Tuesday, December 10, 2024

Informed Comment daily updates (12/10/2024)

 

Shiite Latakia Falls to new Syrian Government, as Sheikhs call for Reconciliation and Recruits are Pardoned



Ann Arbor (Informed Comment) – On Monday, the Levant Liberation Council (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham/ HTS) guerrilla forces extended their rule to Latakia, Syria’s major port, in the northwest of the country. One Syrian source maintained that there was an uprising of anti-Assad Alawites in Latakia, and that HTS rebels had not entered the city. Other […]


Ann Arbor (Informed Comment) – On Monday, the Levant Liberation Council (Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham/ HTS) guerrilla forces extended their rule to Latakia, Syria’s major port, in the northwest of the country.

One Syrian source maintained that there was an uprising of anti-Assad Alawites in Latakia, and that HTS rebels had not entered the city. Other reports suggested that Alawites who had for years been oppressed and bilked by Alawite Baath officers were staging reprisals on them. Informed Comment cannot independently verify these allegations.

The fall of Latakia is significant for several reasons. Latakia is Syria’s major port and the new government cannot hope to run Syria without it. It is near to Tartus, the site of a Russian naval base. Apparently several thousand Russian troops are still stuck in Syria and will have to negotiate safe passage out.

Latakia’s naval and military significance led Israel to bomb some of its facilities on Monday, as well as to damage some of the war ships in the harbor. These strikes on Latakia came as part of a flurry of 250 such air attacks by Israel on Syrian military storehouses and facilities, in an attempt by the Netanyahu government to cripple the new government’s military capabilities during this transitional phase, when it is weak.

Then, the majority of the region’s inhabitants are Alawite Shiites, whereas the HTS is hard line Sunni fundamentalists. The heads of the Baath Party in Syria from 1970 had been the al-Assads, who hailed from an Alawite background, and they engaged in a great deal of nepotism. The best jobs went to Alawites, even though they were only 14% of the population. During the civil war in the past nearly 14 years, Alawite officers, infantry and militias (the Shabiha) put down the rebellion, with great loss of life.

In short, there are all the ingredients for sectarian reprisals and massacres. On Arabic social media, there are many calls for revenge on the Alawites now that the al-Assad regime has fallen. We saw this phenomenon in Iraq, which was a mirror image of Syria demographically and politically. There, the Shiites are a majority but were repressed by a Sunni-led Baath Party. When George W. Bush invaded and occupied Iraq and overthrew Saddam Hussein, the Shiites came to power in elections that they forced on Bush. In 2006-2007, and again in 2014-2018, there were numerous Sunni-Shiite sectarian clashes. The ISIL terrorist group, from which elements of the Syrian HTS hived off, committed numerous massacres of Shiites.

I can only imagine that the Alawite officers in the now-defunct Syrian Arab Army have disguised themselves and are trying to get out of the country any way they can. Some reports suggest they have fled to Lebanon.

On the other hand, I wonder if the threat of Israeli aggression will cause Syrians to pull together?

Al-Quds al-`Arabi reports that the elders (sheikhs) of the Alawite community called for “turning over a new page.” They met with representatives of the HTS at the former provincial residence of al-Assad, in a town called Qardaha in the hills overlooking Latakia. The elders issued a statement in which they called for a “general amnesty” and the safe return of everyone who had fled their homes “in the recent period,” and for an end to the carrying of guns except in accordance with the law.

The Alawite branch of Shiite Islam is an esoteric folk religion in which many of the verities are cultivated by the sheikhs, and the laity may not be steeped in them. They do not have formal seminary-trained clergymen or mosque worship. They are very different from the Twelver Shiites in Iraq and Iran.

After the meeting, the military operations HQ of the HTS issued a “general amnesty” for all conscripted troops of the former Syrian Arab Army, granting them security of property and person and forbidding attacks on them.

Since most people in the army had been conscripts, this amnesty would affect a lot of people. But it excludes those who volunteered for the military or who entered the officer corps through a military academy.

HTS-controlled state television broadcast images of captured Syrian soldiers in Damascus, Homs and Hama being pardoned. Of the 300,000 men in the Syrian Arab Army, probably 200,000 or more had gone AWOL or defected during the civil war. The remaining 50,000 to 100,000 were disproportionately drawn from the Alawite population. So, implicitly, this pardon of the grunts in the army has a sectarian dimension, and is an attempt to avoid sectarian tensions.

On the other hand, the military operations HQ said that military figures guilty of atrocities against civilians in recent years would be tried in the courts. If they can get hold of the officer corps, it appears that the HTS will execute large numbers of them.

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Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

Israel Conducts Air and Ground Offensive In Syria As Assad Regime Falls | India Today


The world owes Palestine this much – please stop censoring Palestinian Voices

The world owes Palestine this much – please stop censoring Palestinian Voices

( Middle East Monitor ) – Social media censorship is a global phenomenon, but the war on pro-Palestinian views on social media represents a different kind of censorship, with consequences that can only be described as dire. Long before the current devastating war on Gaza and the escalation of Israeli violence and repression in the […]


( Middle East Monitor ) – Social media censorship is a global phenomenon, but the war on pro-Palestinian views on social media represents a different kind of censorship, with consequences that can only be described as dire.

Long before the current devastating war on Gaza and the escalation of Israeli violence and repression in the Occupied West Bank, Palestinian and pro-Palestinian voices have been censored.

Some date the censorship to an agreement in 2016 that, according to the Israeli government, sought to “force social networks to remove content that Israel considers to be incitement.”

This was translated, almost immediately, to the shutting down of thousands of accounts and the barring of many social media influencers, with the hope of slowing down the vastly growing pro-Palestinian tendencies in all Meta-linked platforms.

The war on Gaza, however, has escalated the censorship. In a report submitted to the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Opinion and Expression, Human Rights Watch noted that the documented restrictions on freedom of speech “undermine the fundamental human rights to freedom of expression and assembly.”

The censorship became so sophisticated and increasingly involved a direct Israeli role. To ensure that ‘offenders’ to Israeli sensibilities were eliminated in large numbers, Meta began censoring specific words, thus deeming entire contents offensive, racist and anti-Semitic.

But Meta was not the only social media network involved in this practice. On 17 November, 2023, the X platform (previously known as Twitter) declared that users who write terms like “decolonisation”, “from the river to the sea”, or similar expressions would be suspended.

One year later, the social media platform Twitch followed suit by revising its ‘Hateful Content Policy’ to include “Zionist” as a potential slur.

Not only do these decisions, and many others, directly impair the freedom of speech and press, but they also confuse rational conversations with anti-Jewish sentiments.

The word ‘genocide’, for example, is not a swear word, but a common term, embraced by numerous countries around the world, accusing Israel of carrying out acts of genocide, meaning the “systematic destruction of a group of people because of their ethnicity, nationality, religion, or race”.

Under pressure from many countries, and after presenting a powerful case at The Hague, South Africa managed to compel the International Court of Justice to investigate Israel’s acts of genocide in the Gaza Strip in violation of the 1948 Genocide Convention.

In other words, this is not a matter for Mark Zuckerberg or any other social media company to decide, based on direct consultations with those carrying out the mass killings in Gaza.

The same applies to Zionism, an ideologically situated political movement that traces its history to 19th-century Europe, thus, neither to a specific race nor a religious text.

While many are, rightly, outraged by the fact that this kind of widespread, and growing, censorship directly challenges the main tenets of democracy, the actual harm for Palestinians is much bigger.

According to a November 2024 report by the Sada Social Centre for Digital Rights, the surge in digital violations targeting Palestinian content could not come at a worse time.

According to the organisation, “Meta platforms accounted for the largest share of violations at 57 per cent, followed by TikTok at 23 per cent.” YouTube and X follow at 13 and 7 per cent respectively.


“Palestine Exception,” Digital, ChatGPT, 2024.

This censorship, according to Sada, includes the shutting down of WhatsApp accounts, another Meta-owned platform that is also tightly controlled.

Unlike most of us, Palestinians in Gaza use these platforms to communicate with one another, to know who is dead and who is alive, and to raise awareness of certain massacres, often taking place in isolation, especially in the northern Gaza Strip.

Regarding northern Gaza, Sada Social spoke of a ‘digital blackout’, which has compounded the horror of that region – famine, mass killing, destruction of all hospitals, etc.

In the specific case of social media censorship in Gaza, lives are literally being lost as a result of politically motivated decisions.

HRW was one of many rights groups that have routinely spoken about the ‘systematic censorship’ by Meta. A December 2023 HRW report identified the following recurring patterns of censorship: removal of content, suspension of pro-Palestinian accounts, the reduction of visibility, known as ‘shadow-banning’, the restrictions on engagement, and the deliberate misuse of policies on hate speech and graphic content.

The danger of this kind of censorship is multilayered. It is a direct threat to one of the most basic freedoms guaranteed under the law in any democratic society. In the case of Gaza, the censorship takes a dark, deadly turn as it could make the difference between people dying under the rubble of their homes or receiving assistance.

Additionally, censorship of this magnitude often creates precedents and often leads to other forms of censorship that, in fact, are already taking place against other vulnerable communities, whether on a national stage or globally.

While the international community is yet to translate its verbal solidarity with Palestinians into any meaningful action, the least we could do is to give Palestinians their full rights to express their views, share their pain, and raise awareness of their collective plight. The world owes them that much, and no social media company should be permitted to hinder such a simple and reasonable demand.

The views expressed in this article belong to the author and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Middle East Monitor.

Via Middle East Monitor

Creative Commons LicenseThis work by Middle East Monitor is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 4.0 International License.




Abu Mohammed al-Golani may become the face of post-Assad Syria – but who is he and why does he have $10M US bounty on his head?


Abu Mohammed al-Golani may become the face of post-Assad Syria – but who is he and why does he have $10M US bounty on his head?




By Sara Harmouch, American University (The Conversation) – The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now? One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu […] 

(The Conversation) – The fall of President Bashar al-Assad has left a critical question: After a half-century of brutal dynastic rule has come to an end, who speaks for Syrians now?

One group staking a major claim for that role is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which, under the leadership of Abu Mohammad al-Golani, spearheaded the opposition advance that toppled Assad.

But what does the group stand for? And who is al-Golani? The Conversation turned to Sara Harmouch, an expert on Islamist militant groups, for answers.

What is Hayat Tahrir al-Sham?

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has its roots in the early stages of the Syrian civil war, which began in 2011 as a popular uprising against the autocratic government of Assad.

The group originated as an offshoot of the Nusra Front, the official al-Qaida affiliate in Syria. Hayat Tahrir al-Sham was initially recognized for its combat effectiveness and its commitment to global jihadist ideology, or the establishment of strict Islamic rule across the Muslim world.

In a shift in 2016, the Nusra Front publicly cut ties with al-Qaida and adopted the new name Jabhat Fateh al-Sham, which means “Front for the Conquest of the Levant.”

The following year, it merged with several other factions in the Syrian war to become Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or the “Organization for the Liberation of the Levant.”

This rebranding aimed to move away from al-Qaida’s global jihadist agenda, which had limited the group’s appeal within Syria. It allowed Hayat Tahrir al-Sham to focus on issues specific to Syrians, such as local governance, economic issues and humanitarian aid.

Despite these changes, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s core ideology continues to be rooted in jihadism, with the primary objective of overthrowing the Assad government and establishing Islamic rule in Syria.

Who is al-Golani? How central is he to the group’s success?

Abu Mohammed al-Golani was born Ahmed al-Sharaa in 1982 in Saudi Arabia.

Al-Golani spent his early years in Damascus, Syria, after his family returned from Saudi Arabia in 1989. His jihadist career began in Iraq, where he joined fighters aligned with al-Qaida after the 2003 U.S.-led invasion.

In 2011, under the direction of Iraqi militant and then-al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, al-Golani was tasked with establishing the Nusra Front in Syria.

The group quickly became a formidable force within the Syrian civil war.

It was under al-Golani’s leadership that Hayat Tahrir al-Sham sought to portray itself as pragmatic, less focused on global jihad and more on governance issues in the region of Idlib, Syria’s largest rebel stronghold.

This shift in strategy forms part of al-Golani’s effort to transform his national and global image from that of a jihadist leader to a more politically viable figure in Syrian politics.

Al-Golani’s shift toward a more pragmatic approach, particularly post-2017, has been crucial in helping Hayat Tahrir al-Sham control territories and assert itself as a regional governing force. His recent moves, like adopting a more moderate persona and engaging in traditional public service, reflect al-Golani’s central role in the military and the political evolution of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham – underpinning the group’s hold on power and its efforts at gaining legitimacy both locally and internationally.

How did the group rise to become a major force in Syria?

To keep power over the territories it controlled, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham employed a mix of strategies that includes establishing governance systems that could provide stability and services while legitimizing their control in the eyes of local populations.

Aiming to expand and take more territory, the group’s leaders concluded that it needed to win over the international community to minimize international opposition and effectively work with the broader Syrian revolutionary movement.

This involved working with other actors in Syria, aiming to present a united front that could be more palatable to international observers and potential allies. To do that locally, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham brought many groups within Syria under its control. Regionally and internationally, it reshaped its image through public relations campaigns, such as engaging in social services.

Since 2017, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham has been the prevailing force in Idlib, which, after government forces retook control of Aleppo in December 2016, emerged as the last major bastion for various rebel groups.

Over the years, the group has solidified its control in the region by functioning as a quasi-governmental entity, providing civil services and overseeing local affairs – such as controlling highways and collecting duties on commercial trucking – despite reports of human rights abuses.

In recent years, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s propaganda has emphasized protecting Syrian territory and its people from the Assad government.

This has helped the group enhance its position among local communities and other rebel groups.

In an effort to further burnish its image, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham ramped up its public relations efforts, both at home and abroad. For example, it has engaged with international media and humanitarian organizations to negotiate – and film – aid deliveries to the areas it governs.

Doing so helped Hayat Tahrir al-Sham gain some local support, positioning itself as a defender of Sunni Muslim interests.

Meanwhile, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham bolstered its military capabilities by establishing a military academy, reorganizing its units into a more conventional military structure and creating specialized forces adept at executing coordinated and strategic attacks. The recent advance appears to be proof that this strategy has paid off.

What does the US think of the group and al-Golani?

The U.S. has long listed al-Golani as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the Nusra Front as a Foreign Terrorist Organization.

In May 2018, the U.S. State Department expanded this designation to include Hayat Tahrir al-Sham. As a result of these designations, the group and its members face legal restrictions, travel bans, asset freezes and banking restrictions.

Additionally, the State Department’s Rewards for Justice program is offering up to US$10 million for information on al-Golani.

However, news has been circulating that the U.S. is considering removing the $10 million bounty on the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham leader, while the United Kingdom is thinking of removing the group from its terror list.

What happens if al-Golani emerges as a post-Assad leader?

First, we should note that these are very early days, and it remains unclear what Syria will look like post-Assad.

But based on my years researching Islamic history and Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, I’m willing to venture a few educated guesses. Historically, Islamic empires have used distinct governance frameworks to drive their expansion and administration, which might inform Hayat Tahrir al-Sham’s approach to mirroring these successful strategies.

First, I think al-Golani is likely to strive for authentic religious leadership, positioning himself as a leader whose personal piety and adherence to Islamic principles align with the religious sentiments of the population at large.

This could be complemented by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham emphasizing the role of Sunni Islam in Syria’s state functions and integrating religious legal practices into the nation’s laws.

Just as it has established on a localized scale, effective administration might become a cornerstone of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham governance. In Idlib, for example, the group established systems for taxation and community engagement. This is essential for building trust, especially among previously marginalized groups.

Additionally, by allowing some autonomy for regions within Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham could mitigate the risk of unrest, balancing strict Islamic law enforcement with Syria’s cultural and ethnic diversity.

Overall, should Hayat Tahrir al-Sham under al-Golani try to steer the formation of Syria’s new government, we might expect a governance approach that aims for a blend of traditional Islamic governance and modern statecraft, striving to stabilize and unify the diverse and war-torn country.

However, the group’s controversial status and history of militant activities could pose significant challenges in gaining widespread international recognition and internal support.

Sections of this article were first published in an article for The Conversation on Dec. 2, 2024.

Sara Harmouch, Ph.D. candidate in Public Affairs, American University

This article is republished from The Conversation under a Creative Commons license. Read the original article.

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Bonus video added by Informed Comment:

Al Jazeera English: “Who is Abu Mohammed al-Julani, leader of HTS in Syria? ”



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