role of Muslim Conference in Kashmir (1932-1939)’ by Muhammad Yusuf Ganai, pp. 113 -125, at <http://ir.amu.ac.in/2266/1/T%205238.pdf>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
- Muhammad Yusuf Ganai, op cit, pp. 157 – 158.
Also: ‘Kashmir’s Flags: A Historical Overview’ by M J Aslam at <http://www.kashmirtimes.com/newsdet.aspx?q=83588>.
It does, quite interestingly, describe the subsequent transformation of the party, in 1939, into the National Conference, in terms of their respective flags, in the following words:
The green flag with white a crescent & a star in the middle was pulled down & replaced by a flag with red background & a plough in the middle which, thenceforth, became the party flag of the National Conference. - : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Jammu_and_Kashmir_Muslim_Conference>. - : ‘Towards New Kashmir’ at <http://www.jknc.in/UploadFiles/8a2ed918-f302-4831-89a0-d3d301635197__nayakashmir.pdf>.
Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naya_Kashmir>, ‘Naya Kashmir and Human Development: Foundations for State Development Policy’ by SeharIqbal at <http://www.ijmdrr.com/admin/downloads/1509201716.pdf> and ”Sheikh Abdullah’s New Kashmir Manifesto Was A Cut And Paste Of Stalin’s Constitution For Soviet Union” by NaseerGanani at <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/sheikh-abdullahs-new-kashmir-manifesto-was-a-cut-and-paste-of-stalins-constituti/298388>. - : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
- : The first paragraph, Section 3 of the ‘Resolution’, as cited in ‘Lahore Resolution 1940’ at <https://poseidon01.ssrn.com/delivery.php?ID=603006017073091021123087088112123087031020067072039011023110016119127018120084103064002029052121121116050100025126018102090124053017086038086008087087019068090099069035069078113073103094097024107103115094025072087010123026019086029064089110018068119067&EXT=pdf>.
- : In particular, para 23, ‘Presidential address by Muhammad Ali Jinnah to the Muslim League: Lahore, 1940’ at <http://www.columbia.edu/itc/mealac/pritchett/00islamlinks/txt_jinnah_lahore_1940.html>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_movements_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir_(princely_state)#cite_note-6>.
Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict#1846%E2%80%931945:_Princely_state>. - : <http://www.gandhi-manibhavan.org/activities/quit_india.htm>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict#1846%E2%80%931945:_Princely_state>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Attlee_ministry#Post-war_consensus>.
- : ‘British give date for Indian independence’, dtd. Feb. 20 1947, at <https://www.upi.com/Archives/1947/02/20/British-give-date-for-Indian-independence/3317410585124/>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direct_Action_Day>.
Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Partition_of_India#1946_Election,_Cabinet_Mission,_Direct_Action_Day,_Plan_for_Partition,_Independence:_1946%E2%80%931947>. - : ‘Five things you didn’t know about India’s Independence Day’ by ShoaibDaniyal at <https://scroll.in/article/674450/five-things-you-didnt-know-about-indias-independence-day>.
Also: ‘Why was August 15 chosen as Independence Day?’ by Sushant Singh at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/why-was-august-15-chosen-as-independence-day/>. - : ‘Remembering partition: ‘It was like a slaughterhouse” by Steve Chao at <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/08/remembering-partition-slaughter-house-170810050649347.html>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Kashmir_conflict#1846%E2%80%931945:_Princely_state>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_princely_states_of_British_India_(by_region)>.
Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princely_state>. - A highly pertinent observation, even if it pertains to the current, post-accession, scenario:
With its extraordinary medley of races, tribal groups, languages, and religions, Jammu and Kashmir is one of the most diverse regions in the subcontinent. Even its majority community of Kashmiri Muslims is not a unified, homogeneous entity in terms of its political beliefs, its ideological leanings, or the political goals of the decade-long insurgent movement in the Kashmir Valley. There are sharp divisions between those demanding that Jammu and Kashmir become an independent state, those seeking to merge with Pakistan, and those wanting to reconcile their differences with India through constitutional mechanisms guaranteeing their political rights. Nor does the Kashmiri political leadership necessarily speak for the diverse minorities of the state, including Gujjars, Bakkarwals, Kashmiri Pandits, Dogras, and Ladakhi Buddhists. Across the Line of Control, the Northern Areas also presents a rich mosaic of languages, castes, Islamic sects, and cultures, which cannot be subsumed under the overarching category of “Muslim brotherhood” without distorting the diverse political aspirations of the region’s residents. It is essential to recognize the deeply plural character of Jammu and Kashmir’s society on both sides of the line of control and the political aspirations and choices of its minority communities. The irreducible and homogenizing parameters of ideology and nationalism usually applied in analyzing the Kashmir conflict are clearly at variance with the plural realities and diverse political demands of the region’s various communities, ranging from affirmative discrimination to more autonomy, separate constitutional status within India or Pakistan, and outright secession.
(Ref.: Behera, op cit, p. 2.) - : ‘Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan and the Unending War’ by Victoria Schofield, I.B.Tauris, 2003, p. 25 and 30, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/book-kashmir-in-conflict-india-pakistan-and-unending-war.pdf>.
- : ‘Kashmir 1947: Rival Versions of History’ by Prem Shankar Jha, OUP, 1996, p. vii, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/split_jha_kashmir-1947-rival-versions-of-history.pdf>.
- ‘The forgotten Poonch uprising of 1947’ by Christopher Snedden, Seminar 643, March 2013, at <https://www.india-seminar.com/2013/643/643_christopher_snedden.htm#top>.
- : <https://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Political_integration_of_India>.
- ‘APPENDIX – I’ at <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/6534/15/15_appendix.pdf>.
Also: Ref.: ‘Victims of Massacre, 22nd October 1947’ by AshiqueHamdani Syed at <https://defence.pk/pdf/threads/victims-of-massacre-22nd-october-1947-black-day.137665/>.
For a significantly divergent version: ‘Danger in Kashmir’ by Josef Korbel, Princeton University Press, 1954, pp. 75-78, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/05/1954-Danger-in-Kashmir-by-Korbel-s.pdf>.
As regards the “sponsoring”: Korbel, op cit, pp. 93-95.
‘Jammu and Kashmir in Legal perspective’ by EFSAS at <https://www.efsas.org/EFSAS-Jammu%20and%20Kashmir%20in%20Legal%20Perspective.pdf>.
‘Alive and Kicking: The Kashmir Dispute Forty Years Later’ by James D. Howley, 1991, at <https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1132&context=psilr>. - AshiqueHamdani Syed, op cit.
- : ‘Kashmir: Insurgency and After’ by BalrajPuri, Orient Longman Private Ltd, 2008, pp. 8-9, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/puri_kashmirinsurgencyandafter.pdf>.
- AshiqueHamdani Syed, op cit.
- : ‘Kashmir: Legal Documents’, Legal Document No 112, at <http://help.ikashmir.net/historicaldocuments/doc/historicaldocuments.pdf>.
- : ‘Appendix – II’ at <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/6534/15/15_appendix.pdf>.
Also: ‘The Backstory of Article 370: A True Copy of J&K’s Instrument of Accession’ by VenkateshNayak, August 5, 2019, at <https://thewire.in/history/public-first-time-jammu-kashmirs-instrument-accession-india/amp/>. - There are some bitter controversies as regards the precise sequence of events, and even some doubts about the very existence of the Instrument of Accession. Views and inferences diverge, to a very significant extent, on the basis of which side of the divide one is on.
Nayak, ibid, deals with the “existence” aspect, apparently, rather conclusively.
For the larger, rather acrimonious, debate, one may refer to (i) ‘Birth of a Tragedy: Kashmir 1947’ by Alastair Lamb, Roxford Books, Hertingfordbury, 1994, pp. 82-103, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/1994-Birth-of-a-Tragedy-Kashmir-1947-by-Lamb-s.pdf> and (ii) Jha, op cit, pp. 59-73. - Puri, op cit, p. 12.
Also: There is no evidence of any official intervention with the Maharaja, but the only possible guess which suggests itself is that Abdullah was released on the intervention of the government of India, whose Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, had been for years associated with him.
(Ref.: Korbel, op cit, p. 70.) - : ‘Partition 70 years on: When tribal warriors invaded Kashmir’ by M Ilyas Khan, October 22 2017, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41662588>.
- : ‘Understanding Kashmir and Kashmiris’ by Christopher Snedden, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., London, 2015, pp. 126-27/252, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Understanding-Kashmir-and-Kashmiris.pdf>.
- As winter set in, the intensity of operations decreased. For the Indian forces the weather was a serious problem: many soldiers saw snow for the first time in their life, they were not accustomed to the cold weather at all, and there was not enough winter clothing and footwear available (shortages were gradually eased by local purchases). The locally recruited Azad militias and the Pathan fighters – who were generally used to the weather of high mountains – were far less affected by winter conditions. (Ref.: ‘The First Indo-Pakistani War, 1947-48’ by Peter A. Kiss, March 2013, at <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/235932742_THE_FIRST_INDO-PAKISTANI_WAR_1947-48>.)
- : ‘A Mission in Kashmir’ by Andrew Whitehead, Chapter 1: ‘An Italian in Kashmir’, at <https://www.andrewwhitehead.net/uploads/3/5/0/5/3505647/01_an_italian.pdf>.
Also: AshiqueHamdani Syed, op cit. - The first Pakistan Army formation to go into Kashmir was the 101 Brigade. The 101 Pakistani Brigade was the first regular army formation to enter Kashmir.This act of singular decisiveness took place in May 1948. One battalion each from this brigade went to Uri and Muzaffarabad-Kohala-Bagharea,while one company (later replaced by a battalion) went to Tithwal.
(Ref.: ‘The 1947-48 Kashmir War’ by Major Agha Humayun Amin at <https://www.brownpundits.com/2018/02/18/1947-48-kashmir-war/>.) - : ‘History of Operations in Jammu & Kashmir (1947-48)’ by S.N. Prasad, 1987, pp. pp.373-5, as cited in: ‘From Kashmir and 370 to Partition, BJP’s Hatred of Nehru is Fuelled by Falsehoods’ by A. G. Noorani, August 9 2019, at <https://thewire.in/history/from-kashmir-and-370-to-partition-bjps-hatred-of-nehru-is-fuelled-by-falsehoods>.
- Because of Pakistan and India’s dependence on British officers in their respective armies, both countries believed that they had been disadvantaged during the Kashmir war: Pakistan, because General Gracey had refused to send in troops when Jinnah requested him to do so; India because, rather than encouraging the Indians to counterattack and recapture the area around Mirpur and Muzaffarabad, while they were militarily in the ascendancy, General Bucher pressed for a ceasefire. But, from the British perspective, Bucher’s objective, mirrored by that of Gracey, was preventing an inter-dominion war, which would have required men, who had so recently been comrades-in-arms, to fight each other.
(Ref.: Schofield, op cit, p. 72.) - : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_annexation_of_Hyderabad>.
- : ‘Resolutions and Statements of the United Nations Security Council (1946–1989): A Thematic Guide’ edited by Karel C. Wellens, MartinusNijhoff Publishers, Netherlands, 1990, p. 322, at <https://books.google.co.in/books?id=lsyOVH6E-PEC&printsec=frontcover#v=onepage&q&f=false>.
It appears that well before India actually taking the dispute to the UN, Pak Prime Minster, on November 16 1947, had proposed such a course of action, via a press statement.
(Ref.: Korbel, op cit, pp. 90-91.)
That makes the proposition quite plausible that India would eventually go to the UN, on January 1 1948, to forestall such a move on the part of Pakistan and lodge the complaint under chapter VII, instead of chapter VI (which Puri found rather “intriguing”: Puri, op cit, p. 17), to keep the level of UN intervention, all at the same time, to the most minimum and its opinion only recommendatory. At that point of time, quite possibly, it was pretty much an astute diplomatic move, on the part of India in the tussle with rival Pakistan.
Also: Ref.: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UN_mediation_of_the_Kashmir_dispute>. - Puri, op cit, pp. 16-17. Also: Korbel, op cit, p. viii.
- Schofield, op cit, pp. 70-71. Also Puri, op cit, pp. 16-17. Also: <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_47>.
- Lamb, op cit, maps 1-3. Also: Behera, op cit. p. 29.
- Puri, op cit, pp. 17-18.
- : ‘’Resolutions and Statements …’, op cit, p. 322, and <https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_47>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Security_Council_Resolution_307>.
- Puri, op cit, pp. 15-17.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Abdullah#Head_of_emergency_administration>.
- Puri, op cit, pp. 15-16.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Abdullah#Head_of_emergency_administration>.
Also: Schofield, op cit, pp. 92-93. - Ref: Snedden, op cit, pp. 155-6/252. Also: Puri, op cit, pp. 20-21.
- Puri, ibid.
Also: ‘How Pakistan avoided a plebiscite -Excerpts from the book “The Kashmir Story” by B. L. Sharma’ at <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18970/How+Pakistan+avoided+a+plebiscite+Excerpts+from+the+book+quotThe+Kashmir+Storyquot+by+B+L+Sharma>.
For a strikingly different version: Korbel, op cit, pp. 88-91. - For a rather amusing and, yet, telling testimony: ‘My Years with Sheikh Abdullah: Kashmir 1971 – 1987’ by Gulam Ahmad, Gulshan Books, Srinagar, 2008, pp. 24-25, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Ahmad-Years-with-Abdullah.pdf>. Also subsequent pages.
Also: Special Report: Sheikh Abdullah and the Kashmir Issue, Central Intelligence Agency, Office of Current Intelligence, April 22 1964, Approved for Release on December 1999, pp. 1-2, at <https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/DOC_0000283431.pdf>. - Ahmad, ibid, pp. 29-31.
Puri, op cit, pp. 46-47.
‘Radical Land Reforms Were Key to Sheikh Abdullah’s Towering Influence on Kashmir: Within the Valley, the reforms caused a social transformation that has few parallels.’ by SudhirDevdas, December 8 2017, at <https://thewire.in/government/radical-land-reforms-key-sheikh-abdullahs-towering-influence-kashmir>.
Schofield, op cit, pp. 128-129. - Puri, op cit, pp. 25-26. Also: Ahmad, ibid, pp. 33-36.
- Ahmad, ibid, pp. 35-36.
- Central Intelligence Agency, op cit, p.2. Ahmad, op cit, pp. 34-35.
- Jagirs and similar special grants had been abolished. Debt conciliation boards had been set up and were operating so vigorously, I was informed, that they amounted to debt cancellation boards. Rents had been lowered. Security of tenure had been provided for the tillers. A ceiling- on all landholdings had been set at 22¾ acres. All arable land above that figure had been taken away from the owners and redistributed.
(Ref.: ‘The Kashmir Land Reforms” Some Personal Impressions’ by Daniel Thorner, The Economic Weekly, September 12 1953, p. 999, at <https://www.epw.in/system/files/pdf/1953_5/37/the_kashmir_land_reforms.pdf>.)
Also: Devdas, op cit. - : ‘Land Reforms and Politics in Jammu and Kashmir’, pp. 74-79 at <https://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/14486/7/07_chapter%203.pdf>.
- : ‘Towards New Kashmir’ at <http://www.jknc.in/UploadFiles/8a2ed918-f302-4831-89a0-d3d301635197__nayakashmir.pdf>.
Eminent Indian economist, Jean Dreze, has argued that under the influence of this manifesto and with the protective shield of the Article 370, now scrapped, Kashmir could make significantly greater progress in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI) as compared to Gujarat, in particular, the home state of the incumbent Indian Prime Minister and also the Home Minister.
(Ref.: ‘Jean Dreze contests Amit Shah with Gujarat data: Dreze showed how Jammu and Kashmir outscored Gujarat on the basis of a raft of development indices’ by Pheroze L. Vincent, August 9 2019, at <https://www.telegraphindia.com/india/jean-dreze-contests-amit-shah-with-gujarat-data/cid/1696457>.) - : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/All_Jammu_and_Kashmir_Plebiscite_Front>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Theft_of_the_Holy_Relic_from_the_Hazratbal_Shrine>.
- Central Intelligence Agency, op cit, pp. 3-4.
- : ‘Kashmir: Sheikh Abdullah’s Reinstatement’ by David E. Lockwood at <https://www.jstor.org/stable/40394860?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_chief_ministers_of_Jammu_and_Kashmir>.
- Ibid.
- : Schofield, op cit, pp. 125-126.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Maqbool_Bhat>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict#Period_of_integration_and_rise_of_Kashmiri_nationalism_(1954%E2%80%931974)>.
- Schofield, op cit, pp. 133-135.
- Schofield, op cit, p. 138.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict#Period_of_integration_and_rise_of_Kashmiri_nationalism_(1954%E2%80%931974)>.
- Ibid.
- : ‘Kashmir’s flawed elections’ by AltafHussain, September 14 2002, at <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/2223364.stm>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir#Rigging_of_1987_Assembly_elections> and <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmir_conflict#Period_of_integration_and_rise_of_Kashmiri_nationalism_(1954%E2%80%931974)>.
Schofield, op cit, p. 143. - : ‘Media on a Fai ride’ by Jagmohan, August 06 2011, at <http://archive.asianage.com/columnists/media-fai-ride-933>.
- Schofield, op cit, p. 144.
- Puri, op cit, p. 63.
- : ‘How Maqbool Butt Passed on the Baton of Militancy in Kashmir: An excerpt from the book ‘The Story of Kashmir’ by David Devadas.’ by David Devadas, February 11 2019, at <https://thewire.in/books/how-maqbool-butt-passed-on-the-baton-of-militancy-in-kashmir>.
Schofield, op cit, pp. 139-140. - : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Insurgency_in_Jammu_and_Kashmir#1987%E2%80%932004>.
- : ‘Kashmiri Pandits offered three choices by Radical Islamists’ by Col (Dr) Tej Kumar Tikoo (Retd.), January 19 2015, at <http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/kashmiri-pandits-offered-three-choices-by-radical-islamists/>.
This provides quite a graphic account of the alleged atrocities and violence that triggered the “exodus”.
For a very different version: ‘Exposing the Exodus’ by LKH Desk, Augist 18 2017, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/exposing-the-kp-exodus/>. Also: Puri, op cit, pp. 70-73.
The claim, by some, that the “exodus” had been engineered by Jagmohan in order to have a clear field to launch brutal state terror against the local (ref.: ‘Governor Jagmohan Was Responsible for Pandit Exodus, Says SaifuddinSoz in New Book on Kashmir’, June 23 2018, at <https://www.news18.com/news/india/governor-jagmohan-was-responsible-for-pandit-exodus-says-saifuddin-soz-in-new-book-on-kashmir-1787973.html>) does not appear too credible when one takes note of the fact that the bulk had fled the very day Jagmohan had taken over, allowing him no time to do all this. - : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kashmiri_Pandit#Exodus_from_Kashmir_(1985–1995)>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Exodus_of_Kashmiri_Hindus>.
- Schofield, op cit, p. 147.
Puri, op cit, p. 65. - Puri, op cit, p. 66.
Also: <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gawkadal_massacre>. - Puri, op cit, p. 67.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jagmohan#Governor_of_Jammu_and_Kashmir>.
Also: ‘Mirwaiz fiasco sparks off a change of guard in Kashmir.’ by PankajPachuri, June 15 1990, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/magazine/indiascope/story/19900615-mirwaiz-fiasco-sparks-off-a-change-of-guard-in-kashmir-812692-1990-06-15>. - : ‘Muslim Leader of Kashmir Slain; 30 Die as Police Fire on Mourners’ by Barbara Crossette, May 22 1990, at <https://www.nytimes.com/1990/05/22/world/muslim-leader-of-kashmir-slain-30-die-as-police-fire-on-mourners.html>.
‘Desecrating the dead’ by Shams Irfan, July 18 2010, at <https://kashmirlife.net/desecrating-the-dead-650/>.
Puri, op cit, p. 68. - It was the logical outcome of such a reckless and ruthless one-track policy that led to the cross-over of an officially estimated 10,000 desperate Kashmiri youth to Pakistan for training and procurement of arms.
(Ref.: Puri, op cit, 69.)
Also: Schofield, op cit, p. 154. - ‘Rape in Kasmir: A Crime of War’ by Asia Watch, a Division of Human Rights Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, 1993, at <https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/INDIA935.PDF>
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kunan_Poshpora_incident> and ‘KunanPoshpora – The Other Story’ by ShrimoyeeNandiniGhosh, January 20 2014, at<https://kafila.online/2014/01/20/kunan-poshpora-the-other-story-shrimoyee-nandini-ghosh/>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2009_Shopian_rape_and_murder_case>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2010_Kashmir_unrest#Stone_pelting>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Burhan_Wani> and ‘Kashmir: 2 Years AfterBurhanWani: BurhanWani’s killing sparked an uprising that never really ended.’ by Fahad Shah, July 10 2018, at <https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/kashmir-2-years-after-burhan-wani/>.
- : <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2019_Pulwama_attack> and ‘Kashmir attack: Tracing the path that led to Pulwama’, May 1 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-47302467>.
- : ‘The Article 370 Amendments: Key Legal Issues’ by Gautam Bhatia, August 5 2019, at <https://indconlawphil.wordpress.com/2019/08/05/the-article-370-amendments-key-legal-issues/?fbclid=IwAR2h12Puu6pOx9MRjZnkz2OvPd342VJAI6uYOmg_onX22htwVfmXzQpgyqU>.
Also: ‘Article 370 scrapped: What will change in Jammu & Kashmir’, August 5 2019, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/article-370-to-be-scrapped-what-impact-will-it-have-on-jk/articleshow/70534157.cms>. - : ‘With President’s nod to J&K bifurcation, two UTs to come into existence on October 31: The Act was passed to bifurcate the state into two Union Territories — Jammu and Kashmir with an Assembly and Ladakh without one.’, August 9 2019, at <http://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2019/aug/09/with-presidents-not-to-jk-bifurcation-two-uts-to-come-into-existence-on-october-31-2016603.html>.
- : ‘J&K: The first state to become a Union Territory’ by TNN, August 6 2019, at <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/jk-the-first-state-to-become-a-ut/articleshow/70548872.cms>.
- : ‘Kashmir: Why Centre is sending additional 38000 troops to J&K: NarendraModigovt has decided to send 38,000 more troops to the Kashmir Valley even though terror incidents have come down.’ by Prabhash K Dutta, August 2 2019, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/news-analysis/story/-if-situation-has-improved-then-why-send-38-000-troops-to-j-k-1576436-2019-08-02>, ‘Article 370: India strips disputed Kashmir of special status’, August 5 2019, at <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-49231619> and ‘‘Anxiety Fills the Air.’ What It’s Like Inside Kashmir When All Communication With the Outside World Is Cut Off’ by Fahad Shah, August 7 2019 at <https://time.com/5646005/inside-kashmir-communication-shutdown/>.
- : ‘About 4,000 people arrested in Kashmir since August 5: govt sources to AFP’, by AFP, August 18 2019, at <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/about-4000-people-arrested-in-kashmir-since-august-5-govt-sources-to-afp/article29126566.ece>. For a slightly different version: ‘Thousands Detained in Indian Kashmir Crackdown, Official Data Reveals’ by Reuters, September 12 2019, at <https://www.nytimes.com/reuters/2019/09/12/world/asia/12reuters-india-kashmir-detentions.html>.
- : ‘Nearly 300 from Valley detained in UP jails: Separate barracks, families wait’ by Anil Bhatnagar, September 12 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/nearly-300-from-valley-detained-in-up-jails-separate-barracks-families-wait-5987405/>.
- : ‘Kashmir under lockdown: All the latest updates: Latest updates as India abrogates Kashmir’s special status and imposes a security lockdown which is in its second month.’, September 19 2019, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/08/india-revokes-kashmir-special-status-latest-updates-190806134011673.html>.
- : ‘Doctors write to Amit Shah for permission to assess healthcare situation in Jammu and Kashmir’ by Scroll Staff, September 11 2019, at <https://scroll.in/latest/937000/doctors-write-to-amit-shah-for-permission-to-assess-healthcare-situation-in-jammu-and-kashmir?fbclid=IwAR2m0EWUOovJd7lVUnOkuoYojupHv7g4LWadgHLJGNkZoCQ-Xc9HrBe51Js>.
- : ‘Kashmir lockdown: Stories of torture and arbitrary arrests: Thousands have been detained and many of them tortured since India revoked Kashmir’s autonomy a month ago.’ by AkashBisht, September 4 2019, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/09/kashmir-lockdown-stories-torture-arbitrary-arrests-190904122016072.html> and <https://twitter.com/BabaUmarr/status/1174038807634763778>.
- : ‘Even as thousands are detained in Kashmir, courts and legal system remain frozen: Habeas corpus petition are piling up but hearings are being postponed and court orders have dwindled.’ by AnumehaYadav and MenakaRao, September 20 2019, at <https://scroll.in/article/937856/even-as-thousands-are-detained-in-kashmir-courts-and-legal-system-remain-frozen?fbclid=IwAR1I67aRzVEoQS7zD5LxpGrAwmctTsrrI7lbFRoontgBpmSyiYjo6WrxWkw>.
Also: ‘Under wraps so far: 252 habeas corpus pleas in J&K High Court since August 5: Little urgency has been shown by the High Court — each case is either in the stage of admission or has been listed for orders’ by Kaunain Sheriff M, September 20 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/under-wraps-so-far-252-habeas-corpus-pleas-in-jk-hc-since-august-5-6011628/?fbclid=IwAR0L0-DyA4aTa04dRkORdvw3dod5QtK4JF8YwcPy_ogq9FUXT0Y1cNWImiA>. - : ‘Kashmir Valley has seen many a lockdown but why this time it is so different: The Kashmir Valley’s connection with the inside and the outside world has been cut — all internet connectivity, cellular, landline, and cable TV services have been snapped.’ by MuzamilJaleel, BashaaratMasood, AdilAkhzer, August 7 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/valley-has-seen-many-a-lockdown-but-why-this-time-it-is-so-different-article-370-kashmir-amit-shah-5884129/>.
- : ‘The story of Indian democracy written in blood and betrayal: BJP thinks it is going to Indianise Kashmir. Instead, we will see, potentially, the Kashmirisation of India.’ by PratapBhanu Mehta, August 7 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/jammu-kashmir-article-370-scrapped-special-status-amit-shah-narendra-modi-bjp-5880797/>.
- :’2019 Parliamentary Poll: Outcome: Drivers: Consequences: An Exploration’ by SuklaSen, June 15 2019, at<https://docs.google.com/document/d/e/2PACX-1vSX4J7wt12TDUlBKNQ_x1AiIPFvYKiNay001ceKe6qrZD9kAy_8sdtYNE25Jbwk0A/pub>.
- : NirupamaSubramanian@tallstories, September 3 2019, at <https://twitter.com/tallstories/status/1168936922682712067?s=17&fbclid=IwAR02ZDf4czEEZOCayzkTazvNy8770W4eAKWqVc6eSgvijK122QQBdnBlXeI>.
- : ‘Kashmir will not react and erupt in anger, Kashmir will respond’ by GowharGeelani, September 9 2019, at <https://www.asianage.com/opinion/oped/090919/kashmir-will-not-react-and-erupt-in-anger-kashmir-will-respond.html>.
- : ‘Abrogation of J&K’s special status is being seen through one prism: The fear of demographic change: If, indeed, New Delhi believes the decision is for the good of the people, then what explains the siege around every household, an unprecedented communication blockade, a record troop build-up and the detention of almost everyone who has a political or social standing in Kashmir?’ by MuzamilJaleel, Sptember 9 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/kashmir-lockdown-article-370-communication-modi-govt-5978122/>.
- : ‘Kashmiris have lost the sense of fear’, Interview of AnuradhaBhasin by JyotiPunwani, August 30 2019, at <https://www.rediff.com/news/interview/kashmiris-have-lost-the-sense-of-fear/20190830.htm>.
- : ‘Kashmir’s Political Leaders Remain in Detention, Government Mum on Charges: The massive crackdown on mainstream politicians has left the Valley leaders, workers and supporters in both anger and shock.’ by Mudasir Ahmad, August 13 2019, at <https://thewire.in/politics/kashmir-political-leaders-arrest-government-silence>.
- : ‘‘I see no future (for Omar, Sajad, Mufti)… Story has ended for those thriving in vacuum, 8% turnouts’: Jitendra Singh: MoS, PMO, Jitendra Singh says curbs in J&K are nothing new and should not be seen through the prism of Art 370.’ by Express News Service, August 18 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/idea-exchange-jitendra-singh-mos-pmo-jammu-and-kashmir-bifurcation-article-370-jk-reorganisation-bill-5913457/>.
- : ‘Detained in Jammu and Kashmir: Three former CMs, ex ministers, MLAs, Mayor’ by BashaaratMasood, August 19 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/detained-in-jk-ex-top-ministers-mlas-mayor-5915920/>.
- : ‘J&K leaders will be freed in less than 18 months: MoSJitendra Singh: Singh’s statement is the first one by a senior functionary in the Union government about the maximum time for which mainstream political leaders in Jammu and Kashmir may remain under detention.’ by Arun Sharma, September 18 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jk-leaders-will-be-freed-in-less-than-18-months-mos-jitendra-singh-6004598/>.
- : ‘No talks with Hurriyat, only with people of J&K…will continue to claim PoK: Amit Shah’ by Liz Mathew and PradeepKaushal, August 7 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/jammu-kashmir-reorganisation-bill-passed-lok-sabha-no-talks-with-hurriyat-amit-shah-5884095/>.
- : ‘Talks with Pakistan now will only be about PoK, says Rajnath Singh’ by Archis Mohan and PTI, August 18 2019, at <https://www.business-standard.com/article/current-affairs/talks-with-pakistan-now-will-only-be-about-pok-says-rajnath-singh-119081800832_1.html>.
- : ‘Kashmiri delegation meets Amit Shah in Delhi’ by IANS, September 3 2019, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/kashmiri-delegation-meets-amit-shah-delhi-1594839-2019-09-03>.
Given that the report uses both past and future tenseswhile referring to the “meeting”, one cannot be really too sure whether any such meeting had actually taken place. - : ‘Lahore Declaration February, 1999’, February 02 1999, at <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?18997/Lahore+Declaration+February+1999>.
- : ‘When Vajpayee and Musharraf ‘Almost Resolved’ the Kashmir Dispute: History remembers the Agra Summit as one of the greatest missed opportunities of India-Pakistan relations. Former Pakistan Foreign Minister Khurshid Mahmud Kasuri in his book ‘Neither a Hawk nor a Dove’ wrote that the “solution to Kashmir was in the grasp of both governments”.’ by Uday Singh Rana, February 13 2018, at <https://www.news18.com/news/politics/when-vajpayee-and-musharraf-almost-resolved-the-kashmir-dispute-1659481.html>.
- : ‘Joint Statement Prime Minister of India Dr.Manmohan Singh and the Prime Minister of Pakistan Syed Yusuf RazaGilani’, July 16 2009, at <https://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/4855/Joint+Statement+Prime+Minister+of+India+Dr+Manmohan+Singh+and+the+Prime+Minister+of+Pakistan+Syed+Yusuf+Raza+Gilani>.
- Rivera, op cit.
- It was the acknowledgement that Kashmiris need to be counted in, plus the realism that neither diplomacy nor war would change the map, that propelled the backchannel talks on the four-point solution for Kashmir in the first decade of the century. It was a truly exciting period in this history of South Asia, because for the first time, here was a historic opportunity to end the hostility. It had four elements — borders will not change, but Kashmiris will be allowed to move freely across it; a phased withdrawal of the military on both sides; more autonomy from Islamabad to PoK, and from Delhi to J&K; and a joint mechanism for the “supervision” of J&K. This formula remains the best way out of the mess that India and Pakistan have created in Kashmir.
(Ref.: ‘India’s actions over the status of J&K provide an opportunity to revisit four-point plan for Kashmir’ by Nirupama Subramanian, September 19 2019, at <https://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/jammu-kashmir-restrictions-article-370-pakistan-6007817/?fbclid=IwAR3GwwTdGOa95VhUGeuBADjJp7NPHXAeA-_O1mJc_q5OixRd65riFSD4Uuo>.
The very same proposal, albeit in greater details, had been laid out here as well: Uday Singh Rana, op cit. - : ‘First Person – Shades of Azadi: Address the rage and frustration of the youth and everything else will follow’ by GhazalaWahab at <http://forceindia.net/firstperson/shades-of-azadi/> and ‘What does azadi mean to Kashmiris? The answer may be surprising: On the issue of joining Pakistan, the answer is 50-50.’ by Harsh Kakar, June 10 2017, at <https://www.dailyo.in/politics/kashmir-azadi-india-pakistan/story/1/17742.html>.
- : ‘Press Release from the President’s Secretariat’ (PR No. 193/2018), Islamabad, December 18 2018, at <http://president.gov.pk/imgs/121418/121418e.pdf>] and keep fanning insurgency[Ref.: ‘Kashmir in Comparative Perspective: Democracy and Violent Separatism in India’ by StenWidmalm, p.88, at <https://lostkashmirihistory.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/01/Kashmir-in-Comparative-Perspective-OCR.pdf>.
- : ‘Factbox: India and Pakistan – nuclear arsenals and strategies’ by ZebaSiddiqui, March 1 2019, at <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-kashmir-pakistan-nuclear-factbo/factbox-india-and-pakistan-nuclear-arsenals-and-strategies-idUSKCN1QI4O5>.
Also: ‘India and Pakistan are quietly making nuclear war more likely: Both countries are arming their submarines with nukes.’ by Tom Hundley, April 4 2018, at <https://www.vox.com/2018/4/2/17096566/pakistan-india-nuclear-war-submarine-enemies>. - : ‘The Summit’, July 14 2001, at <https://mea.gov.in/in-focus-article.htm?20047/The+Summit>.
- : ‘The story of how Nawaz Sharif pulled back from nuclear war’ by EliasGroll, May 14 2013, at <http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/05/14/the-story-of-how-nawaz-sharif-pulled-back-from-nuclear-war/> and ‘Joint Statement (of US President Clinton) With Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif of Pakistan’, July 4 1999, at <https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/WCPD-1999-07-12/pdf/WCPD-1999-07-12-Pg1278.pdf>.
- : ‘Imran welcomes Trump’s offer of mediation on Kashmir, says it won’t be resolved bilaterally’ by PTI, July 23 2019, at <http://www.ptinews.com/news/10726606_Imran-welcomes-Trump-s-offer-of-mediation-on-Kashmir–says-it-won-t-be-resolved-bilaterally.html>.
Also: ‘PM Modi rejects mediation on J-K, Donald Trump agrees: The two leaders met for the first time since India scrapped the special status to Jammu and Kashmir.’ by HT Correspondent, August 26 2019, at <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/pm-modi-rejects-mediation-on-j-k-donald-trump-agrees/story-4z1mdXYD6RKSCrbdfai71I.html>.
‘Trump once again offers to help India-Pakistan, says Kashmir mediation offer still out there: Donald Trump has offered to help resolve the tensions between India and Pakistan. He said that the offer to mediate over the Kashmir issue is still there.’ by India Today Web Desk, September 10 2019, at <https://www.indiatoday.in/india/story/donald-trump-again-offers-to-help-india-pakistan-kashmir-1597424-2019-09-10?utm_source=JioXpressNews&utm_medium=JioXpressNews&utm_campaign=JioXpressNews>. - : ‘Imran Khan rakes up prospect of nuclear war with India’ by IANS, September 15 2019, at <https://www.khaleejtimes.com/international/pakistan/imran-khan-rakes-up-prospect-of-nuclear-war-with-india>.
Also: If the world does nothing to stop the Indian assault on Kashmir and its people, there will be consequences for the whole world as two nuclear-armed states get ever closer to a direct military confrontation. India’s defense minister has issued a not-so-veiled nuclear threat to Pakistan by saying that the future of India’s “no first use” policy on nuclear weapons will “depend on circumstances.” Similar statements have been made by Indian leaders periodically. Pakistan has long viewed India’s “no first use” claims with skepticism.(Ref.: ‘Imran Khan: The World Can’t Ignore Kashmir. We Are All in Danger.: If the world does nothing to stop the Indian assault on Kashmir and its people, two nuclear-armed states will get ever closer to a direct military confrontation.’ by Imran Khan, August 30 2019, at <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/08/30/opinion/imran-khan-kashmir-pakistan.html>.) - The UNSC, Secretary General has, however, expressed his concern.
Look, I think, on Kashmir, the Secretary‑General… as the Secretary‑General said and has said previously, he remains engaged. I think he will also use the opportunity of discussions during the General Assembly to raise it. He’s also underscored the need for dialogue as the only way to resolve the issue and, as part of the solution for the current crisis in Kashmir, to make sure that human rights aspects are very much dealt with, as well.
(Ref.: ‘Daily Press Briefing by the Office of the Spokesperson for the Secretary-General’, September 19 2019, at <https://www.un.org/press/en/2019/db190919.doc.htm?fbclid=IwAR3NGLocaVK-CoTw615WFsqKQMrrmxEz9dLCw3phJ_0XjBYXOaOMPlg2NsU>.) - Here is a list of key militant groups, as in 2006: Behera, op cit, pp. 160-1.
Subsequently, the Al Qaeda and ISIS have also been reported to try to gain footholds.
(Ref.: ‘Al Qaeda chief threatens India over Kashmir, unveils Pak’s role in fueling cross-border terrorism’ by IANS, July 10 2019, at <https://www.business-standard.com/article/news-ani/al-qaeda-chief-threatens-india-over-kashmir-unveils-pak-s-role-in-fueling-cross-border-terrorism-119071000389_1.html> and ‘Isis claims to have established Kashmir ‘province’’, May 12 2019, at <https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/isis-claims-to-have-established-kashmir-province-bz92ls7jk>.) - : ‘Pakistan’s secret dirty war’ by Declan Walsh, March 29 2011, at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/29/balochistan-pakistans-secret-dirty-war> and ‘Pakistan: Hazara Shia Muslims end protest in Quetta over killings’ by AsadHashim, May 3 2018, at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/05/pakistan-hazara-shia-muslims-protest-quetta-killings-180502131145156.html>.
- : ‘Pakistan’s Sham Election: How the Army Chose Imran Khan’ by C. Christine Fair, July 27 2018, at <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/pakistan/2018-07-27/pakistans-sham-election>.
- : ‘Sri Lanka Massacred Tens of Thousands of Tamils While the World Looked Away’ by CallumMacrae, August 5 2015, at <https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/kwxz4m/death-of-a-tiger-0000710-v22n8>.
- : ‘Myanmar: Events of 2018’ at <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2019/country-chapters/burma>.
- : ‘The value of the SC’s Kashmir order’ by Gautam Bhatia, Jan. 12 2020, at <https://www.hindustantimes.com/columns/the-value-of-the-sc-s-kashmir-order-opinion/story-AQBLRCMYZ2mkAhVWWiMnIL.html>.
- : ‘Jammu and Kashmir administration lifts ban on social media sites’ by PrashastiAwasthi, March 4 2020, at <https://www.thehindubusinessline.com/news/jammu-and-kashmir-administration-lifts-ban-on-social-media-sites/article30981290.ece>.
- : ‘Kashmir schools reopen after 7 months’ by Yusuf Jameel, Feb. 25 2020, at <https://www.deccanchronicle.com/nation/current-affairs/250220/kashmir-schools-reopen-after-7-months.html>.
- At least two of these deserve special mention: (i) ‘Imprisoned Resistance – 5th August And Its Aftermath’, November 12 2019, at <http://pucl.org/reports/imprisoned-resistance-5th-august-and-its-aftermath> and (ii) ‘#KashmirCivilDisobedience’, October 12 2019, by Anirudh Kala, Brinelle D’Souza, RevatiLaul and ShabnamHashmi at <https://cdn.dnd.com.pk/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/report-titled-Kashmir-Civil-Disobedience.pdf>.
- ‘Interrogating the “Normal” in Kashmir: Report of a Visit to the Valley, January 31 to February 5, 2020’, March 4 2020, by KalpanaKannabiran, SarojiniNadimpally, Navsharan Singh, RoshmiGoswami and Pamela Philipose at <https://indianculturalforum.in/2020/03/04/interrogating-the-normal-in-kashmir/?fbclid=IwAR1fsd2aHAn4QsGlaP-gpxcE5O8JkWXFDk1dQvzk6u13fvIGu2ZWWGHMAng>.
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Motion against India’s divisive Citizenship Amendment Act moved in New Westminster
by Gurpreet Singh
Following in the footsteps of Seattle City council, which unanimously passed a motion against the discriminatory citizenship law adopted by India, a councillor in New Westminster made a similar move on Monday, March 9. Chuck Puchmayr, who is vocal on social justice and human rights, tabled a motion calling for the scrapping of the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA) amidst a tense atmosphere inside the council chamber. The motion also urges the Canadian government to intervene.
Odisha needs a Climate Change Commission
Press Release
Odisha is the first state to present a climate budget. However it is not the same as a gender budget or a nutrition budget. It’s a
esseantailly a perspective paper. It gives a perspective on budgetary components relating to climate change.Climate-resilient budgeting requires resource alignment to these components, which is missing now. The next step therefore is, the related schemes are revisted and resource allocations realigned.
Apple growers of Kashmir: Plight of surmounting Debt and commissions
by Javid Majid
Joint or group farming like farmer interest groups, farmer producer companies/organizations, SHGs etc. may prove quite helping in the dissemination of technology and reduction of risks at various levels of farming up to marketing. The clarion call of PM Modi to double farmers income by 2022 look mirage to valley producers as of now.
Media Trial, State and the Criminalizing of individuals in Democratic India
by Nilanjana Bhattacharya
At the helm of massive protests against CAA-NRC, indiscriminate slapping of charges against protestors criminalizes the democratic foundation of protest. This rampant haze of identifying the ‘criminal’ protestor brings about questions- and demands a deeper reflection over the vilification campaign run by the sensationalist media.
It Was/Is Shameful For Any Political Party In Democratic India To Keep The Children Of Sindhias In Their Flock: Look At 1857 British Gazetteers
by Shamsul Islam
Never forget that Rani Laxmi Bai was martyred by the joint armed forces of Sindhias and East India Company. Not only this, one of the leading commanders of 1857 Indian War of Independence, Tatya Tope was
captured in Gwalior State ruled by this criminal Sindhia clan and executed on 18 April 1859 in Shivpuri, part of the Gwalior State.
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