Cotton is the only genetically modified (GM) crop that has been officially approved in India and has been cultivated (illegally then legally) in the country for more than 20 years. Although GM mustard has been approved for commercial cultivation by India’s apex regulatory body for GM crops (the Genetic Engineering Appraisal Committee, GEAC), a public interest litigation led by Aruna Rodrigues is before the Supreme Court challenging that decision and commercialisation of the crop is on hold.
The push to drive GM food crops into India has been happening for many years. Back in February 2010, the government placed an indefinite moratorium on the release of Bt brinjal after numerous independent scientific experts from India and abroad had pointed out safety concerns.
Minister Jairam Ramesh therefore rejected the commercialisation of Bt brinjal. He imposed a moratorium on its release till such time independent scientific studies establish the safety of the product from the point of view of its long-term impact on human health and the environment, including the rich genetic wealth existing in brinjal in India.
The moratorium has not been lifted and the conditions Ramesh set out have still not been met. Regulatory processes have been shown to lack competency, possess endemic conflicts of interest and demonstrate a lack of expertise in GMO risk assessment protocols, including food safety assessment and the assessment of environmental impacts.
Not to be deterred by any of this, the GEAC is now facilitating final-stage trials of a new Bt brinjal (event 142). It also seems dismissive of the Supreme Court-appointed Technical Expert Committee (TEC) Final Report in 2013 which was scathing about the prevailing regulatory system for GM crops. As a result, the TEC recommended a 10-year moratorium on the commercial release of all GM crops.
Immediately after the 2010 moratorium was announced, the GEAC carried on regardless and went straight ahead and sanctioned fresh trials for the new Bt brinjal. It appears that developers-cum-lobbyists were actually sitting on regulatory bodies as event 142 was proceeding, granting biosafety clearance and claiming all tests are complete, despite data being kept out of the public domain.
I recently contacted Aruna Rodrigues to discuss the current situation.
Colin Todhunter: The government has asserted that hybrid insecticidal Bt cotton in India has been an outstanding success and argues that it is a template for the introduction of GM food crops.
Aruna Rodrigues: The metric used to pronounce the grand success of hybrid Bt cotton is adoption/total production data as opposed to the real measure of performance, which is yield expressed as kg lint/ha and for the farmer, total net income/ha. The error is so basic that it is embarrassing that supposedly leading public sector scientists can err in such manner. But this is deliberate because the official agenda to promote GMOs is being openly espoused without any factual data or science to back a decision of such profound importance and irreversible ramifications.
They want to use hybrid Bt cotton as the model to introduce other Bt crops, principally food crops. And indeed, thousands of field trials of Bt crops have never been stopped, not even when the central government overturned the commercial approval of Bt brinjal a decade ago and imposed an indefinite moratorium.
CT: Renowned international experts have argued that we now have definitive evidence of the failure of Bt cotton in India, not least in terms of stagnant yields, pesticide use that is back to pre-Bt era levels, increasing pest resistance and rising input costs.
AR: The scientific evaluation of Bt cotton is the work of eminent scientists: Prof Dr Andrew Gutierrez, with Dr Hans Herren (World Food Prize Laureate), Dr Peter Kenmore (former head of FAO Plant Protection) and Dr Keshav Kranthi (former Director of the Central Institute of Cotton Research, India’s apex cotton institute). Together, they have nailed the data and analyses of hybrid Bt cotton to provide conclusive proof of its definitive failure. (See ‘International scientists highlight failure of GM Bt cotton in India’ on GMWatch.org and ‘International Webinar on Bt Cotton in India: Myths & Realities’ on YouTube)
The use of hybrids has played an important role in the failure of hybrid Bt cotton, the development of the yield plateau in India, high production costs and low productivity. The data show that suicides increase with economic distress, (Gutierrez et al; ‘Bioeconomics of hybrid Bt cotton and suicides’ in the process of being published by Environmental Sciences Europe) – low yield, rising costs and low net income. The low yield is related to inappropriate hybrid Bt varieties and low planting densities and falling net revenues due to stagnant yield, unstable cotton prices and escalating costs of production.
Also entering this equation are insecticide-induced pests and insecticide resistance, increasing resistance in pink bollworms to Bt toxins and the vagaries of weather on hybrids. American bollworm resistance is also increasing. By 2013, pre-Bt era of 2002 levels of insecticide use were surpassed. It should be noted that reducing insecticide use was the raison d’etre for the Bt technology; it has no trait for yield.
Most hybrid cottons are long season of 180-200 day duration that increases the opportunities for pest resurgence and outbreaks. Additionally, hybrids require stable water and more fertiliser.
In 13 years, the cost of cultivation increased 302%. In 15 years, there was a 450% increase in labour costs. Costs of hybrid seed, insecticide and fertiliser increased more than 250 to 300%. And net profit was Rs. 5971/ha in 2003 (pre-Bt) but plummeted to net losses of Rs. 6286 in 2015 (Kranthi: https://eands.dacnet.nic.in/Cost_of_Cultivation.htm Cost of cultivation).
CT: How does the performance of Bt cotton in India compare with elsewhere?
AR: Hybrid Bt cotton was designed to increase yield and quality, but India’s global rank is 36 in terms of yield out of the 75 cotton growing countries. This ranking leaves India behind at least 21 major producing countries, including many in Africa, which do not employ GM cotton and cultivate only open pollinated varieties. The top eight producers use high density plantings of appropriate varieties that are approximately six-fold higher than commonly used in India. Herein lies the solution for India in the potential of high-density short-season cotton.
CT: The use of long-season hybrids in India seems unique. You and others have argued that the only reason to combine GM technology with hybrids was to serve as a value capture mechanism: for the seed companies to extract profit at the expense of farmers because in India international property rights on seeds cannot be enforced like they are in the West through signed contracts. But there have been other implications. Can you say something about these hybrids?
AR: The use of hybrid cotton is unique to India, being sold as a value-capture mechanism to enable seed companies to safeguard their profit and side-step intellectual property rights concerns. The hybrid technology disallows seed saving by millions of small farmers who cannot be controlled by threats of lawsuits. There is no other reason why hybrid technology was used; but it added significantly to the failure of Bt cotton.
Non-hybrid cotton varieties in other cotton growing countries are grown at densities of more than 100,000 plants per hectare, which is at least five times higher than India’s national average density of 18,500 plants per hectare.
Scientific trials conducted with non-Bt varieties in all the cotton growing states of India and in more than 6,894 demonstrations in farmer fields by government agencies during 2012 to 2016 unequivocally show that high density planting results in higher yields compared to the most popular high priced Bt cotton hybrids.
Furthermore, long staple desi cotton varieties also give consistently high yields above the national average of Bt cotton hybrids. The high price of hybrid Bt seed engenders low planting densities in India that contributes greatly to low yields.
High-density short-season planting of non-GM straight line varieties of desi cotton and American cotton species that interrupt the lifecycle of the pink bollworm is required. This simple insight has important implications and provides the basis for a proven solution against pests.
CT: Bt is a toxin encoding gene. And yet the proposal is to incorporate it in brinjal, a vegetable that is eaten across all sections of Indian society. Can you say a little about Bt toxicity and the implications for brinjal?
AR: The question of the toxicity of Bt proteins is circumvented by the regulators accepting a discredited version of cry toxicity based on a Monsanto myth that Bt toxins are only toxic to alkaline gut systems of insects, not the acidic stomachs of mammals. There is plenty of proof that Bt proteins are indeed toxic to both humans and animals (Schubert letter of Nov 2009 to Minister Jairam Ramesh, when he called for a scientific review of Bt brinjal). Failed Bt cotton is indeed the model for hybrid Bt brinjal and for monumental catastrophe.
CT: Bt brinjal has been sanctioned for final-stage field trials. If, in 2010, Hybrid Bt brinjal was deemed unsuitable for India, given that these trials are going ahead, what if anything has changed?
AR: Nothing has changed. The Bt gene is still a Bt gene and it is a toxin. It is worth reading an excerpt from the letter Prof David Schubert wrote to Jairam Ramesh in 2009:
“It is virtually certain that within the vast Indian population a large number of people eating Bt brinjal are going to be or will become allergic to this foreign protein; this number cannot be predicted and some of the immune responses will likely be severe, causing anaphylaxis and possibly fatalities. Since there will be no way of tracking these adverse reactions within the population, and since once Bt brinjal is commercially grown, its genetic presence within a major calorie source for the Indian population is irreversible, a simple decision has to be made. Is the negligible benefit of Bt brinjal worth the clear risk? My conclusion is that it is not worth the risk and that it would be a profound disservice to India if Bt brinjal were allowed to enter her food supply.”
We now have the immeasurable advantage of the definitive assessment of the failure of hybrid Bt cotton across all relevant measures. We must use this knowledge to the benefit of our nation and Indian agriculture. Bt Brinjal Event 142 is also planned in hybrids that will increase seed costs and prevent seed saving.
One thing is crystal clear and it is worth repeating for warning and emphasis: hybrid Bt cotton is a negative model for hybrid Bt brinjal; for a monumental irreversible catastrophe.
Virtually no safety testing/risk assessment protocols were carried out for Bt brinjal more than 10 years ago. It stands as the only test case where the raw data was subsequently assessed by several eminent international scientists. They found a virtual vacuum. None of this engenders confidence in the regulators as responsible or trustworthy.
Furthermore, GMO contamination in what is a centre of diversity is of paramount importance. Our regulators have an uncanny ability to focus on two crops (mustard and brinjal) of great genetic diversity. There are about 9,000 accessions of mustard in our gene banks and India is a centre of origin/diversity of brinjal with the richest germplasm in the world.
I only have questions of our regulators because the things they do are fundamentally in error. And the list is endless. They also want to open up Indian agriculture to the second front of GM technology, herbicide tolerant crops, when chemicals (e.g., glyphosate) are documented to pose serious environmental and health risks.
The only option is to stop all environmental release of GMOs, because we are at serious risk from our own regulators. This is not just petitioners’ stance in the Supreme Court. Four official reports support the petitioners and two of them belong to the Parliamentary process in India of Parliamentary Standing Committees (PSCs), which are appointed across party lines. Both PSCs were unanimous that Indian regulation is seriously awry, both for a lack of expertise and an endemic conflict of interest. Both PSCs recommended a moratorium on GMOs.
CT: Given the vast genetic diversity of mustard and brinjal in India, developed over millennia, it is clear that ‘need’ has not been established for these (or any other) GM crops. Why is the government pushing so hard for GMOs?
We don’t have independent regulation in India, not just in the sense of the regulators themselves, but also attendant ministries and institutions are rife with conflicts of interest. They promote GMOs. The glaring example is the regulatory body called the Review Committee on Genetic Manipulation of the Department of Biotechnology, in the Ministry of Science and Technology (DBT). In this case, the DBT funds GM mustard development and also promotes it. The GEAC has historically had a serious conflict of interest with the line between the regulators and the regulated difficult to distinguish and partly explains why the government is pushing GMOs so hard.
Colin Todhunter is an independent writer
Bihar is the land of notable religious and social reformers who not only sought reform in dogmatic religious practices but also advocated social equality, social harmony and social justice- key factors for peace and tranquility. This is the land of Buddha, Mahavir, Chandragupta Maurya, Samrat Ashoka, etc. And so also of Jayprakash Narayan, BP Mandal, Karpoori Thakur, etc. They prescribed unity of the deprived, social cohesion through equality and end of exploitation. There has been a strong social justice ethic, born from the fundamental principle of compassionate action, in Buddhism, which says, “When some decide to take for themselves beyond what is reasonable, others go without.” On the basis of Uttaradhyayanasutra, we can say that the essence of social harmony is virtue which leads everyone towards moral & just actions, spirituality, liberty & equality, love & peace and brotherhood. All these are norms to establish social justice in society. Emperor Ashoka was the pioneer of social harmony who tried to maintain economic and social justice throughout his kingdom applying the tenets of Buddhism. According to Jayprakash Narayan, “Democratic socialism is a true democracy.” The conception of social justice can be found in his conception of socialism. Karpoori Thakur, the pioneer of social justice in Bihar, introduced reservation for OBCs in government jobs and educational institutions and created sub-groups within OBCs. He wished to implement essence of social justice in pragmatic ways. Ideals of BP Mandal represented an umbrella coalition of the oppressed Bahujans comprising Shudra, Ati Shudra, Adivasis and Muslims symbolizing unity of the marginalized social groups. His recommendations and later its implementation have empowered OBCs of all religious affiliations.
Many leaders like Lalu Prasad Yadav, Sharad Yadav, Nitish Kumar, Ram Vilas Paswan, etc., emerged from the JP movement from whom the Bahujans had much expectations that they would get social justice resulting in social, economic and political equality. They hoped for adequate representation in politics and participation in governance. Even though there was a genuine transfer of Bihar’s political power in favour of social justice, as the years passed, most of the leaders ended up getting coopted by the upper caste feudal oligarchy.
The consequence of this has been a complete derailment of social justice movement. Today’s political space is completely occupied by the Upper Caste Hindu (UCH) groups such as Brahmins, Rajputs, Bhumihars & Kayasthas, who try to maintain their political dominance by inventing and inserting diversionary and communal issues in political sphere. Although seats are reserved for SCs and STs in Bihar Assembly in proportion to their population share (39 for SCs & 2 for STs), they are deprived of genuine representatives as they never raise the issues of progress and justice of these groups. The Hindu OBCs and Muslims are two main social groups which are deprived of genuine political representation and participation in governance. Even in OBCs, dominant castes like Yadav, Kurmi (cultivator) and Koiri (vegetable growers) have occupied most of the political space. Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), Janata Dal (United) (JD (U)) and Rashtriya Lok Samta Party (RLSP) are led respectively by Lalu Yadav, Nitish Kumar and Upendra Kushwaha, who, in undeclared way, give preference to Yadav, Kurmi and Koiri castes respectively. Lower OBC castes like Mallah and Been (Fishermen), Lohars (Blacksmiths), Teli (Oil Presser), Badhai (Carpenter), Turaha (Vegetable Seller), Kumhars (Potters), Noniya (Soil tiller), etc., are highly unrepresented in Bihar’s politics. Political underrepresentation of Muslims, because of their underdevelopment and emerging communal politics, is also very alarming in the state.
As per 2011 Census, population of Muslims in Bihar is 17.55 million which is 16.87 per cent of total population. Thus, Muslims are the second largest majority community and the largest minority group in Bihar. Since 1952 when the first election to Bihar Assembly was held, Muslims have never been represented in proportion to their population share and have always suffered huge political deprivation.
Table: Muslims in Bihar Legislative Assembly
| Year | Total MLAs | Muslim MLAs | % of Muslim MLAs | Muslim MLAs expected as per population | Deprivation | % Deprivation |
| 1952 | 330 | 23 | 6.97 | 37 | 14 | 37.84 |
| 1957 | 318 | 26 | 8.18 | 36 | 10 | 27.78 |
| 1962 | 318 | 22 | 6.92 | 40 | 18 | 45.00 |
| 1967 | 318 | 17 | 5.35 | 40 | 23 | 57.50 |
| 1969 | 318 | 20 | 6.29 | 40 | 20 | 50.00 |
| 1972 | 318 | 22 | 6.92 | 43 | 21 | 48.84 |
| 1977 | 324 | 24 | 7.41 | 44 | 20 | 45.45 |
| 1980 | 324 | 24 | 7.41 | 44 | 20 | 45.45 |
| 1985 | 324 | 29 | 8.95 | 46 | 17 | 36.96 |
| 1990 | 324 | 17 | 5.25 | 46 | 29 | 63.04 |
| 1995 | 324 | 21 | 6.48 | 48 | 27 | 56.25 |
| 2000 | 324 | 29 | 8.95 | 48 | 19 | 39.58 |
| 2005 | 243 | 17 | 7.00 | 40 | 23 | 57.50 |
| 2010 | 243 | 19 | 7.82 | 40 | 21 | 52.50 |
| 2015 | 243 | 24 | 9.88 | 41 | 17 | 41.46 |
| Total | 4593 | 334 | 7.27 | 633 | 299 | 47.24 |
From 1952 till 2015, 15 elections to Bihar Legislative Assembly have been held in which a total of 334 Muslim MLAs got elected out of a total of 4,593 directly elected MLAs, thus Muslims representation during a period of almost 70 years is 7.27 per cent. On basis of their population share, 633 Muslim MLAs were to be elected, however, they suffered a deprivation of 299 MLAs which is 47.24 per cent. This shows Muslims of Bihar are a highly politically deprived community. Unlike most other states, including Assam, UP and West Bengal one singular feature of Bihar assembly is the relative steadiness of number of Muslim members which ranged between 17 (1967 & 2005) and 29 reaching the highest level of 29 members in 1985 which got repeated in 2000. Elections of 1952 and 1957 indicated that the Indian National Congress (INC) had near monopoly over Muslim members, but 1962 elections marked the beginning of Muslim political diversification. In 1977, Janata Party secured 13 and INC 8 Muslim seats out of a total of 24. In 1980-85, the INC staged a comeback in Bihar elections like rest of the country. Nationwide it was the period of Muslim-friendly electoral trend. It made Bihar Muslims secure the highest representation of 29 MLAs in 1985. From 1990 it is the JD formation which has been the major party representing Muslims.
If last three elections are analysed, in 2005 Bihar Assembly elections, first after the bifurcation leading to formation of Jharkhand in 2000, only 16 Muslims (6.58%) could manage to win the poll which was the lowest representation since Independence. Mehboob Ali Kaiser won by-poll of Assembly held in 2009 on INC ticket and thus the number was raised to 17 (7.00 per cent). As per their share in population, they deserved 40 seats and thus they suffered a deprivation of 23 seats i.e. 57.50 per cent. Those 17 MLAs were distributed among 7 political parties. RJD and INC had jointly fielded 46 Muslims out of which only 9 could win – 4 on RJD and 5 on INC tickets. LJP had fielded 47 Muslim candidates but only one could win. JD (U) had fielded 9 out of which four had won. One each belonged to CPI (ML), NCP and independent. A surprising but important fact of 2005 Bihar Assembly elections was that 42 Muslim candidates finished as runner up, many of whom with very thin margin, in some cases less than of thousand votes. The reasons could have been anti-incumbency against RJD and low number of Muslim nominees from JD (U). The then incumbent govt of RJD had fielded many Muslim candidates but most of them lost due to heavy anti-incumbency. The third reason could be the division of Muslim votes as JD (U) and BJP fought elections together and Muslims overwhelmingly voted for JD (U).
In 2010, 19 Muslims got elected – 4 more than the previous Assembly of 2005 comprising 7.82 per cent of total seats, suffering a deprivation of 52.50 per cent. Of these 19 legislatures, maximum 7 were from JD (U), 6 from RJD, 3 from INC, 2 from LJP and one from BJP. Interestingly, three of the 4 INC and two of the 3 LJP legislatures were Muslims. 36 Muslim candidates ended as runner up, at many places with very thin margins. The INC fielded 46 Muslim candidates followed by the RJD with 26. The JD (U) fielded 14 candidates, the LJP 10 and the BJP only one. Average performance of Muslims was also due to division of votes among four main political parties- RJD, LJP, INC and JD (U). The shifting of Muslim votes to Nitish was due to his reopening of Bhagalpur riot cases and conviction of the accused through speedy trials, keeping Bihar free from communal troubles and also sending a message that he would not compromise on issue of secularism despite sharing power with the BJP.
In 2015, the Grand Alliance of RJD, JD (U) and INC led by Nitish Kumar romped into a landslide victory clearing way for Nitish to become CM the third time. 24 Muslim candidates got elected which is 9.88 per cent of total. Although the result was satisfactory, Muslims suffered 41.46 per cent deprivation. Among 24 MLAs, 12 belonged to RJD, 6 to INC, 5 to JD (U) and one to CPI (ML). 16 candidates ended as runner up. In 2015 Muslims had no confusion in choosing a secular party and they had overwhelmingly voted for the Alliance. However, they felt cheated as Nitish Kumar withdrew from the alliance and shifted his loyalty to BJP without any valid reason.
There are various reasons behind huge political deprivation of Muslims in Bihar like elsewhere in other states. Main parties representing Muslims do not give nominations in proportion to their share in population. Over the years in Bihar, the INC gave 9 to 10 per cent tickets to Muslims which is less than their share in population. RJD has given 10 per cent tickets and CPI and CPM nominated an average of 7 & 8 per cent respectively. The second reason is reservation of Muslim-dominated constituencies for SCs and STs. In these constituencies Muslims have more possibility to win due to their numerical strength. This very fact has been pointed out in the Sachar Committee Report of 2006. Field experience indicate that due to gerrymandering of Muslim dominated constituencies many of which have been so carved out that Muslims are not in position to decide the winning candidate. It’s a deliberate act of the delimitation authorities to make Muslims a minority in many constituencies. Parties who take Muslim votes do not give tickets to Muslims in many Muslim dominated constituencies and they are asked to contest elections from a constituency which has low number of Muslims. The community has sizable population and is in position to decide the winner in around 50 constituencies in Kishanganj, Purnea, Araria, Katihar, Madhubani, Sitamarhi, Bhagalpur, Darbhanga, Siwan, Gopalganj, West Champaran and East Champaran. Division of Muslim votes is also one of the reasons when they have many choices and fail to judge who is the strongest.
Political empowerment is key to all empowerments. Muslims of Bihar are socially, economically & educationally backward as they do not have proper and effective political representation. When seats are not reserved for a deprived section, it is the duty of an inclusive and representative government to ensure proper participation in politics and governance by evolving some other methods. These methods are basically part of a broader social justice spectrum. If the principles of social justice are implemented in true sense in Bihar, not only Muslims but also SCs, STs and OBCs can get proper share in politics and governance. It is right moment for parties and their leaders to bring about a paradigm shift in their narrow political thinking by adopting more inclusive and liberal mindset for development of Muslims in Bihar.
Abdur Rahman is a 1997 batch Maharashtra cadre IPS officer who resigned protesting against the controversial Citizenship (Amendment) Act. He is also author of Sachar Ki Sifarishein (Hindi), 2012 and Denial and Deprivation: Indian Muslims After Sachar Committee and Rangnath Mishra Commission Reports, Manohar Publication, Delhi (2019) Twitter @AbdurRahman_IPS
Sources of data:
- Iqbal A. Ansari, Political Representation of Muslims in India (1952-2004), 2006, Manak Publications, New Delhi.
- http://twocircles.net/2010jun26/present_bihar_assembly_has_lowest_muslim_representation_60_years.html
- http://www.ndtv.com?india-news/why-muslims-voted-for-nitish-kumar-440295
- https://twocircles.net/2015nov08/1446998780.html
- Bihar Assembly Election Results in 2005 – Elections in India (elections.in)
- Bihar Assembly Election Results in 2010 – Elections in India (elections.in)
- Bihar Assembly Election Results in 2015 – Elections in India (www.elections.in)
Reactionary politics in India, and the Indian State itself, seek to promote Hindi and thwart development of other languages and nationalities, not only those of South India, but notably also those in north India. The term “Hindi States” is an artificial construct meant for the same purpose. Whole languages were undermined and shown as “dialects”.
The policy on languages and states is driven by political interests of the ruling classes and their parties rather than any objective, democratic and scientific criteria.
Modi’s BJP government in a hurry made a special law in the latest monsoon session of the parliament and declared Kashmiri, Dogri and Hindi as official languages in Jammu and Kashmir, in addition to Urdu and English. It readily got Presidential Assent on Sep 26.
It is a part of its continued efforts to dismantle and disintegrate the political status J&K had. Kashmiri is spoken by around 7 million, mostly Pandits. Dogri is spoken by 2.6 million people as per 2011 Census. They are spoken in POK also, it is to be noted, which will be brought under India’s physical control as Home Minister Amit Shah had asserted last year in parliament.
They were accorded a Status by being listed in the 8th Schedule of the Constitution : Kashmiri in the beginning itself, as Constitution was drafted soon after the First Kashmir war in 1947.
And Dogri in 2003, by 92nd Amendment, along with Bodo, Santhali, Maithili, by Vajpayee regime of BJP-NDA.
Earlier, by 71st Amendment, Manipuri, Nepali, Konkan were added in 1992, by PV regime of Congress.
In all, 7 languages were added, to 15 in the Schedule 8. All these additions are languages spoken by smaller populations, and the decisions were driven by some narrow political motives of the rulers, rather than meeting their aspirations.
Bihar is going to polls soon. But no party, ruling or opposition, raised the Bhojpuri issue. They are more interested to divide the voters on communal and caste lines, than responding to linguistic-political aspirations, for instance of Bhojpuris.
Bhojpuri, among others, is not accorded a due official status, despite a long pending and justified demand. It is estimated to be spoken by about 15 crore people, 8 in Bihar and 7 in UP, apart from Jharkhand.
The United Nations has published the universal declaration of human rights in Bhojpuri and Sarnámi, one of 154 languages of the world.
About 51 million people got themselves enumerated as Bhojpuri-speaking ( recorded as a sub-group of Hindi for technical reasons ) in 2011 census. Unless consciously insisted, they are counted as Hindi-speaking. Bhojpuri has its own media, newspapers and hundreds of films made in it. If it were same as Hindi, how is this possible?
It is spoken in contiguous areas of western Bihar, adjoining Eastern UP ( poorvanchal demand is there ), and North west Jharkhand. Thus it can claim a due official status. Despite all this, it is treated as a second rate language.
It is one such language separately taught in Bihar’s schools, and universities. It is a second language in Jharkhand schools. It is not a dialect of Hindi, has many of its own dialects in Bihar and including four in eastern UP.
This map shows the rich linguistic diversity of Bihar that is denied to show it as a Hindi State. It marks areas of Bhojpuri, Mythili, Magahi etc, with their dialects too.
One Ravikant Dubey had petitioned that Bhojpuri be one of the official languages of India (Times of India, 2012 Jan 23). Due to the persistent demand from Bhojpuri language activists to recognise it as an official language, P Chidambaram, then Union Home Minister, announced 17h May 2012 to Lok Sabha speaker a few lines in Bhojpuri : “hum rauwa sabke bhavna samjhatani (I understand your feelings)”, proposing to include Bhojpuri in 8th Schedule of the Constitution and accorded the official status. It remains unfulfilled.
The concept of linguistic states was initiated in Andhra of 1956, but the principle was not accepted nor implemented, particularly in North India. It was always narrow political interests that dictated the policy.
Seven languages were added to 8th schedule in the last 20 years. But for instance, not Bhojpuri, spoken by about 15 crore people. Why? This is to see that the hegemony of Hindi is maintained, and not undermined, in the name of “Hindi states”, a misnomer often.
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Languages Are Treated As Dialects , And Vice Versa
“In fact, when East India company arrived, there was no Hindi language as we know it now. Bihar was called as Northern Frontier Province, and people there spoke at least four different languages before Hindi arrived there. Some of them had their own scripts, had official status too.”
The above, and similar lines about UP, are from an article written (around 2011) in the context of a movement for separate Telangana, before its formation in 2014. One of the dialects spoken in Telangana, of Telugu, was presented as a distinct language it was not.
When there are so many Hindi states, why not two or three Telugu states? That was the argument of certain ruling class groups of Telangana, based on a false interpretation of a dialect of Telugu as a distinct and separate language.
Intellectuals from Telangana including linguists were mostly overtaken by separate state chauvinism; they deserted scientific principles of linguistics; some who knew the folly kept silent, or rather silenced by rabid chauvinism. That was the context in which the article was written.
Some of them had then named the dialect as Amma Bhasha, replacing the word matru Bhasha, mother tongue. They said it should be the medium of instruction in schools, not “Andhra language” of the latter region. After formation of Telangana, however, the government ditched the Amma (mother), and went “patriarchal”: They promoted English as the medium of instruction in schools. The chauvinists who had harped on Amma Bhasha, now again kept silent or acted as accomplices of the rulers. After some protests, it was assured, mercifully, that Telugu will be given its due place. Similar is the case with Andhra Pradesh.
While in Telangana, a false interpretation was made of a dialect of Telugu as a distinct and separate language, it was a case of reverse in north India: The reality there was several older languages were misrepresented and shown as dialects of Hindi, a newly evolved language, by the ruling classes. We mentioned Bhojpuri above.
Thus development of those ( non-Hindi) languages in the North, and evolution of associated distinct nationalities, was sought to be thwarted by the State.
In UP, the Centre of Hindi chauvinism, displayed by Tripathis, Tiwaris to Lohias, English medium in schools was initiated by the regime of Mulayam, a rabid Hindi advocate. That policy was greatly expanded by the BJP government in 2018 by converting 5000 Govt primary schools to English medium. “ The move will give fresh impetus to education in UP ” Anupama Jaiswal, Education Minister said.
Now the BJP’s Modi govt prescribes, in its NEP, mother tongue as the medium of instruction. It is sheer duplicity.
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Hindi Bias in the Constitution
Indian Constitution dealt with the language question in Articles 343 to 351. It is constantly misrepresented by several authorities, experts and media. You ask any one what is the the National Language of India, the most likely answer would be HINDI, as if Hindi is the National Language, which it is not.
That was what was attempted when Home Minister Amit Shah in September 2019 said : “ It is absolutely essential that the entire country has one language that becomes the identity of the nation in the world.” Only Hindi could unite the country. And it is a national responsibility that Hindi expands and prospers, he said on Hindi Diwas. (The Indian Express, Sep 15, 2019.)
He however later clarified, when met with vociferous protests from non-Hindi states, that he was not for imposing Hindi, but reiterated the need for promotion of Hindi. It is part of the “One Nation” politics promoted in an India that is multi-national, multi-ethnic, multi-lingual. To be fair to BJP, it was not alone in this nefarious game. Congress was at it, but was resisted by non- Hindi states, and dearly paid for it in Tamilnadu. Hindi zealots of North India are one in it. Ram Manohar Lohia, Mulayam Singh etc are examples.
This bias for Hindi and bias for “One Nation” politics is built into the Indian Constitution. It was stiff opposition that thwarted Hindi imposition even at the time it was being drafted. Still, informally, the idea is inbuilt in the false notion of Hindi as the national language.
Article 343 actually says “the official language of the Union shall be Hindi in Devanagari script.” That is how the idea of Hindi as the national language of the whole country is deceptively worded. This distinction was part of the debate in the Constituent Assembly itself, some wanted it as THE national language of the whole country. It was strongly resisted and so the above formulation , official and of the Union, was retained.
Amidst lot of opposition to imposition of Hindi, clause 343(2) says “English shall continue to be used for all the official purposes of the Union” for a period of 15 years from 1950. However, due to recurrent strong protests from non-Hindi states, it was assured that English shall continue (indefinitely).
Article 344 however hints at “progressive use of Hindi”…It does not stop there. It speaks of “ restrictions on use of English.”
Article 345, mischievously titled as Regional Languages, (as if Hindi is not a regional languages), however says states can adopt “any one or more of the languages in use”, or Hindi, as the official language in that state. English of course shall continue to be used.
Article 351 betrays the Hindi bias and provides for a “ Directive for development of the Hindi language” as a duty of the Union.
What were passed off, wrongly and for long , as Hindi states and Hindi dialects needed to be given a new and separate status. They were not Hindi dialects at all.
Thus in 8th Schedule of the Constitution 22 languages are listed, including those that were originally listed. More were added, to meet and neutralize the rising aspirations by 71st Amendment, Dogri, Manipuri, Nepali, Konkan in 1992; by 92nd in 2003-04,Bodos, Santhali, Maithili.
As per the Union Home Ministry, demands for inclusion are there, kept pending, from 38 more languages, including those spoken and claimed as mother tongue by crores of people like Bhojpuri , Magahi, and Chattisgarhi. But the Modi govt pushes only the latest Bill for Kashmir.
It is to be noted that Sindhi, the official language of Sindh province of Pakistan, but of no state in India, was added by 21st Amendment in 1967; two years after 1965 war with Pakistan. Why Sindh is added, and others are not included is a question by itself.
DV Rao (1917-1984, communist revolutionary and former MP) had raised this issue, while rejecting the One Nation and Two Nations theories, explained about a multi-national India in his 1971 Statement before the Court. He took into account the democratic aspirations in the north and asserted, “The linguistic areas of Hindi are not homogeneous. People of different dialects, having their own literature and culture, have characteristics enough to develop into separate nations, Rajasthan has already developed in that direction. It is possible that some more also develop likewise.”
In fact, Hindi literature is hardly 200-250 years old. Whereas written literature of other languages, wrongly listed as Hindi dialects, began centuries before that ( say 1300 AD onwards ), not to speak of oral literatures.
At the same time he rejected anti-Hindi chauvinism and the contention of a “Hindi imperialism,” as “unreal and unscientific”, having ‘no economic foundation.”
“The language policy of the ruling classes is a part of their reactionary and anti-people policies. They are following the footsteps of the imperialists in this respect also.” The victims include those of north India and Hindi-speaking people.
(People’s Democratic Revolution In India, 1971, p.211-212)
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They Can Not All Be Lumped As “Hindi States”, Which Is A Misnomer!
There was a day when entire South Indians were lumped together as Madrasis. It was laughed at as ignorance of the north Indians. The fact is, north or south, ignorance, opportunism and chauvinism go together in these matters.
For an average South Indian, or even a journalist or a politician or a quiz master , UP, MP, Bihar, Himachal, Delhi, Haryana, Rajasthan once constituted “Hindi states”. Three more were added in 2000 AD: Uttaranchal ( renamed uttarakhand), Jharkhand, Chattisgarh. The population of all these states adds up to some 46 crore as per 2001 census.
In 2011 census, 43.63% of population are listed as Hindi speaking. They include those speaking distinct languages like Bhojpuri, including those who asserted Bhojpuri, not Hindi, is their mother tongue. The enumerator, who represents the state, records them as Hindi speaking.
Bhojpuri, Haryanvi, Braj, Awadhi, Bhojpuri, Bundeli, Bagheli, Kannauji etc all are lumped together as Hindi languages. So also Chattisgarhi and Jharkhandi, and Pahadi, Kumaoni, though three states were formed. Some misrepresent even Rajasthani as Hindi.
This and such other questions were discussed in the article , mentioned in the beginning, written (around 2011) in the context of a movement for separate Telangana. Information about North Indian languages is taken from Wikipedia etc. Extracts from that are given below. (Data is old, 2011 Census data was not yet available.).
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Beneath The The Camouflage Of Hindi States
Is it a fact that those shown as Hindi-speaking are really so? A little study brings out the following highlights.
There are 1652 mother tongues listed in India officially, and 22 languages in 8th schedule of the Constitution. And some more are to be added to that list.
The newly carved out states of Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh have their own distinct languages, literatures, some have separate official status and scripts of their own.
Maithili ( spoken by 4 crore people ) and Santhali which we had lumped up as part of Hindi states were officially given separate language status ( 8th schedule) in 2003. Some more are in the queue, like Bhojpuri (15 crores). But they are shown as Hindi-speaking.
In earlier times , UP was actually called United ProvinceS, and MP as Central ProvinceS. Mark the plural. They were not compact entities, nor Hindi-speaking states.
In fact, when East India company arrived, there was no Hindi language as we know it now. Bihar was called as Northern Frontier province, and people there spoke at least four different languages before Hindi arrived there. Some of them had their own scripts, had official status too.
Haryana has a population of 2.1 crore( 2001), nearly 70 percent of whom speak Haryanvi, which has a separate identity as a second language, with 55 percent Haryanvi literacy, as different from 68 percent claimed for Hindi.
Rajasthan was called as United States of Rajasthan in 1948 period. Now it has a population of 5.64 crore including about 1.6 crore people who speak Marwari, now in the queue to be listed in the 8th schedule. It has its own script. Mewari is another language spoken by 52 lakh people. Bagri is spoken by 20 lakh people.
Then there are Mewati, Shekhawati, Hadoti, Dundhari and several other tongues. All these have distinct geographical areas. Braj is spoken in east Rajasthan. If you can call Gondi, Savara, and koya languages as Telugu, we can call these as Hindi. Obviously we can not. Rajasthani is the lingua franca that is evolving, but with distinct claims by Marwari and the like.
Himachal Pradesh has its own pahadi group of languages. Kinnauri is a distinct language with its own territory.
The case of south Indian languages is different from Hindi. They evolved as distinct languages, with different scripts, separate preserved written literatures which are at least 1000 years old. Tamil claims and has greater ancestry. What happened in 1953-56 was not separation, but actually integration and reorganization of states on linguistic basis. Therefore their reorganization on linguistic basis could not be stopped. Andhra Rashtra ( it has a distinct connotation) was a pioneer in this regard., and soon emerged as AP though people could not, and were not allowed to, unite as one nationality.
It is ironic that separatists who claim a separate status for Telangana dialect (it is definitely not a distinct language, not even one dialect, but a group of dialects), lump scores of distinct languages as one HINDI with several states and base their argument on that. It is a tragedy that scores of Telangana’s reputed social scientists, writers, linguists and (so-called ?) revolutionaries–not to speak of degenerate politicians– are party to this unscientific outlook, to this opportunism and perfidy.
Evolution of nationalities and nations
It was part of world-wide process of formation of distinct nations and evolution of emerging nationalities. This process was completed in west Europe before 1900 AD, and began in East Europe after 1900. While most of them evolved into distinct nation states like Germany, France, England, Spain, Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland , some developed into multi-national states like USSR, Yugoslavia, and India. Soviet Union and Yugoslavia later broke into nation states by and large. India evolved into a Union of States and still undergoing a churning process.
Now let us see what is the reality of the claim of one Hindi and several states.
Bhojpuri, mother tongue of 15 crore people
This map shows Bhojpuri area that is contiguous
As of now, it is not yet listed in 8th schedule, but people have their own way: they have distinct literature, different world-wide academies.
Wikipedia says it is chiefly spoken in the Purvanchal region of Uttar Pradesh, in the western part of Bihar state, and in the northwestern part of Jharkhand in India. Bhojpuri is one of the national / official languages of Nepal, Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Fiji and Suriname.
Bhojpuri speaking region is bounded by the Awadhi-speaking region to the west, Madhesh to the north, Magahi– and Maithili-speaking regions to the east, and Magahi– and Bagheli-speaking regions to the south. Bhojpuri was historically written in Kaithi scripts,[4] but since 1894, Devanagari has served as the primary script.
Bhojpuri has its own kaithi script, used since at least 16th century until early 20th century; it was written in both kaithi and Nasta’liq ( Persian script) for sometime, and kaithi had replaced Persian script in courts and offices 1880s onwards. During those times it was known as the language of Northern Frontier Province language.
British India standardized the script, used it in offices and courts . It was the medium of written instruction in primary schools. It continued to be used as such in some distrticts into 1960s. Devnagari was introduced as late as in 1894.
Babu Ram Smaranlal wrote his stories ( 1898) in Kaithi. Padmasri Sarda Sinha is the koel of Bhojpuri folk songs, Bhikari Thakur is known as the Shakespeare of Bhojpuri theatre. Rahul Samkrtyayan wrote some of his writings in Bhojpuri. Swami Sahajananda Saraswati was a great peasant leader-orator in Bhojpuri. They have their own – not Hindi – media : newspapers (five), magazines (the Sunday Indian has a Bhojpuri version etc. ), TV channels ( Mahua, Hamar etc.), websites and wikipedia in Bhojpuri and scores of Bhojpuri cinemas too. Modern Hindi evolved with Bhojpuri as one of its bases.
And it is deemed as a dialect of Hindi, ie., like callig a mother as the daughter!
Magadhi (Magahi, some say) is another Bihari language spoken by about 2 crore people. Bhojpuri, Magadhi, and Maithili are three major languages of Bihar, after separation of Jharkhand, and they are spoken in distinct geographical zones, with some overlap in course of modern development.
Maithili, listed in the 8th schedule, but not Bhojpuri
Linked to ancient Mithila where Sita that is Maithili was supposedly born. It is spoken ( in Bihar etc ) by some 4.5 crore people, though officially only 1.22 crore people ( not a small number) were listed in the census (2001). It is the enumerating staff who enter the data and illiterates do not and can not insist otherwise, it should be noted. It has two major variants, the north Bihari and the Angika in east Bihar and adjoining Jharkhand areas. And it is listed in the 8th schedule as a distinct language, by popular demand in 2003.
It has distinct script(s) : Mithilakshar, relegated by Hindi promoted by the govts., is sought to be preserved. Tirhuta and Kaithi are its other scripts. ( There are some languages with more than one script, like Konkani written in kannada, Marathi and Devnagari.) With a modern grammar prepared by George Abraham Grierson, it is used in official correspondence too .
Sahitya Academy gives prizes for Maithili works separately from Hindi. It has rich and old literary tradition dating back to Varna Ratnakaram (1224 AD) by Jyothiswar Thakur . Vidyapati was its most popular poet ( known as soul of Mithila ) and even today no celebration goes without his songs. There is a Vidyapati samaroh every year.( His Bengali works are also famous. There were kingdoms including today’s Bihar and W.Bengal.
Bihar was separated from Bengal in 1911-12 period, amidst demands for linguistic provinces. Lord Hardinge wrote to the Secretary of State of India : “We are satisfied that it is in the highest degree desirable to give the Hindi-speaking people now included within the province of Bengal, a separate administration.”
He got a positive reply dated 1911 November 1 and thus Bihar was perhaps the first linguistic province formed, though the British had their own strategies. ( Cited by KV Narayana Rao, p.30-31 in The Emergence of AP, 1973).
In fact, it is said, it was Vidyapati ( 1350-1450 period ) who got it an official status, replacing Sanskrit, by Raja of Darbhanga( there is a constituency by that name in Bihar today).
Besides the above two, in UP Avadhi is spoken by 2 crore people, Kanauji by one crore people. Geographically, far east UP has Bhojpuri, and west of it is Awadhi, then kanauj in central UP, and far western UP has Braj Bhasha .
Braj and Awadhi were the original literary languages of this part of North India, which were precursors for modern Hindi, like Bhojpuri and Mathili mentioned earlier. Hindi in fact developed as a lingua franca with official patronage, including Urdu dialects also.
Bhakti poetry of Tulsidas , Surdas, Gurudas, Amir Khusro’s sufi poetry were all written in these languages , not Hindi as we know it now. There is Brajbhoomi demand ( we know it as the land of Kamsa , krishna’s uncle ) covering far west UP, east Rajasthan ( Bharatpur and Dhaulpur ), and south Haryana ( Faridabad, Gurgaon), Delhi- Mathura road , all a contiguous region. Mayawati’s BSP supports it as also Bundelkhand . Southern UP ( Jhansi to Banda zone) , and adjoining districts of MP speak Bundeli , with Bundelkhand as a demand And we lump them all as Hindi !
Uttarakhand , not a Hindi state, has its own languages
We often hear arguments if three Hindi states could be divided into six, why not break up AP too. Take Uttarakhand separated from UP. Out of its 85 lakh population (2001), 40 lakh speak Garhwali , mostly in west of the state, and 24 lakh (1998 data) spoke Kumaoni, in eastern parts of the state. The rest speak several allied languages linguists classify under pahadi group of languages. In fact, they are distinct languages. For instance, Kumaoni has its own script, and it is officially taken as a second language with 58 percent literacy rate. They are not Hindi dialects
Chattisgarhi is an official language and has 8 dialects of its own !
Chattisgarh carved out of MP in 2000 AD has its own official language, different from MP. Chhattisgarhi Language is a rich Indo -Aryan language and is spoken in almost all the parts of Chattisgarh.
Out of its more than 2 crore population, Chattisgarhi is spoken by 1.15 crore people, as per dated statistics. It is regarded as an official language along with Hindi. Linguists treat it as a distinct language, and not as a dialect, and it has 8 dialects of its own ! The rest speak several tribal and other languages ( some are a part of Dravidian family, nearer to Telugu, some borrow from Munda ), adding up to 90 dialects. The state has a rich tradition of folk songs and folk theatre. Habib Tanvir ( Charandas Chor) restored its pride of place.
Jharkhand , a land of tribal languages and adivasi struggles
Jharkhand literally means the land of jungles and bushes and was carved out of Bihar in 2000AD as a predominantly tribal state ( 28 percent STs ,and 12 percent SCs ) with 32 ST groups. It has a history of tribal rulers since 1200 AD, Santhali and Munda tribal rajas being noted among them. It was known as Jharkhand since 1765 when British East India company came to control it. 70 percent of its 2.7 crore population speak Jharkhandi group of tribal languages, Santhali, Mundari, Ho, and some speak the Dravidian tribal languages which include Oraon (Kurukh), and Korwa. They have distinct geographical spread.
Santhali has a modern Olchiki script, now in use. Likewise Warang chiti Script is used by Ho. Tolongsiki Script is developed for Kurux (Oraon)language though not much in use. 10 percent speak Bengali, in areas adjoining Bengal.
Adivasi struggles
The period of revolts of the Adivasis ( Santhals Oraons Mundas Hos) to protect their Jharkhand land took place from 1771 to 1900 CE. The Santhal insurrection broke out in 1855 under the leadership of two brothers Sidhu and Kanhu. Then Birsa Munda revolt, broke out in 1895 and lasted till 1900. It was the longest and the greatest tribal revolt in Jharkhand. It was also the last tribal revolt in Jharkhand. All of these uprisings were quelled by the British through massive deployment of troops across the region.
How can this land of tribal languages (70 percent population speak them, 10 percent speak Bengali) , and adivasi strugles be called a Hindi state?
“Hindi written Devnagari script” the Constitution specifies
Kaithi script was used for administrative purposes in the Mughal era for writing Bhojpuri, Awadhi, Maithili, Urdu, Magahi and Hindi from at least the 16th century up to the first decade of the 20th century.
By 1894, official texts in Bihar were written in Kaithi and Devanagari.
It was so popular that Government gazetteers report that Kaithi was used in a few districts of Bihar through the 1960s. Bhojpuris who were indentured labour in Africa and the Caribbeans mostly used Kaithi.
“Hindi written Devnagari script” the Constitution specifies, not only to deny that status to Urdu script that was used by crores of people, including “Hindu” writers like Kishan chander , but to deny it to crores of Hindus.
The reactionary, undemocratic, and discriminatory language policies that were pursued by British imperialists were inherited by the Congress regime after 1947 August. The British sought to impose English as the official language.
In a country where after seven decades of independence, real functional literacy, the ability to read and write in mother tongue, is hardly 25%, the first and foremost task is to rectify that situation.
Instead of that, the Congress regimes continued a so-called three language policy, which in effect added Hindi to English as a burden. While the South India (except Tamilnadu) tried it, others in the North did not implement it. Those who migrate and need it for their livelihood would learn any language(s). Congress mouthed the slogan of unity in diversity but neglected the development of the non-Hindi languages including those in the so-called Hindi states.
The BJP claimed it is a party with a difference, but its Modi-led government is basically going along the same path more deceptively. The double yoke of English and Hindi is continued by it.
The need for one or more link languages for certain purposes should not be mixed up with the basic needs of people. Imposition of any language on the masses of people is undemocratic, and should be rejected.
India claims to be the largest democracy, a big power with nuclear and satellite technologies, and seeks a permanent seat in Security Council. If it can not treat all its nationalities and their languages as equal, what worth is it? The USSR had 15 Republics and around 30 crore population when it collapsed. All languages of the Republics were dejure official. For an India with 130 crore people, it should not be difficult to accord a similar status to all the Scheduled languages, after revising the same.
The struggle for real and complete democracy, in multi-national India, should reject the reactionary One Nation Policy, and the discriminatory and arbitrary language policy, pursued by the ruling classes and their parties. All major languages of all nationalities must be treated as national, official and equal.
(Author was a mediaperson)
September 28. Central Criminal Court, London.: Throughout the sham process formally known as the Julian Assange extradition trial, prosecutors representing the United States have been adamant: the carceral conditions awaiting him in freedom’s land will be pleasant, accommodating and appropriate. Confronting 17 charges under the US Espionage Act and one under the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, Assange and his defence team have been resolutely sceptical.
Today, the prosecution reiterated its position on the US federal prison system as one of rosy comfort and decent facilities. As has happened at several points in the extradition trial, the views of Gordon Kromberg, assistant US attorney for the Eastern District of Virginia, were given another airing. Stale as ever, Kromberg told the court that, “Inmates in administrative segregation are able to speak to one another through the doors and windows of their cells.” How civil. “Typically,” he also noted, “there are several inmates in administrative segregation.” He does not tire of this canard, and makes the point one more time with robotic certitude. “Even in administrative segregation, Assange would be able to communicate with other inmates through the doors and windows of his cell.”
Ellis on solitary confinement
The defence witness Yancey Ellis, as with others more acquainted with the bestial prison conditions of the imperium, suggested something quite different. Ellis is a former judge advocate in the US Marines. First would come the experience of being held in the Alexandria Detention Center (ADC), where Assange will be given his pre-trial blooding on US soil. Most likely, he will find himself, Ellis claimed, in X block, kept in a narrow cell each day for 22 to 23 hours, containing “a sleeping area, a small sink and a toilet”, guarded by thick doors. Meals would be taken in the cell. The precious one or two hours granted to the inmate would often only be granted at “very odd hours.” The time would be spent in the “common area of the ADSEG unit, which is maybe about twice the square footage.” Only one inmate in the unit would be permitted out of the cell at any one time. “There is limited interaction with other ADSEG inmates because their doors and food-tray slots are closed.”
Such an individual is purposely segregated from others, alienated and prevented from accessing therapeutic or other programs available at the facility. “There is no outside recreational or exercise area at the Alexandria jail and I do not recall there being any windows in the ADSEG unit,” Ellis notes in his written submissions.
As with other defence testimonies, Kromberg’s came in for special attention. There were “several assertions made by Mr Kromberg” that were “incorrect or incomplete”. When asked by Edward Fitzgerald QC for the defence whether Assange would be given the means to “associate with other prisoners”, Ellis was far from convinced. “The short answer is: not really.” Administrative segregation implied just that. Kromberg’s assertion in his affidavit that there was no solitary confinement at ADC was dispatched. “1X ADSEG unit is essentially the same as solitary confinement.”
Ellis had himself experimented with conversing through such barriers, and was discouraged by the effort. In his court statement, he suggests that it might be “technically true” to suggest that words might be exchanged. But in practice, it was “impossible. In 1X ADSEG the cell doors are made of thick steel and the ‘windows’ are transparent, thick plexiglass material with no slots or holes.” It would be, Ellis explained, “almost impossible to speak through the door if the food tray slot is not open. It would not be possible for anyone to say that if he is familiar with the X Bloc.”
Communicating with his clients through such doors proved “very difficult, even when standing several inches away. I find it implausible that inmates could really communicate in this way, unless they constantly screamed at loud volumes. I would routinely have to ask for a deputy sheriff to open the cell’s food tray slot in order to be able to speak with a client.”
In addition to the physical features of the facility will be Special Administrative Measures (SAMs), further limiting Assange’s communication and hindering his means of mounting an adequate legal defence. While Ellis conceded to having had no experience of them, he understood them to entail further impositions on visits and communication with friends and family.
On matters of mental health, Ellis was distinctly discouraging. Provision at the facility was rudimentary. “The extent of mental health care is that a social worker or counselor comes around to check on you every once in a while to ensure basic functioning.” There were no permanent doctors in residence at ADC. Part-time psychiatrists were employed instead, meaning irregular visits and consultations. Those at risk of self-harm found themselves in suits designed to prevent suicide, immobilizing “the arms away from the body, removing shoe strings and sheets, etc.”
In cross-examination, James Lewis QC for the prosecution attempted to shore up the shoddy assertions in Kromberg’s affidavit. Ellis, he suggested, was doing a bit of crystal ball gazing: how could he really know if Assange would be held in X Bloc? Ellis had, after all, not interviewed the warden, a psychologist or prison staff about the conditions. This was a desperate ploy; Ellis had been asked to testify on the conditions he had seen, not the totality of a policy that remained opaque. “I have requested those records [determining how inmates will be housed] before and can never get them.” Triumphantly, Lewis suggested that “Kromberg’s statement of how [Assange] would be assessed for housing at the ADC” was not something that could be disputed. As to whether Assange would actually find himself in administrative detention, Ellis was cautious but convinced. “I can’t predict the future, but I would bet he would be put in administrative detention.”
The prosecutor also attempted to lay a trap in discrediting the testimony. Had Ellis been massaged by the defence to use the words “solitary confinement” in his statement to the court? No, came the reply. The time detainees in administrative segregation are permitted outside the cramped confines of their cell was “generally equivalent to solitary confinement.” Mockingly, Lewis scrapped about definitions: an inmate could not be said to be enduring conditions of solitary confinement meeting his lawyers three hours each day. (Not much verisimilitude on the part of the prosecution, given that the application of SAMS would make such meetings a difficult, if not an impossibility.)
Lewis then focused on Assange’s standing in Ellis’ eyes. Did he feel that the publisher’s case had garnered publicity and large public support? “I would agree with the publicity,” came the reply. Public support was another matter he could not speak to. The fact that previous prominent figures such as Paul Manafort and Maria Butina had been housed at the ADC and placed in “administrative segregation” suggested that Assange would not be treated any differently.
This line of questioning stirred Judge Vanessa Baraitser, who went on to probe Ellis on how the US Bureau of Prisons would handle Assange’s case. In the United Kingdom, “Assange has been in custody in this jurisdiction for 18 months,” housed in the general wing. “Other than his being a public figure, any reason you think he’ll be held in administrative detention?” The “primary reason”, suggested Ellis, would be his notoriety, though mental health might be a factor officials would consider. But as the mental health unit was located in the general population, a decision might still be made to place him in “administrative segregation”. “The mere fact you are high-profile dictates conditions?” inquired Baraitser. Generally, came the reply, the ADC preferred segregating “these types of defendants” to “maintain a secure and safe environment” though he could not say why. “I am just speaking from experience.”
Sickler on health care
Veteran prison advocate and founder of the Justice Advocacy Group in Virginia, Joel Sickler, followed for the defence. Much of his testimony seemed reiterative and supplementary to that of Ellis, though it also moved into discussion about the ADX Florence supermax facility, a nightmare Assange may face after softening at the ADC. He suggested that Assange would have “no meaningful reaction” at the ADC, kept in his parking-space sized cell. It was “ridiculous” to assert, as Kromberg had done, that credible communication between inmates in administrative segregation in the facility could take place. “You’re twiddling your thumbs. You’ll have access to reading material, but your whole world is the four corners of that room.” There was also “significant sensory deprivation comparable to isolation in a cell. There is little natural light as well as access to fresh air.”
While Assange’s attorneys would be permitted “to meet with him at any time during professional visiting hours” finding yourself “in the ADSEG unit at the ADC could compromise Mr Assange’s ability to focus on and assist his attorneys in his defence – for reasons related to how debilitating the experience may be for a prisoner.”
There was also a real risk of SAMSs being applied by the Attorney-General in the event of conviction. Challenging them would pose almost insuperable challenges. “It’s a well-known fact here that even the most minor administrative appeals by inmates are denied.” Sickler claimed to have filed over a thousand appeals, “winning a dozen at most.”
Sickler’s testimony also covered the issue of health care at the ADC. “Mr Assange should expect to receive only the most limited medical service at the ADC. Any suggestion to this Court that he will be fully evaluated and assessed for medical or mental health conditions is misleading.”
Holding the flame for the prosecution was Clair Dobbin, who attempted to create a world of textual reality rather than grounded fact. Policies of the US Bureau of Prisons were discussed; staffing and health care provisions were canvassed, including ADX facilities where inmates might be able to labour and improve their conditions. This would present a good case to the authorities to have their SAMs removed. Sickler suggested that what the BOP was claiming was different from practice.
While the prosecution smelled blood in suggesting that Sickler was actually unexperienced on the actual operations of X Bloc and the application of SAMs, Sickler rallied on the issue of how medical care would be supplied in such prison facilities. Dobbin made the assumption that he had no access to prison medical records. Not so, came the correcting reply. Dobbin then moved on to limiting the value of such knowledge gained: it was specific to Sickler’s clients; not of the same order as an academic or research account on medical care in the prison system. As for whether SAMs would be applied or not, this was up to the US Attorney General, who would determine the case on the basis of whether the prisoner had classified information threatening to “national security”.
Dobbin then engaged in what could only be described as a tidying up effort for one of the most notorious facilities in the US. ADX Florence was hardly atrocious, she insisted. Prisoners, she noted from a report, had claimed to form close personal relations with the staff. “If it’s such a great place,” Sickler retorted, “why are so many prisoners trying to get out?” Finding the report “incredulous,” he also suggested that institutionalisation brings with it fears of change. Under re-examination, he noted that a client of his at ADX was “begging to get out.”
On Sickler’s own example of the darker side of the US penal system – an individual who suffered a mental breakdown at the Metropolitan Detention Center in Brooklyn, New York, “severely beaten by correctional officers” and “thrown in the hole naked” – Dobbin was bizarrely disingenuous. Initial calls by Sickler that the individual suffered psychiatric illness might have been callously ignored; and it took a federal court to grant the individual bail and eventually receive a writ for treatment at the Bellevue psychiatric center, but “judicial oversight” had prevailed.
The prosecutor also referred to the case of Cunningham v BOP to illustrate that things, even if they had been dire, must have improved. The case involved ADX inmates, described as “five seriously mentally ill men”, along with six other ADX prisoners (“interested parties”) with “serious mental illnesses” suing the Bureau of Prisons in 2012 for violating BOP policy and the Eighth Amendment.
The class action argued that the authorities had failed to adequately diagnose and treat prisoners at ADX with grave mental illness. This eventually led to an approved settlement covering, amongst other things, a range of improved measures for screening and diagnosis for mental illness and the provision of mental health care and suicide prevention. Dobbin was being selective. As Sickler noted in his statement, “that same Court would find that the health care in ADX failed to meet basic standards of care for inmates.”
Dobbin, continuing her train of dissimulation, submitted another, deeply flawed example. ADX Florence had permitted a convicted terrorist known as the “Underwear Bomber”, Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab, time to see family members during his time at the facility. This belied an inconvenient reality: Abdulmutallab sued the Justice Department in October 2017 claiming that prison officials had held him in “long-term solitary confinement”, restricted his communication with relatives and force-fed him during hunger protests and fasting sessions. Abdulmutallab had also been the subject of SAMs, and incarcerated in the infamous H-Unit of ADX. Not exactly a paragon of US prison treatment, and not one of the prosecution’s better examples.
Dr. Binoy Kampmark was a Commonwealth Scholar at Selwyn College, Cambridge. He lectures at RMIT University, Melbourne. Email: bkampmark@gmail.com
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On 21 September, 2020, – World Peace Day – diverse sectors of the Colombian society held protests throughout the country, resulting in 142 actions including in the cities of Bogotá, Medellín, and Cali. In response to these demonstrations, the Colombian state unabashedly used its repressive power. At least 11 people were injured and 13 others were detained by the Colombian security forces. In Bogota, the National Police’s Mobile Anti-Riot Squad (ESMAD) injured several young people after throwing a stun bomb.
Present-day mobilizations in Colombia have been triggered primarily by police brutality. On September 9, 2020, Javier Ordóñez, a 46-year old aeronautical engineer, lawyer, and father of two, was pinned to ground by two police officers in Bogota and repeatedly tased with a stun gun as he begged “Please, no more, I can’t breathe”. When Ordonez was transferred to the hospital after this unprecedented show of benumbing brutality, he was pronounced dead. Ordonez was barbarically killed by the police because he was found drinking alcohol in the street with others, in violation of social distancing rules designed to curb the spread of the Coronavirus. The response of the police officers to this violation was patently disproportionate. Before the officers attacked him, Ordonez had appealed “to his right to appear before the appropriate authorities if he had committed any illegal act.” With his last words, Ordonez had further implored, “Give me the fine.” Uninterested in any legal niceties, the Colombian police cold-bloodedly murdered Ordonez in the street. When Colombians protested against the murder of Ordonez, they encountered police repression which left 14 people dead and hundreds injured in Bogota.
This latest act of police brutality is not new. During the anti-neoliberal protests of 2019, Colombia had police violence of a similar scale. On 25 November, 2019, Colombia’s riot police killed Dilan Mauricio Cruz Medina, an 18-year-old protester. He was struck in the head by a projectile fired by riot police while participating in popular protests against the increasingly unpopular president, Ivan Duque, and his neoliberal government. The killing of Cruz was preceded by continued state violence where the ESMAD shot people at point-blank range with tear gas canisters, kicked people in the face and released tear gas on peaceful demonstrators. On 21 November, 2019, for instance, police officers had hit people, smashed windows and fired shots in the middle of the street in the Policarpa neighborhood in Bogotá. Police also threatened people living in this neighborhood with weapons in hand, and according to Lobsang Parra, a sociologist at the Universidad Nacional, the police “were showing their weapons and would point them at the windows where they saw people, as if to scare them and keep them from going out in the street.”
The phenomenon of police brutality in Colombia is overtly linked to US imperialism which has heavily militarized the country and initiated a regime of violence geared towards capital accumulation. With the help of this regime of violence, anti-imperialist social movements have been coercively halted and the dominance of the Washington oligarchy has been maintained. The institution of this regime of violence can be traced back to the history of the FARC which rapidly built powerful bases of counter-hegemony and thus, necessitated an American military intervention.
Operation Marquetalia
FARC originated from PCC i.e. the Colombian Communist Party. PCC was accredited in 1930 and was radically different from the two dominant political ideologies followed by Conservatives and Liberals. It advocated the formation of peasant republics and self-defense communities oriented towards the construction of alternative communities. PCC called for the simultaneous building of peasant leagues in the rural regions and popular fronts of political mobilization in the urban areas. This was an early effort to build cross-geographical class solidarities and expand Communist ideology to different regions. The party began supporting rural militancy from the 1920s onward in response to landholder-sanctioned violence and blood-tainted capital accumulation. It organized seizures of land, strikes, protests, and established self-defense groups in the rural regions. PCC’s membership was predominantly rural with more than 48% of the members being identified as peasants at the Tenth Congress of Party held in 1966. Being a militant rural party, PCC involved itself almost immediately in the struggles over Indian communal lands, the rights of tenant farmers, and public land claims. All this was part of the fundamental process of re-constituting the social relations of production and at all times, PCC’s activities expressed explicit class content. It was due to this explicit espousal of the doctrines of class struggle that the PCC-established communist communities were attacked by Liberals and state forces who saw in PCC’s ideology a radical threat to their bourgeoisie order.
FARC emerged out of the rural militancy of PCC on 27 May, 1964, as traditional channels of opposition were abruptly closed by the ruling elites. Between 1948 and 1958, Colombia was the scene of one of the most intense and protracted instances of widespread violence in the twentieth century. In this period, there was a civil war called “The Violence” between Liberal and Conservative parties which took 200,000 lives. In order to bring an end to civil war, the Conservatives and Liberals made a political pact in 1958, known as the National Front which established that the presidency would alternate between the two parties for a period of 16 years and all positions in the three branches of government throughout the country would be distributed evenly between them. Despite this, violence continued until 1966. The National Front barred the PCC from conventional political process in 1955 and thus, established essentially a two party dominance. The National Front helped in the alternation of power between the aligned sections of the Colombian Conservative and Liberal elite while strengthening the Colombian armed forces to suppress popular reforms. After the civil war, capital accumulation consolidated, agri-business interests grew stronger and land concentration increased.
Despite rising violence and growing dominance of capitalism, PCC continued to organize peasant self-defense collectives to fight against the exploitative social relations. PCC solidly organized defense-based peasant collectives which attempted to materially support the construction of communist communities. In these areas where the revolutionary communities were located, PCC applied mechanisms of collective decision making and participatory governance. The basic idea behind the creation of these areas was to guarantee the objective security needed to implement radical measures and construct an alternative to capitalism. As a direct result of their effectiveness, the self-defense communities were seen as a threat to the existing order and Conservative Party Senators termed those areas as ‘independent republics’ adhering to politics from Soviet Union instead of the Colombian constitution. Consequently, a plan of aggression against these zones began to be elaborated in 1957 which would involve direct military action. This plan took place on 27, May 1964 with the actualization of “Operation Marquetalia”. A series of heavily US-supported military operations were carried out by the Colombian state consisting of aerial bombardments and a 20,000 ground troop offensive against the settlements in the Marquetalia region in the southern part of the Departments of Tolima, Huila and Cauca. Colombian Air and Armed Forces also utilized US-supplied napalm during the campaign to destroy the Marquetalia valley. In Operation Marquetalia, a military attack aimed at killing the PCC leader Manuel Marulanda Vélez was also envisaged. While Operation Marquetalia devastated the region, Marulanda survived and the entire community of 4,000 was able to flee due to the organizational preparation of the guerrillas.
Plan Colombia
As is evident from Operation Marquetalia, USA militarily assisted the Colombian state whenever it saw a threat to its imperialist dominance. Since then, its imperialist strategy has evolved considerably and now it uses the pretext of counter-insurgency and drug war to militarize Colombia and suppress popular movements. Plan Colombia, a $10 billion aid program funded by USA and primarily managed by State Department’s International Narcotics Control program, has proved to be a major method through which the new US imperialist strategy has been carried out.
Out of the $10 billion allocated for Plan Colombia, 57.5% was devoted to counter-narcotics operations and the prevention of organized crime, emphasizing the purely military nature of the US aid program. Since Plan Colombia’s initiation, violence in Colombia has increased significantly: out of 7 million people displaced in Colombia, 4 million were displaced beginning from 2000; since the plan’s inception, more than 1000 trade unionists, more 370 journalists and more than 400 human rights defenders have been murdered. Between 2001 and 2009, nearly half a million women were subjected to sexual violence. From 2000 to 2010, more than 5700 civilians were killed by state security forces.
Plan Colombia’s disastrous results are expected because militarization is closely tied to increased aggressions. Heavy weaponry, combat training, and tactical organization that come with militarization translate into increased disruptive capacity. This enlarged combative capacity transforms into the use excessive force against civilians. For instance, levels of violence will increase as law enforcement moves away from traditional weapons like pistols closer to military weapon such as submachine guns and assault rifles. With the establishment of Plan Colombia, the disruptive capacity of various security forces exponentially increased as military assistance poured in from the US: Colombia received $30 million in 1995, $98 million in 1998 and $294 million in 1999. In total, from 1999 to 2002, the United States gave Colombia $2.04 billion in aid, 81% of which was for guns.
As military aid steadily flowed from USA, the police architecture of Colombia became bellicose and militaristic. In 1998, President Andrés Pastrana created the First Battalion Against Drug-Trafficking which later mutated into the Army’s Counternarcotics Brigade, responsible for aerial and manual eradication operations, drug seizures, and the destruction of laboratories. By the time Plan Colombia was adopted in 1999, the number of domestic operations to address drug trafficking reached 977 in 2005. Militarization of policing accelerated in 2011 when the Fourteenth Directive from the Ministry of National Defense involved the military in the fight against organized crime through joint operations with the National Police. Operation Troy, for example, involved 1,000 members of the National Police and 3,000 soldiers in the Caucasia area. Presently, 300,000 members of the armed forces work in citizen security activities throughout the country, of which 60,000 have been deployed under Plan Victoria to occupy the former FARC zones of influence.
Colombia’s National Police Corps (CNP), founded in 1891, also serves as a good example of the effects of Plan Colombia. CNP is a centralized and militarized police force assisting the armed forces in counter-insurgency operations. Initially, the deployment of CNP was geographically restricted to rural areas. Later, it developed into an urban-focused crime-fighting and investigation unit. USA strengthened the militarization of CNP by pouring some $850 million into counter-narcotics assistance and giving the CNP better military and surveillance equipment than the armed forces.
The Need for Anti-imperialist Administrations
As protests go on in Colombia, the necessity of a socialist administration, opposed to USA’s imperialism, is becoming increasingly clear. Through its security aid, the US has military repressed social movements which challenge the dynamics of capitalism and imperialism. In the last few years, the hubristic American empire has intensified its military onslaught against the anti-neoliberal activism of Latin America. Between 2000 and 2016, the U.S. Department of Defense provided Latin American and the Caribbean over US$5.5 billion in security aid. This aid is tied to military equipments—such as Blackhawk and Apache helicopters—provided as assistance for anti-drug efforts. The number of special operations forces training missions to Latin America tripled between 2007 and 2014, and USA works with the security forces of all countries in Latin America except Cuba, Venezuela, and Bolivia where socialist governments are or have been in power. In the contemporary period, we need more anti-imperialist governments in Latin America which can prevent USA from militarily ravaging the continent.
Yanis Iqbal is a student and freelance writer based in Aligarh, India and can be contacted at yanisiqbal@gmail.com. His articles have been published by different magazines and websites such as Monthly Review Online, ZNet, Green Social Thought, Weekly Worker, News and Letters Weekly, Economic and Political Weekly, Arena, Eurasia Review, Coventry University Press, Culture Matters, Global Research, Dissident Voice, Countercurrents, Counterview, Hampton Institute, Ecuador Today, People’s Review, Eleventh Column, Karvaan India, Clarion India, OpEd News, The Iraq File, Portside and the Institute of Latin American Studies.
Originally published in Eurasiareview.com
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